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 i 
Abstract 
This thesis explores Canadian responses towards unexpected arrivals of asylum seekers at 
their borders. Grounded in critical and feminist geopolitics, it aims to unveil hidden and concealed 
policies that are implemented behind a narrative of humanitarianism. In particular, it takes the land 
border crossings from the US to Canada that occurred after the implementation of restrictive 
asylum policies in the US in 2017 and following years. Although migratory movements can be 
attributed to several factors, this displacement was triggered by Trump’s anti-immigrant narratives 
and policies aimed to decrease refugee and immigrant arrivals to their territory. 
The dissertation’s central argument is that Canada’s bordering practices rely on an 
invisible/visible dichotomy to restrict asylum seekers arrivals at territorial limits. This thesis 
explores how Canada’s border restrictions and policy often act through means that invisibilize the 
border, through tactics of (un)provision, neglect, and selectivity. I argue that these factors restrict 
in important ways refugee claimants’ experiences and identities, and human mobility in general. I 
also explore how these dynamics temporarily shift in times of crisis when the Canadian 
government visibilizes the border as a way to maintain the state narrative of protecting its integrity. 
I argue that these particular responses are directed to a specific audience: the electorate and the 
Parliament. 
In service of this central argument, I use and expand the concept of reverberations in two 
manners: to trace back the impacts of harsher US immigration policies in the Canadian refugee 
system and to make Canadian border policing visible in local spaces. Using the concept of 
reverberations proves crucial to understand policy impacts at different scales. Throughout this 
project, I jump scales to demonstrate how the invisible border is particularly found in localized 
spaces, like refugee centers. In particular, I offer insights into how local organizations adapted the 
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ways in which they offered services to refugee claimants, after Canada’s government provided an 
insufficient response towards refugee protection and settlement needs. I also explore how invisible 
Canadian bordering practices play out in more personal and intimate spaces: refugee claimants’ 
identities. I discuss this by analyzing Canadian categorization practices based on colonial 
perceptions of refugees. Particularly, I focus on differences in rights and access to services between 
refugee claimants and resettled refugees. I argue that the border is often concealed through 
practices of selectivity and humanitarian exclusion, which are determined by hierarchies of 
membership that lie at the core of Canada’s refugee system. 
This dissertation contributes to literature on migration, border practices and 
humanitarianism. This research produced empirical and comprehensive examination on how 
different scales intertwine in asylum policy. It particularly pays attention to issues related to 
refugee identity and experience. Its most constructive contribution comes with exploration of the 
“invisible” border policing dynamics and its consequences in the intimate spaces of refugee 
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Where and what exactly is the border? Is it this line in the dirt, stretching for 3,000 kilometres? 
Is the border more accurately described as a zone which includes the towns of El Paso and 
Ciudad Juarez? Or is the border the whole country, the continent? Where does the US end and 
Canada begin? Does the US end at the 49th parallel or does the US only end at your living room 
when you switch on the CBC? After all, as Carlos Fuentes reminds us, a border is more than just 
the division between two countries; it is also the divisions between two cultures and two 
memories- Guillermo Verdecchia, 1993, from his play Fronteras Americanas 
 
After a long bus ride to Fort Erie, a border city between the United States (US) and Canada, 
I was received enthusiastically by one of the service providers whose center offered protection to 
refugee claimants. Her refugee center was hosting three families at the time. I had already met her 
a few months ago when I interviewed the only family living at her centre at the time. The place 
seemed spacious enough but, as she mentioned, it became rapidly crowded as people arrived with 
large families of their own. I was sitting in a small room while I waited for the first family to 
interview, looking out the window where a small group of children were playing outside, speaking 
to each other in Spanish. The first family arrived, sat down and immediately asked me if I was 
their lawyer. They seemed confused after I explained that I was a researcher and the purpose of 
my study. While they still agreed to participate in the study, they felt disappointed that they had 
not met their lawyer yet. They told me that they have been waiting weeks to meet her and to 
continue with their asylum applications. They had come to Ontario from British Columbia where 
they crossed, as they believed having access to a lawyer and other services was much easier here, 
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in Ontario. Unfortunately, a few weeks before they arrived in Fort Erie, the legal aid cuts were 
implemented in the province, making it more difficult to secure representation for their refugee 
cases. As they had not talked to their lawyer, they were unaware of how much money they would 
have to pay for her services after this change.  
The following family who entered the room was the one who I had previously interviewed 
the first time I was at this center. The grandfather of the family –and only adult male– lived in the 
US as undocumented for twelve years, but decided to cross to Canada with his partner, his kids 
and his grandchildren. I decided to make this a follow up interview and they agreed to tell me what 
had improved in the last few months. Unfortunately, their situation had not changed much. He was 
still waiting for his job permit, they still relied on welfare, and they had not found affordable 
housing for his large family. He was doing small jobs, like repairing cars or driving people to 
places. Four months after their arrival, they were still living in this center because the houses that 
they looked were either too expensive or not suitable for their large family.  
These two families, whose journeys and migratory histories are similar, seemed that they 
were abandoned, neglected by institutions; waiting in the dark to get the answers and resources to 
have their basic needs fulfilled. This trip to Fort Erie, particularly, made me ask how refugee 
claimants were facing such difficulties in Canada. They left the US with hopes of protection in 
Canada; however, they still faced important –concealed– barriers in the refugee determination 
process. I constantly questioned how was it possible that such hardship was experienced in 
Canada? Was Canada a safe haven for all? And, how were these “concealed” experiences as 
wounding as other more “theatrical” border policies? 
This type of experience was lived across Ontario after the influx of asylum seekers arriving 
from United States in recent years. People crossed irregularly and by official means to Canada 
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after harsher immigration policies in the US were implemented by the Trump administration in 
2017. Asylum seekers believed they could access protection in Canada, nonetheless they also faced 
lengthy backlogs in the refugee determination system, inefficient management of their cases, 
provincial cuts and an unaffordable housing market in some provinces. These mechanisms had 
relevant impacts not only in asylum seekers experiences, but also in human mobility in North 
America.  
In an era marked by capitalist expansion and globalization, states’ desire to control border-
crossings, human mobility and displacement has caused a “re-bordering” of the world through new 
technologies and discourses (Bigo, 2002; Anderson, 2006). Although prized by its welcoming 
attitudes to immigrants, Canada has not been the exception to this reality. Framed in post 9/11 anti-
terrorism language, Canada has implemented its own security apparatus to stop unwanted arrivals 
in its territory. Given Canada’s geographical position, surrounded by sea borders and the shared 
border with the US, the share of displaced people they receive is significantly low compared to 
other peer countries. Since 1980, Canada has welcomed 1,088,015 refugees; however, the number 
of displaced people (including 26.4 million refugees, 48 internally displaced people, and 4.1 
asylum seekers) ascended to 80 million in 2020 (UNHCR, 2020b).  
Historically, Canada has established immigration policies that control its borders, while 
also maintaining a humanitarian reputation in the international arena. However, their borders are 
not the exception of “immigration crisis” episodes, like the one that occurred in 2017. After former 
President Trump entered office, Canada recorded the highest number of refugee claims on record 
for a single year with 47,425 petitions in 2017 compared to 23,350 in the previous year (IRB, 
2017). After that, Canada provided a strong response to manage the growing numbers of irregular 
and regular arrivals at their borders and implemented a resource-intensive plan to manage the 
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backlogs in the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB). It is relevant to note that the 2020 pandemic 
halted the number of crossings after Canada and US closed their border on March 2020 as COVID-
19 was first spiking. Nonetheless, the backlog of petitions in 2020 was still alarming with more 
than 90,000 claims in March of that year (IRB, 2020a).  
It is clear that Canada has often felt secure in its ability to select migrants and types of 
refugees from abroad. Compared to its southern neighbour, irregular immigration is not a recurrent 
event at their boundaries. Moreover, episodes where Canadians “lost control”1 of their borders 
have been fewer or shorter. Although these episodes are limited, they have had an important impact 
in domestic policy and are key to implementing more border regulations and immigration control. 
This project revolves around three main questions. First, what are the dynamics of Canadian 
responses towards influx of unexpected asylum seekers at their borders? Second, how is the border 
(re) asserted through their responses? And third, how do bordering mechanisms impact intimate 
and personal experiences of refugee claimants?  
The overarching argument of this thesis is that Canada’s bordering practices rely on an 
invisible/visible border dichotomy to restrict asylum seekers arrivals at their territory. I develop 
this argument in the following ways. One the one hand, Canada’s border restrictions and policies 
often act through means that invisibilize their border, concealing the forms of control that the 
government imposes on refugee claimants. Contrary to other nations that rely on theatrical border 
measures, Canada deflects its harsher policies and intertwines them in other elements of refugee 
claimants’ experiences and every-day lives. For example, restricting their rights to get medical 
attention or reducing their opportunities to get adequate housing for their families. Thus, bordering 
 
1 I use the phrase “lost control” as an expression that follows the current immigration and border reality, in which 
states perceive that they have control when they have an “organized” migration system and border crossings, according 
to their standards. In a neo-liberal world, having lost control means mass arrivals of irregular migration and chaotic 
petitions of asylum at the border.  
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policies end up having relevant impacts at local and personal scales. Although Canada maintains 
a humanitarian narrative to frame refugee resettlement policies, the Canadian invisible border is 
reproduced through practices of selectivity, (un)provision and neglect. In particular, I show that 
there is a selective exclusion among types of refugees which impacts their access to settlement 
services. This selective exclusion is practiced through categorizations that are based on colonial 
constructions of refugeeness. Canada’s critical strategy of labelling, which impose disparities 
between refugees, allows the government to protect in more clear ways one type of refugee while 
excluding others deemed as threats and undeserving (i.e., refugee claimants).  
To make this form of border police visible, I shift scales to trace the outcome of Canadian 
bordering dynamics in refugee centers and into refugee claimants’ experiences. I analyze how 
Canadian border policing impacted in relevant ways those organizations aimed to ensure the 
protection of refugee claimants. As a result of (un)provision and lack of real solutions from the 
government, refugee centers had to implement new mechanisms to offer services to everyone 
arriving at their doors. In addition, I study the impact of Canadian policies in refugee claimants’ 
lives and identities by using categorizations. Through categorization practices, Canada is not only 
limiting access to primordial services to refugee claimants, but also the formation and expression 
of their own identity.  
While this is a recurrent dynamic, this changes in times of crisis when the Canadian border 
needs to become visible as a way to maintain the state narrative of protecting the integrity of its 
borders. This study shows how the impacts of US harsher immigration policies reverberate in 
Canadian territory making their border more evident, as Canada often has to react visibly towards 
asylum seekers’ flows as a way to promote an image of security. Therefore, Canada imposes 
stricter and harsher responses to limit irregular border crossings from the US, but most importantly, 
 6 
to demonstrate that everything is under the control of the state. I take Hiemstra’s (2012) concept 
of reverberations as it highlights the transnational dimension of border policing. She uses 
geopolitical research on borders to demonstrate that US detention and deportation practices 
reverberate to immigrants’ places of origin. Her work is informative as it illustrates how 
immigration enforcement has become disengaged from territorial borders.  
Nevertheless, these reverberations expand and become equally intertwined in invisible 
mechanisms of border policing. For example, the rapid increase of asylum petitions’ backlog in 
Canada was a direct consequence of US implementing harsher immigration policies in their 
territory. However, other less visible elements, like administrative inefficiencies, created 
impending restrictions for those already in Canada asking for asylum. Therefore, the backlog, 
heightened by Canada’s institutional neglect and inefficacy, became part of the Canadian border 
policing apparatus. On the other hand the changes made by Canadian politicians to adapt to the 
surge of new arrivals from the US, were not enough to eliminate the constrains for refugee case 
processing. Years of institutional neglect hindered effective solutions for offering protection to 
those arriving at their borders after 2017.  
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the invisible border causes as much damage as a border 
wall or the growing presence of border patrol agents. For example, by not increasing and 
officialising refugee claimants’ support, by neglecting institutions that facilitate resettlement, by 
cutting legal aid, and by dismissing refugee claimants’ experiences, the state is constraining human 
mobility as much as any visible border policing practice. I show that the invisible border in Canada 
can be seen at different scales. At the regional scale, Canada fails to cover a humanitarian need in 
the region looking away from Central Americans refugee crises; at the local scale, Canada neglects 
institutions and fail to improve basic resources refugee claimants need for a positive settlement 
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experience (e.g. shelter and housing). At the level of the body, Canada invisibilizes and re-asserts 
their border, by using selective practices that differentiate between deserving and undeserving 
refugees. The following sections of this introductory chapter will discuss in depth the latest episode 
of border crossings from US to Canada, the methodological approaches used for this study and the 
dissertation outline. 
 
Canada’s place in North America: Asylum seekers’ crossings after 2017  
The latest episode of mass influx of asylum seekers from the US to Canada is of particular 
relevance as it demonstrated that Canada is not ready to receive unexpectedly large amounts of 
asylum seekers at one or multiple entry points. The year Trump entered into office (2017), more 
than 20,000 people crossed irregularly to Canada in search of protection (Government of Canada, 
2020a). The refugee claimants crossing the border are comprised of people who had a visitor visa 
and only transited in the US for a short period with the intention of claiming asylum in Canada as 
well as people who stayed in the US for a number of years with pending or denied asylum claims 
or in risk of being deported due to their policies (UNHCR, 2019a).  
The causes in the surge of arrivals are the result of a few factors; however, empirical 
research has demonstrated that US policy change during Trump’s administration is one of the main 
factors driving an increase in border crossings (see Smith, 2019; UNHCR, 2019a).  President 
Trump’s administration was built upon anti-immigrant rhetoric which was translated into proposed 
policies like eliminating Temporary Protected Status (TPS) programs, giving more power to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents to arrest undocumented migrants, increase 
interior enforcement, and barring the entry of asylum seekers using a public health statue during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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Some of the refugee claimants, who used the US as a transit country, were part of the so-
called “extra continental migrants” who hoped to traverse the American continent to seek asylum 
in United States or Canada. Routes previously used almost exclusively by Central Americans are 
used now by people coming from countries such as Eritrea, Congo, Burkina Faso, India, Pakistan 
and Nepal (Lawal, 2019). Most of them escaped conflict, repression and lack of economic 
opportunities. These extra continental migrants enter the Western Hemisphere through legal 
means, particularly to countries with lax visa requirements, like Ecuador, Brazil and Guyana 
(Yates, 2019). From there, they start their dangerous, arduous, and expensive journey north to 
reach either the US or Canada. Figure 1 shows the potential routes used for asylum seekers who 
transited through Latin America and US to reach Canadian land. However, some of them abandon 
their quest and remain in South America whether by choice or as a result of tough migration 
policies in US; for example, as a result of the “Remain in Mexico” policy which mandates that 
people who start a refugee claim in the US should wait in Mexico until their cases are processed 
(Chishti and Bolter, 2019).  
Figure 1. 









Source. CBC (2017). https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mexico-asylum-seekers-canada-
1.3990408 
 
This demographic change is particularly helpful to situate Canada in the global context at that time. 
Throughout 2018, traditional destinations and transit countries in Europe were implementing more 
restrictive immigration policies which significantly changed patterns and routes taken by asylum 
seekers (UNHCR, 2018a). For example, in 2018, Italy made the decision to no longer allow 
refugees, who were rescued off the coast of Libya through the Libyan Search and Rescue 
operations, to disembark in their territory.  Particularly, in June of that year, Italy closed ports to 
all rescued refugees, leaving Aquarius, a search and rescue vessel, stranded at sea for eight days. 
The vessel had 630 vulnerable men, women and children on board until they were allowed to 
disembark in Valencia, Spain (Medecins sans Frontiers, 2018). In that year, the Libyan Coast 
Guard Search and Rescue operation, a program backed by the European Union, stepped up its 
operations. Most of those intercepted and returned to Libya faced detention in appalling conditions, 
torture, exploitation and abuse. In the aftermath of these events, European governments failed to 
reach a solution to share responsibility for refugees arriving at Europe’s’ shores. This has caused 
shifting migratory routes; for example, a key movement trend in 2018 was that Cyprus had a sharp 
increase in migrant arrivals. More migrants tend to arrive to the Greek- administered Cypriot south 
as a way to reach European Union sovereignty and access protection (Hauswedell, 2021). 
The migratory restrictions in 2018 were not exclusive to the European continent. In North 
America, Trump’s administration was also implementing its “zero-tolerance policy” to prosecute 
anyone crossing the border. This policy ended up affecting hundreds of asylum seekers, 
particularly those coming from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala). 
The policies established by United States are explored in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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Asylum applications in other countries by citizens of the Northern Triangle increased more 
than elevenfold from 2011 to 2017 (Mathema, 2018). This region is considered one of the most 
dangerous regions in Latin America for diverse groups of people. People flee from the region due 
to circumstances like gang-violence, cartels, domestic violence, human trafficking and sexual and 
gender-based violence (KIND, n.d.). Women, children, and LGBTQ people are often more 
recognized by states as a protected category; however, the level of vulnerability and risk varies 
among populations. Historically, the main destination for these people has been United States; 
however, after Trump’s administration policies they looked into other options to seek protection, 
like using Caravans or extending their journeys to Canada. It is key to understand how asylum 
seekers aiming to reach Canada are situated in a larger geopolitical context. 
These changes in migratory routes in North America and Europe during 2018, and 
subsequent years, is relevant because it demonstrates asylum seekers active search for other 
countries where they can access protection when facing harsh immigration policies in traditional 
destination countries. Therefore, asylum seekers were diversifying routes and operations, while 
also starting to consider other places as destination countries. This thesis demonstrates that Canada 
contributes to this phenomenon as it started to be considered as a country of first asylum for people 
who traditionally looked for refuge in the United States. By implementing harsher immigration 
policies, the US was pushing asylum seekers out and away, and redirecting them to the next 
geographically proxime country where they could access asylum. This work shows the nuances 
and implications of these movements.  
In the case of Canada, the influx of arrivals in 2017 consisted of irregular asylum seekers 
and those who started asylum petitions at official ports of entry. While irregular arrivals 
represented the major share of arrivals; petitions at officials ports of entry also increased from 
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people whose cases fell under one of the Safe Third Country exceptions. The demographics of 
asylum seekers also changed overtime. The nationalities of people shifted from Haitian to Nigerian 
in the beginning to people coming from Central and Latin America. At the beginning, the 
geographies of crossing were focused on Manitoba, Quebec and Ontario. The geographies of each 
region determined the types of crossings, while Quebec received the major share of irregular 
arrivals, Ontario welcomed people asking asylum in a regular manner in official ports of entry. 
Figure 2 shows the number of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) interceptions at the US-
Canada border in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia from 2017-2020. The RCMP 
interceptions refers to asylum seekers apprehended between ports of entry, i.e. irregular arrivals. 
Ontario is excluded from this table as its geography does not allow for land border crossing 
between ports of entry. Note that 2020 numbers are low due to the closure of the US-Canada border 
during the pandemic.  
Figure 2.  








2017 2018 2019 2020
Quebec Manitoba British Columbia
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Note: Reproduced with statistics published by the Government of Canada 
The spike of asylum claimants in 2017 impacted considerably the capability of the 
Immigration Refugee Board to resolve petitions on a timely manner. Figure 3 shows the increase 
on the total number of asylum claims in Canada received by the Refugee Protection Division from 
2016 to 2020, including irregular and regular arrivals at any port of entry. One year before the 
pandemic, the petitions filed at the IRB were at its highest with 58,378.  Moreover, the increase of 
irregular arrivals to Quebec and of regular arrivals to Ontario caused important challenges in local 
settlement systems. People who crossed to Canada and made their petition also confronted issues 
like the lack of affordable housing, provincial cuts and a more polarized society and politics in 
asylum policy. 
Figure 3. 
Number of Claims in Canada referred to the Refugee Protection Division from 2016 to 2020 
 
Note: Reproduced with statistics published by the Immigration and Refugee Board (2013-2020) 
 
Canada’s humanitarian responses are often focused on the resettlement of refugees from 
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of the major streams of resettlement in Canada (Reynolds and Hyndman, 2014). The vast majority 
of resettled refugees come from a few regions; for example, in 2017, Canada admitted 26,925 
refugees through both streams (GARs and private sponsorships) from which 17,340 came from 
Middle East and 8,490 from Africa; only 380 came from the Americas (UNHCR, 2018b). Canada’s 
involvement in the ongoing migration crisis in Central America has been sparce and, therefore, 
their encounters with irregular migration have been limited. However, the 2017 surge in arrivals 
to their borders made evident that more people are considering Canada as their first option of 
asylum as the US was no longer considered safe for the purposes of seeking asylum. During the 
Trump administration, the US was perceived as less hospitable for immigrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers, leading to a “border rush”, particularly after the announcement of some of harsher 
immigration policies. 
The status quo in North America has been informed by the role of the US as the country 
that receives the largest share of irregular migration and spontaneous arrivals from Central and 
South America. Canada, comparatively, receives refugees from major displacement crises in the 
world (i.e. Syria and Iraq) but with less involvement and provision of protection in the Northern 
Triangle. During my research, I was expecting to find interviewees that came from countries whose 
nationals were the targets of Trump’s policies (Haitians, Nigerians)2; however, the majority were 
from Latin America. This shows that the US is not necessarily the primary choice of refuge from 
asylum seekers coming from Central and the rest of Latin America.  
Although Canada’s geographical position is closer to Central America than the crises in 
the Middle East, their position in the last years has been to look away from what has been occurring 
in Central America. In recent years, the UNHCR has made appeals to the Canadian government 
 
2 Haitians were in risk of losing their TPS and Nigerians were included in the list of countries whose citizens 
would be restricted from entering the United States.  
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for further support of Central American refugees. Canadian financial and technical help is needed 
in the region to train refugee adjudicators, provide psycho-legal assistance to vulnerable 
populations (LGBTQ and unaccompanied minors), and keep shelters safe and open for children 
and adolescents (Beuze, 2017). Moreover, in 2017, the UNHCR asked Canada for $37 million but 
only 20% of that amount was provided at the end of that year (Heilman, 2018). To make matters 
worse, the Safe Third Country Agreement makes it almost impossible for Central Americans to 
claim asylum in Canada as the majority of them have no way to get to Canada without first entering 
the United States.  
 
Methodology and site selection 
The methodological approach of this project is informed by a feminist scholarship. This 
study was designed to critically understand the impact of policies at different scales and they are 
organized as such in the chapters of this thesis. At the national and regional scale, I explore 
Canadian responses towards refugees and how US policy reverberated in the Canadian refugee 
and settlement system. At this level, I aim to show how Canada increases the visibility of their 
border to ensure the discursive narrative of protecting their land against outside threats. At a local 
scale, I study the effects of Canadian responses in refugee centers and its capabilities to offer 
adequate services; and considering the scale of the body, I assess the embodiment of categorization 
practices and policies of selective exclusion in refugee claimants. Thus, I show the Canadian tactic 
of invisibilizing their border as a form of policing and restriction.  
The research design of this project started in 2018 when I began to explore methodologies 
that could unravel the complexity of the migratory dynamics in North America. While previously 
having studied the US-Mexico border through interviews in both sides of the wall, I realized that 
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I had to use methods that allowed me to go deeper, as the governance of asylum in the US-Canada 
border was not as evident as in the case of the US southern border. For example, there were no 
evident walls or many border agents patrolling the border. During the Summer of 2018, Canadian 
media began to massively portray the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers coming to their 
borders after changes in US policy; however, in contrast with the US southern border, they were 
portrayed as crossing in an organized manner and welcomed by Canadian officials. Although 
media was framing these crossings as a migratory crisis, the Canadian government was still shown 
as altruistic yet with problems to manage these inflows.  
After critical review of media and news, I decided to interview both people who were 
implementing and following policies, but also those who were on the receiving end. Thus, I 
attempted to be comprehensive and conduct interviews with as many people involved in the 
reception and crossing of asylum seekers. In addition, I included policy research as a way to 
understand the US-Canada relationship and the institutionalization of their security cooperation 
complex. I reviewed specifically policies that showed the development of the security apparatus 
at the border, such as the Safe Third Country Agreement and the Smart Border Declaration; and 
those policies that represented significant shifts in refugees’ rights, such as the Immigration 
Refugee Protection Act 2002 and its amendments in 2010. Locally, I reviewed Ontario’s 
Immigration Strategy and the Toronto Newcomer Strategy. Policy research also involved 
exploration and analysis of current responses towards the immigration flows after 2017; such as 
media releases of the Ad Hoc Task Force on irregular migration, established in 2018, and 
announcements on other important changes like the creation of the Minister of Border Security 
and Organized Crime Reduction and changes in processing times in refugee hearings. I also 
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explored the municipal reports that discussed the development of refugee capacity plans after 
2017. 
Moreover, I added participant observation in my research design as I considered it was key 
in obtaining data to support my investigation. Participant observation was valuable because it 
provided me the opportunity to engage actively with the participants of the study. I used 
ethnographic methods as a way to understand individuals’ performance and behaviours in their 
everyday lives (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2018). These also helped me to investigate participants’ 
perception and attitudes and to “construct a representation of the worlds in which they [the 
participants] exists and interact, beyond the scope of quantitative research paradigms” (Jaimangal-
Jones, 2014:40). 
To start field research, access to potential research networks is crucial particularly when 
you are not a member of those networks. As Warren and Karner (2010) suggest, I started where I 
was and began the recruitment of participants in my local community centre in Kitchener, Ontario. 
This opened up a cycle of interviews with refugee center workers and, subsequently, with refugee 
claimants who were clients of these centers. Case workers distributed to potential interviewees a 
recruitment flyer, written in Spanish and English, that stated my affiliation and the objectives of 
the research (see Appendix A). On the other hand, the concept of membership and access became 
clearer once I started volunteering in two refugee serving centers and connections with potential 
interviewees became more fluid and engaging.  
Choosing the Province of Ontario to carry out this research was part of a critical analysis 
on the data obtained during the time I was preparing my research proposal. Although Ontario did 
not record any irregular land border crossing in 2017 and onwards, they faced an important sharp 
increase in the number of refugee claimants seeking shelter and other services, triggering a human 
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service response starting in 2017 (City of Toronto, 2018). While a relationship between these two 
phenomena has not been proved empirically, the rise in refugee claimants in migrant shelters in 
Toronto during the same period of time suggests that refugee claimants were looking for 
opportunities in other cities and embarked on secondary migration. Moreover, previous 
scholarship has shown that cities like Toronto have historically received immigrants through 
secondary migration, particularly those coming from Quebec (Simich et. al. 2003).  
Quebec was receiving the larger share of irregular arrivals with 18,518 RCMP interceptions 
in 2018 (Government of Canada, 2020b); nonetheless the effects of these new immigration 
dynamics were felt in cities of Ontario, particularly in Toronto. The City of Toronto reported that 
since 2016, the proportion of refugee claimants using the shelter system had increased significantly 
which, consequently, caused the City to incur in additional $64.5 million in direct costs related to 
providing shelter to refugee claimants (City of Toronto, 2018). Initially I aimed to explore the 
relationship between the irregular land border crossings in Quebec and the strain in services in 
Ontario. Nonetheless, as my research developed, I understood that there was a more 
comprehensive explanation, which included a combination of both, petitions for asylum at border 
crossings in Ontario, and the arrival of refugee claimants to Toronto as secondary migrants. 
I chose to focus on Ontario because it illustrates two relevant situations in Canada: 1) the 
capacity building process and management of refugee claimant arrivals in one of the primary 
destination Provinces for immigrants in Canada 2) the struggles and experiences of claimants when 
encountering an already burdened refugee and settlement system. This project also aims to show 
that although Quebec was an important entry point to Canada for asylum seekers, many go on to 
other provinces, making this a matter of relevance for the federal, provincial, and municipal 
governments.  
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Interviews, confidentiality and other emerging challenges  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 29 participants in Ontario, from January to 
September 2019. Specifically, I conducted interviews in 4 different regions of the Province, 
including Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo, Fort Erie and London. Participants included 11 refugee 
claimants, 14 directors and case workers of refugee centers and 4 members of the government (see 
Appendix B for a detailed chart of the different groups interviewed). While interviews with refugee 
center workers were relatively easy to obtain, contact with members of the Canadian government 
and with refugee claimants were particularly challenging. However, I insisted on getting at least a 
few interviews with these groups of people because it was important to understand the different 
viewpoints of the impacts of Canadian policy in an institutional level and a local scale as well. For 
example, interviews with members of the provincial government gave me insights to understand 
how the state is not one entity that covers all levels of policy but that there are discrepancies 
between institutions and federal, provincial, and municipal governments.  
Refugee center directors and case workers, as well as members of the provincial 
government were largely contacted through e-mail and cold calling; however, claimants’ 
interviews were scheduled using a specific procedure. The caseworker made the initial contact 
with them explaining the aim of the interview and, if they were interested, they contacted me. This 
represented a significant challenge as I could not explain my project in detail and clarify why their 
participation was important. The interviews lasted around 45 minutes each and were conducted in 
a variety of settings: refugee centers, homes, offices, and coffee shops. With the consent of the 
participants, the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed through open coding. The 
purpose of the interviews was different with each of these groups of participants.  
 19 
The purpose for the interviews with members of the government was to elicit information 
about the relationship between the provincial government and federal decisions, and how that 
translated into local policies in relation with municipal- funded refugee centers (see Appendix C 
for the list of questions). I conducted interviews in the City of Toronto Newcomer’s Office, in the 
Emergency Shelter, Housing Support in Toronto and the Local Immigration Partnership-Waterloo. 
They offered an ample understanding on the institutional limitations they encountered to increase 
their financial support to agencies serving refugee claimants. On the other hand, interviews with 
directors and case workers of refugee centers were central as they act as mediators between refugee 
claimants and government policies. Moreover, they recognized the needs that this population have 
and often advocate for more support at high-policy levels (see Appendix D for list of questions).  
In regard to interviews with refugee claimants, the questions posed elicited information on 
their a) decision to ask for refuge in Canada and the US policy role in this choice b) their 
perceptions of the Canadian refugee system c) their experiences as refugee claimants d) their 
interactions with refugee settlement services (see Appendix E for list of questions). The criteria 
for this group of interviewees included those refugee claimants: 
• Who have arrived to Canada, and Ontario specifically, during the last three years 
and made inland claims 
• Who have lived or stopped at the US prior to crossing to Canada 
• Who have used refugee settlement services in Ontario 
Interviews are often seen as conversations by social scientists as they entail a social 
interaction between the researcher and the participant (Warren and Karner, 2010; Warren 2012). 
During the interviews, I ensured the participants were provided with informed consent forms and 
were recorded only if they approved it. Nonetheless, there we inevitable challenges that came from 
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interviewing people with precarious status. First, as previously mentioned access was an important 
issue as I had to build relations with refugee centers as they would make the connections between 
myself and potential participants. Once I scheduled a few interviews, the next challenge was to 
create trust and rapport with the participants. People with precarious status also tend to have fear 
of their claims to be denied and of subsequent deportation if they say something wrong or 
inadequate, even after I explained that these interviews would not impact their refugee process. 
Moreover, Bernhard and Young (2009) explain that “people would be hesitant to participate or 
reluctant to answer the questions when the immediate benefit to themselves was unclear” (180). 
To reduce this hesitation, I informed them of the benefits of this research and how it could inform 
future policy. I also provided them with a feedback research sheet after data collection and analysis 
of data stages ended. 
Other issues were considered, like the effects of recounting difficult personal experiences. 
In order to address this challenge, I designed the interview questions to avoid any potential 
psychological and emotional effects when telling their stories. I also designed the interview 
protocol as to provide constant negotiation of what participants wanted to share. These difficulties 
are closely linked to the researcher positionality and the relations of power encountered in 
academic investigation. Being a Canadian citizen and a researcher from a University posed their 
own challenges that would be addressed in the following section.   
 
Research positionality and the co-production of knowledge 
 
Scholars have studied the asymmetries created in the field which often favour the 
interviewer. Social research is at risk of creating depersonalizing, exploitative and patronizing 
relationships (Limerick et. Al., 1996). Feminist scholars, as critics of this power imbalance are 
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particularly eager to dismantle these relations of power that exists between the researcher and the 
researched.  While the participant should have agency and concerns such as closeness, reciprocity 
and collaboration should be fulfilled; the researcher should acknowledge the power of their 
positionality. Issues of positionality and reflexivity were incorporated into my research 
methodology and findings in order to reduce these challenges.  
Throughout the entire field research, I was cognizant of my own role and position of power, 
particularly, when engaging with highly vulnerable population. My own positionality as a 
Canadian woman, student in a University afforded me a certain degree of access to refugee centers, 
which in turn, allowed me to secure potential interviews with refugee claimants. Although, 
accessing and scheduling interviews with claimants was a difficult process, most of them spoke to 
me about their experiences willingly and in a highly cooperatively manner. My ethnic and cultural 
background as a Latin woman whose first language is Spanish also played an important role in 
establishing trust with my participants. These two factors, speaking Spanish and a Latino 
background, made them felt that I could possibly understand better what was happening in their 
home countries as most of them came from Colombia, El Salvador, and Honduras. Moreover, due 
to my status as a newly arrived person in Canada, they felt understood when talking about daily 
experiences of immigrant life, for example, leaving their family or finding difficult to navigate the 
Canadian health system. On the other hand, talking about their life experiences in their mother 
tongue (Spanish) made them felt more comfortable as, some of the participants mentioned, lots of 
their life experiences get lost in translation. 
Although these elements worked productively to gain access to my participants and 
establish relationships of trust; I had a heightened consciousness of my position and understand 
that the struggles and traumas that refugee claimants can have are different from my own 
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positionality as a Canadian citizen. Accepting these privileges allowed me to look and establish 
methods that addressed these issues.  
First, I always attempted to situate refugee claimants at the center of the analysis, 
understanding their agency and the ways they challenge state policy. Secondly, I aimed to 
comprehend refugee claimants’ narratives as an ongoing dialogue avoiding flattening their stories 
into abstract generalities. As I used semi-structured interviews, participants were the guiders of the 
interviews and they were in power of the production of knowledge and narratives. While the 
researcher often has the power of interpretation, it is impossible to embark this process without the 
input of the participants. Thus, this becomes a process of co-production of knowledge and research 
material. In this regard, some people decided to not share particularities of their journeys like how 
they arrived to the US, what they told to immigration officials or how their life was in the US as 
undocumented persons. On the other hand, it is at this stage when the positionality of the researcher 
can change as I was dependent on that participants’ willingness not only to take part on the study 
but also to share their experiences and thoughts. Raheim et.al. (2016) work explain that participants 
often determine the narrative as they talk about what they felt most strongly, including experiences 
more or less relevant to the study. I aimed to have a constructive qualitative encounter by having 
an empathetic listening but also encouraging reflection on what was particularly relevant for this 
study.  
Finally, I engaged with methods that are flexible instead of static, like open-ended 
interviews and participant observation. This approach is better suited to accessing subjugated 
knowledge and the voices of the marginalized as it does not presume that the researcher knows 
what it is important in the participants’ daily experience and enable them to contextualize and 
represent themselves as much as possible (Johnson, 2013). 
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On the other hand, volunteering was key for this study for two reasons: 1) to access the 
community 2) to understand the local dynamics in refugee centers. The decision of volunteering 
was also to made to give back to the organizations and the community which was being studied 
by my research. This role allowed for some reciprocity in the research relationship (O’Connor and 
Baker, 2017). Moreover, in some ways, volunteering decreased the hierarchies of power as I could 
build relationships with people and the participants felt more comfortable with me as a researcher 
as I was perceived as an insider which shared the organizations’ ideals. By implementing this 
ethnographic method, I was able to gain new insights on day-to-day activities, experiences, 
motivations and challenges from refugee center workers but also from refugee claimants who 
accessed their services.  
 
Dissertation outline 
In this chapter I have introduced key conceptual and methodological elements of this 
project. The ensuing chapters frame and discuss the context and research analysis by following a 
coherent structure. While Chapter 2 and 3 provide the theoretical framework and contextualization, 
the following chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) present my findings focusing on a different scale of 
analysis. Each findings chapter was written to answer my research questions using a separate 
conceptual framework related to the specific issue addressed in each section. Thus, I draw on 
critical and feminist border studies for the overarching project; however, I take a distinct 
theoretical endeavour in each chapter. From the impacts of state policy, border policing and 
reverberations (Chapter 4) to the local turn in social services and the invisible border (Chapter 5) 
and categorizations’ impact in refugee identity construction (Chapter 6). I aim to integrate these 
different conceptual approaches with the findings presented in each chapter.  
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This thesis continues in Chapter 2 by explaining the epistemological framework that guides 
my approach to study Canada’s bordering practices. This framework grounded on critical and 
feminist geopolitics gives attention to exploring immigration enforcement policy at different scales 
and unveiling power structures often hidden in policy implementation. Chapter 2 explores 
theoretical frameworks on four of the most relevant concepts of the study: the invisible border, 
humanitarianism, selective exclusion, and refugee identity.  
In Chapter 3, I explain the contextual and historical overview of the project. By engaging 
in a historical-geographical study of the area, I aim to demonstrate the particularities that the US-
Canada relationship holds, and which makes it worth of scholarly attention. I focus on exploring 
the US-Canada special geopolitical relations and contextualizing border dynamics before and after 
the 9/11. This historical perspective is key as to critically demonstrate how US politics has played 
an important role on the development of the current Canada’s asylum system and border 
enforcement. I show this by discussing the “border rush” of Central Americans during the 1980s 
and 1990s, and Canadian responses to this event.  
Moreover, in this chapter I discuss the changes in security control, particularly after the 
terrorist attacks as this is when border control became a high priority at the US-Canada border 
which, consequently, guided the process of border crossings in the following years. More 
importantly, I show that securitization not only stays at the border but also have important 
implications in the Canadian refugee protection system. The following section of this chapter 
discuss refugee policy in Canada. I explore restrictive refugee policy, like IRPA 2002 and 2010, 
and the establishment of the Safe Third Country Agreement, to demonstrate how Canada considers 
seeking asylum as a security issue rather one of protection. More importantly, I show how the 
present-day refugee determination structure and hierarchies are based on categorizations which 
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determine the access to services and supports for different types of refugees.  This chapter ends 
contextualizing the events at the border after 2017 and explaining the difficulties of seeking asylum 
in North America after Trump’s administration came into power.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the national and regional scale to discuss how Canadian responses 
harshened after receiving asylum seekers at their borders. I argue that the US acted as a catalyst of 
changes in Canadian refugee and settlement systems. I follow Hiemstra’s (2012) approach in her 
work on transnationalism and what she calls reverberations of policies. This chapter aims to 
expand this concept, by demonstrating that policies not only reverberate to people’s everyday lives 
but also to the systems controlling them. To understand these reverberations across borders at a 
national level, it is relevant to explore the US-Canada geopolitical relations. In this chapter, I argue 
that US and Canada share a parallel position in border security matters which creates an important 
dialectic relationship in matters of asylum control at their borders. 
Central to this chapter is the discussion on the Canadian management of the border as a 
visible (in times of crisis) and invisible entity whose provisions are concealed and intertwined in 
neglecting and failing to adapt to a humanitarian need. By engaging in a meticulous mapping of 
Canada’s responses towards this flow of asylum seekers, I trace the Canadian domestic position, 
particularly by exploring the implementation and changes of bills and legislation after 2017 in 
immigration matters. This chapter first discuss the responses through which Canadian politicians 
attempted to make the border visible and stop irregular claimants to enter their territory. Although 
these policies were seemingly aimed to deter refugee claimants for arriving to Canada, these 
changes were implemented to deter the image of Canada’s refugee determination system as chaotic 
and underprepared.  
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While these policies had important repercussions in refugees’ mobility and access to 
asylum in North America, I show that the invisible and concealed Canadian bordering practices 
cause more damage to those already in their territory.  Therefore, in the last sections of Chapter 4, 
I engage with a discussion on particular Canadian responses and (in)actions that aimed to 
invisibilize and re-assert their border at the same time. I show this through three particular 
situations: the ineffectiveness of the Immigration Refugee Board to process asylum claims, the 
resistance of Canada to cover a humanitarian need in Central America and the lack of intentions 
to modify or eliminate the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).  
Chapter 5 enters into the local space through the examination of refugee centers’ responses 
and their day-to-day challenges after receiving more than the regular number of claimants at their 
doors. By “jumping scales” in my research, I demonstrate that the invisible border is particularly 
found in localized spaces, like refugee centers. My findings in this chapter aim to trace the 
implications of the Canadian invisible border as a consequence of neglecting to adequately provide 
settlement services to refugee claimants. In particular, this chapter draws upon research completed 
at the provincial and municipal level and addresses the role of these organizations in supporting 
refugees and refugee claimants.  
Interviews with case workers and directors of refugee centers revealed the ways in which 
they were forced to shift some of their practices to keep serving to most of the people who asked 
for their services. The refugee centers’ experiences offer important insights into how resources 
towards refugee claimants have been disregarded. Particularly, I demonstrate this with an in-depth 
discussion of shelter and housing access for this group of people. Thus, the invisible border can be 
traced into the lack of settlement support. Analysis in this particular issue takes most of the second 
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section of this chapter as it was clearly highlighted as the main problem faced by refugee claimants 
in their settlement process.  
Chapter 6 draws on feminist theories of embodiment and demonstrates that refugee policy 
sets deep in refugee claimants’ lives, even in the identity-formation and/or identity-shifting 
process. It revisits the idea of the state power over people’s mobility and access to services by 
stigmatizing and classifying types of immigrants. Focusing on the experiences and stories of 
refugee claimants allowed me to fill in the blanks and understand the underlying implications of 
Canadian border policing in refugee claimants’ lives. I argue that the border is concealed through 
practices of selectivity based on refugee status and neglect on settlement services aimed to cover 
the needs of refugee claimants. Thus, Canada’s humanitarian practices are determined by 
hierarchies and categories of membership that lie at the core of their refugee system.  
By taking the categorization of resettled refugee versus refugee claimant, I show how 
Canada determines their level of refugeeness depending on where their cases fall under this 
classification. Thus, they are imposing the invisible border in one of the deepest and more personal 
elements of an individual: their identity. These categorizations represent an advanced form of 
dismissing refugees’ experiences, by stigmatizing identities and classifying refugee claimants as 
undesirable groups.  
Moreover, this chapter shows how, this type of policing, through categorization practices, 
is relevant not only because these labels determine access to welfare services but also because it 
makes claimants more vulnerable to changes in policy that leaves them in a more precarious 
situation. Therefore, because they do not have status, they are not entitled to full rights in Canadian 
soil leaving them unprotected to policy changes. For example, with the 2019 Provincial cuts in 
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legal aid or changes in the Federal Interim Health Program in 2012 that restricted the access to 
essential health coverage to refugee claimants.  
 Lastly, in the last chapter I offer concluding thoughts on how Canada’s position in the 
region should change to provide resources to those fleeing violence, regardless of how decided, or 
were forced, to make a claim. By having more involvement in the continent, by acknowledging a 
shared responsibility of spontaneous arrivals in North America and domestically implement more 
resources for inland claimants, Canada’s humanitarian tradition and generosity can be sustained. I 
also reflect on the empirical and conceptual contributions of this project to the field of political 
geography. Finally, due to the changing global and regional circumstances that impacted asylum 
and human mobility in the region –the COVID-19  pandemic and the election of President Biden 
in US–, I included a postscript to offer some thoughts on potential change in geographies of 















Frameworks to study the invisible dimension of the Canadian border 
 
In presenting the overarching arguments I suggest that border policing has changed from 
physical outcomes to more abstract and concealed practices. Borders were perceived at first as 
only physical and visible elements to then be considered as capable of being invisible and dispersed 
throughout national territory. This has been an important point of departure as it changes how 
territoriality and sovereignty is understood. Central to these shifts is understating how the power 
of state is used and legitimated by this bordering work. Although contemporary scholarly 
approaches have demonstrated that not all forms of governance are captured by the figure of the 
state (Walters, 2006), it is relevant to explore how state power in border policing becomes more 
complex, yet less visible and disguised at the same time.  
Border studies have also shown that the new type of bordering practices (externalization, 
de/territorialization, etc.) are not less hard than any other “traditional” border mechanism (Johnson, 
et. al., 2011). I aim to contribute empirically to this discussion as I argue that the invisible border 
imposed through selectivity, negligence and (in)action is as functional and damaging as other 
traditional mechanism. This chapter will examine some of the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations that guide this dissertation. While discussing these theoretical frameworks, I will 
explain how the Canadian experience fit into these concepts. I will start by discussing the dynamics 
of the US-Canada unmilitarized border as a way to recognize concealed mechanism implemented 
to manage migration. Then, I will shift my focus to engage in a theoretical discussion on Canadian 
practices of immigration control, including selective exclusion and exclusive humanitarianism. 
Finally, as this thesis employs critical and feminist geopolitics, I discuss the importance of shifting 
geopolitical scales by highlighting the embodied dimension of immigration policies. This will 
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provide an important theoretical context to comprehend the effects of policy in refugees’ identities. 
It will also provide an entry point in examining how the figure of refugee has been incorporated in 
humanitarian discourses.  
 
Theoretical approaches to changes in border policing  
 
Over more than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries around the world 
kept building massive fences on their borders. Even though some scholars have showed that the 
traditional military significance of borders fences declined as they became strategies that mainly 
marked distinctions of sovereignty between states in the post-Westphalian world (Brown, 2010; 
Jones and Rosiére, 2012; Vallet, 2014). Although the end of the Cold War represented to many 
the end of an era –including the end of borders, the victory of Western democracy and the start of 
a global world– this idea is yet to be accomplished. Rather than seeing a decrease, borders are 
proliferating and embedding themselves in our daily lives. Not all borders are physical or 
territorial. Undoubtedly, we can say that nowadays many border practices are based on non-visible, 
soft and virtual strategies. The “borders are everywhere” (Balibar, 2002; Bigo, 2002; Agnew, 
2008; Rumford, 2012) thesis in political science talks about the proliferation of states’ initiatives 
to protect their territory beyond the edge of their boundaries.  
Borders have become part of human life. In the last decades, scholars have advocated to 
leave behind theorizations of territory and borders as fixated, and to expand our horizons to 
understand territory as a flexible construct that carry social and political power (see Paasi, 2009; 
Newman, 2010; Johnson et. al., 2011). As borders are no longer encountered at the edge of the 
state, borders have become invisible entities situated everywhere and nowhere (Khosravi, 2007). 
Several scholars have used the dichotomy of invisible/visible border to explore how the 
 31 
contemporary border regime works (Newman, 2010; Rumford, 2012; Khosravi, 2007). While 
borders have become heavily militarized through growing use of technologies and surveillance 
(Amoore, 2006), new forms of governance have been used to control territories and mobility 
(Paasi, 2009). For example, Krishna (1996), exposes how invisible borders are often hidden within 
geographical texts and literature, including maps. These new mechanisms entail abstract, 
intangible and scattered strategies to police the border and manage human mobility. Thus, border 
policing has moved beyond the limited dimensions of physical and finite spaces.  
In my work, I draw on Andreas’ thesis of border games (2009), which situates heavy border 
policing as an element of the state implemented to seemingly deter irregular migrants, but whose 
main purpose is to recraft the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the states’ 
territorial authority. Thus, for him, this type of policing includes a theatrical escalation of border 
enforcement which becomes a symbolic representation of state authority. This performative action 
is driven by domestic entities to satisfy certain audiences, like politicians and the electorate, and 
seeks to justify their own funding and expansion. In this respect, Andreas (2009) argues that the 
escalation of state enforcement, through control intensification, major surveillance, and bloated 
US Customs and Border Patrol budgets does not precisely prevent the smuggling of people and 
drugs, but highlights the narrative of having control of the border and legitimizes enforcement 
implementation.  
On the other hand, Brown (2010) also makes an important point about the implications of 
visibilizing the border. She argues that border walls (visible elements of border enforcement) say 
more about states’ erosion of power and their unsettled sovereignty than of states’ actual 
capabilities to control. Thus, states aim to show an image of security rather than strictly having it.  
While these frameworks develop the politics of the visible border and its implications, I aim to 
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understand what it is situated at the other end of the spectrum: the invisibility of bordering 
practices.  
In my work, I also take Rumford’s (2012) analysis on the multiperspectival study of the 
border to demonstrate that a border should not always be visible in order to function. For him, the 
location of borders remains invisible to many as they do not feel the impacts of bordering practices. 
However, the border become palpable for those who attempt to cross them. In this sense, borders 
are selective “and work so as to render them invisible to the majority of the population, who do 
not recognise the border as a border, or for whom no such border is deemed to exist” (Rumford, 
2012: 892). In my work, I expand this argument as in Canada the border is rendered invisible not 
only domestically but internationally as well, as they aim to maintain a humanitarian reputation to 
the refugee cause.  
 In the case of Canada, I demonstrate that in times of crisis, the state attempts to give signs 
of a visible border; however, Canada more often uses less visible resources to expand border 
policing. Instead of theatrically expanding their borders, Canada aims to make their border policing 
invisible. Canada’s commitment to protect refugees and offer them a fair consideration of their 
cases is proudly displayed in IRPA as a key expression of Canada’s humanitarianism (Arbel and 
Efrat, 2013). To maintain this humanitarian position, their border should be concealed and hidden 
in other practices that make the border less recognizable but never disappearing.  
On the other hand, the concept of externalization is key to understand practices of 
securitization beyond borders. Originally, externalization was used a way to describe the extension 
of the border enforcement beyond “receiving nations” and into neighbouring countries or sending 
states. For some, the power of externalization practices relies on their application towards 
migration management in a third country, which in turn, results in immobilizing migrants in their 
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countries of origin or transit countries, and only those who are deemed adequate for further 
mobility are selected (Frelick et. Al., 2016). However, scholarly research has also emphasized the 
question of “extra-territoriality” as a way to study multiplicity of spaces where the border can act 
and impose its effects (Ryan, 2010; Casas-Cortes, 2016).  
Currently existing literature has studied how migration enforcement is either pushed into 
the interior of the state, through the strengthening of controls and increased detentions and 
deportations, or pushed beyond its national borders with assistance of third countries (Menjivar, 
2014). For example, Hyndman and Mountz (2008) explore how border enforcement is moved 
offshore reducing the capacity of asylum seekers to make refugee claims in sovereign territory, 
while Coleman (2009) studies the devolution of US immigration enforcement to the interior of the 
state. Throughout this thesis, I consider externalization as practices carried out inwards and 
outwards of the edge of the state, as it is through this that the border is located externally to the 
territorial location. As Stock et.al. (2019) argues, it is difficult to theorize where borders start and 
the effects these practices uphold at different levels. Thus, rendering it difficult to identify inside 
versus outside distinctions and effects of borders. 
The research on extra-territoriality and externalization show how borders proliferate and 
expand its power in several ways. Borders proliferate even where border agents, barbed wires or 
unmanned drones are not so noticeable. The un-militarized borders also have security measures in 
place, even when people cannot see them. This is the case of the US-Canada border. This thesis 
aims to offer relevant insights on why studying non-militarized borders is important for 
geopolitical scholarly research. Even when it is not considered a chaotic border, it is a contentious 
site for people seeking asylum in Canada. The US-Canada border also contributes empirically to 
the disruption of the “territorial trap”, a term developed by John Agnew (1994) to question 
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traditional political understandings in which the state has clear and defined state limits. Also, by 
tracing the invisible, unmilitarized Canadian border through (in)action, (un)provision and 
negligence, I also elucidate invisible processes happening at visible, militarized borders around 
the world. The next section discusses in more depth the politics of the US-Canada –unmilitarized– 
border.  
 
A note in the invisible/visible border dichotomy 
 
My main argument explores how the invisible/visible border is used by Canadian 
authorities to implement practices that restrict human mobility. While I aim to demonstrate that 
Canada invisibilizes borders and intertwines them in other elements of the refugee experience, I 
also show that making the border visible is key for Canada to preserve a narrative of security. 
These movements between visibility and invisibility, sometimes happening simultaneously, 
demonstrate the complex dimensions of these practices. This dichotomy is not either/or as it is part 
of a more intricate duplicity in which the border is constantly changing along a spectrum of 
concealment/discernibility. 
In her work on the Guatemalan war and duplicity of the State, Nelson (2009) mentions that 
there is often “a sense that the world available to our senses hides another face behind it” (2009: 
XV). Following Nelson’s idea, I aim to demonstrate that bordering practices are charged with 
particular meanings that determine when and how it will be invisibilized, in order to “hide another 
face behind it”. Thus, for example, the Canadian government invisibilizes the border not only to 
use a different approach of border security, but to maintain a narrative of humanitarianism towards 
the refugee cause. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Canada will invisibilize all their practices 
as deterring unwelcomed immigrants and protecting the integrity of their refugee protection 
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division are also objectives of the national government. Thus, this thesis shows that the border will 
constantly move through invisibility levels directed to particular audiences, which will also 
conceal other key elements of border enforcement, like criminalization or irregularization of 
migrants (Connoy, 2018).  
Moreover, the complexity of the invisible/visible border dichotomy conveys a series of 
elements that will also determine how the border comes into view. This invisible/visible border is 
related to concealment and distancing, which in turn, impacts immigrants’ and refugees’ relation 
with border enforcement. For example, bordering practices implemented to complicate settlement 
experiences of irregular arrivals will only appear at times, for example at the moment of trying to 
access certain services. On the other hand, these specific practices will remain unknown or 
invisible towards people arriving through Official Ports of Entry or by resettlement programs. 
Thus, this dichotomy works to explain how the visibility of the border is determined by authorities 
for their own purposes; however, as the border is intertwined in other elements of the refugee 
experience, the border will be revealed differently to refugees depending on their own 
characteristics, status and level of vulnerability.  
While bordering practices that shift through the invisibility/visibility spectrum are complex 
and convey a series of meanings, this work aims to open a discussion on how invisibility is also 
acting through inaction and neglect. Therefore, invisibilizing the border through inaction is also a 
way of legitimizing the border without any policy change. The importance of exploring the 
transparency of the border is that it can also be transposed to other migratory policies and 
immigrants’ experiences. Those who look to settle outside their home countries will often navigate 
a complex set of invisible/visible bordering practices that will determine their arrival and 
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settlement experiences. The following section will focus on the US-Canada border and the 
implications of being an “undefended” space. 
  
The political anatomy of an unmilitarized border 
 
In matters of immigration and asylum the US-Canada border also has walls, yet not visible 
nor tangible as people often assume. The US-Canada border has been an important symbol for 
Canadians as it is considered a site of defence for Canadian identity against US hegemony, but 
also holds the mythology and history of the longest undefended border in the world. However, this 
border also provides a prism at which broader and relevant questions of political, economic and 
cultural questions in the region come into focus (Roberts and Stirrup, 2014). The developments in 
border security in the last decades and the level of transnational cooperation in this matter 
demonstrate that these nations no longer have the “world’s longest undefended border” (Nicol, 
2015). In this section I refer to the political anatomy of the US-Canada border, as I aim to scrutinize 
the structural elements that build and guide functions at this space. I also take the concept of 
anatomy from biological sciences as it is concerned with the description and identification of 
structures in living things. In this sense, I aim to move away from the territorial thinking related to 
borders (Agnew, 2008) and conceptualize the border as a living entity, which is never static but 
constantly transforming, evolving, and expanding. 
During the 21st Century, the US-Canada border evolved following trends in global border-
making which involved changes in ways of governing and perceptions of territory and identity to 
accommodate globalization (Nicol, 2015). As many other borders around the world, it moved its 
management to new locations, not precisely on the territorial boundary itself. Technologies and 
externalization practices became key to a new era in which borders proliferated “crossing people” 
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rather than people crossing them. The security perimeter established by the US-Canada Smart 
Border declaration (2001) and reinforced through the Beyond the Border initiative (2011) resulted 
in heavy surveillance and onerous documentation standards for some cross-border travellers. 
However, most importantly, it meant more challenges and obstacles for asylum seekers to reach 
sovereign territory. Even when there is not a physical wall like the one located at the US-Mexico 
border, the border manifest itself playing an important role in the development of security for some 
and insecurity for others.  
The process of US-Canada border management integration began in the late 1990s and 
continued throughout the 2000s (Nicol, 2015). This deeper integration was suggested by policy 
makers, politicians, and academics, which used the discourses of inevitability to push various 
proposals of integration between both nations (see Gilbert, 2005). The following table shows three 
of the key agreements between the US and Canada that demonstrate increased border cooperation: 
Table 1.  
Key agreements between the US and Canada in immigration and security matters 
Year Agreement Main focus Relevant provisions 





of people, protection 
against illicit activities, 
reducing costs to both 
governments  
2001 Smart Border 
Declaration 






identifiers, share and 
exchange information 
on immigration-related 





2011 Beyond the Border 
Initiative: A Shared 
Vision for Perimeter 
Security and Economic 
Competitiveness 
 
Security at and 
beyond the border 
(perimeter 
initiative) 




of people who pose a 
threat, trade 
facilitation across 
border, cooperate on 







Note. Table reproduced with information from the US and Canadian security and immigration 
agencies. 
 
The change in focus of the agreements is evident after 2001. The first accord aimed to improve the 
efficiency of cross border operations, particularly those related to trade. However, the following 
two highlight the relevance of protecting themselves against external threats and fortify their 
border enforcement cooperation. The Smart Border Plan was the first accord that included more 
concealed mechanisms of control as biometrics was listed as their number one priority. By 
integrating biometric capabilities, and establishing further additional screening, persons 
designated as security risks could be increasingly controlled. Biometric mechanisms also represent 
a way to outsource the border onto individuals’ bodies. As Amoore (2006:338) argues “the 
biometric border is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same 
time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on 
subways, or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood”. In following years, the border security 
was expanded through biometrics by implementing standardization of identity documents, 
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including biological information in ID cards, shift to passports that are machine-readable and 
implementing mandatory biometrics to trusted travellers’ programs (Nicol, 2015). 
A series of agreements have been implemented which have redesigned the Canada-US 
border; most of these have responded to 9/11 security discourses (Gilbert, 2012). Although these 
are fluid and often change to add other imperatives, they have one constant: their capacity to create 
insecurity for certain groups of people. Border technology, which is often not visible, is 
instrumental in managing mobility and in advancing specific geopolitical agendas. The US-Canada 
border has not been militarized as the US perceives both countries’ societies share similar values 
and in regard to security issues, political agendas are analogous. Thus, the risk is lower than at the 
US-Mexico border. The security strategies are aimed towards nationals of other countries deemed 
less desirable. For example, the land border strategies, including the Safe Third Country 
Agreement, are mainly implemented to control people from other nations who happen to be in the 
US or Canada and want to cross to any of these countries in order to claim protection- mainly from 
the US to Canada due to geographical circumstances. Externally, strategies are implemented to 
contain people at their countries of origin or transit to prevent them to reach their territories, using 
visas, refugee security screening, and enhanced technology. 
On the other hand, in many ways, the US-Canada border follows a deterritorialization 
pattern in which borders are increasingly diffuse as they can be found in quotidian spaces of the 
private and public life (Newman and Passi, 1998, Passi, 2009, Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 
2009, Walters, 2006). In particular, Canada has been the pioneer in placing the border on sites 
other than the edge of their state (Lowry, 2002; Arbel and Brenner, 2014; Gilbert 2019). Tightened 
visa requirements, implementing greater security screening and signing the STCA are some 
strategies executed to secure their borders. The Canadian border,  barely territorialized, uses more 
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powerful –and invisible– endeavours to accomplish its objective of controlling unwanted arrivals. 
By using these mechanisms, the Canada’s commitment to the refugee cause is questioned as 
externalization measures “produce and reinforce relations of inequality in the management of 
mobility between states, states and civil society organizations, and migrants” (Stock, et. al., 2019).   
My focus on the US-Canada border involves an interest in recognizing which concealed 
mechanisms are used and implemented to manage migration by Western nations. Most of the 
research on borders in North America focuses on the US-Mexico border and it is sometimes 
considered as the birthplace of the Border Studies discipline (Michelson and Johnson, 1997; 
Roberts and Stirrup, 2013). The US-Mexico border is contentious, powerful, combative, blurred, 
where thousands of transnational families cross every day, it is “una herida abierta [an open 
wound] where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds” (Anzaldúa, 1999: 25). In 
contrast, the US-Canada border represents less of a violent association.  However, it cannot aptly 
be explored in terms of an “undefended” border, where all asylum seekers are welcomed with open 
arms because the reality is different and more complex.  
 Images in media outlets portray irregular crossings of the US-Mexico border and the 
Canada-US border differently. While the portrayals of irregular arrivals at the US-Mexico border 
are often violent, in mass, and tumultuous; crossings at the US-Canada border are portrayed as less 
turbulent, contributing to the Canadian welcoming image. During and after 2017, different news 
showed people crossing the US-Canada border in an organized and orderly manner, lining up to 
be processed by CBSA (Canadian Border Service Agency) agents (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4.  












Source: How thousands of asylum seekers have turned Roxham road into a de facto 
border crossing. CBC news. 
 
Nonetheless, this portrayal of the US-Canada border can be inaccurate as the mechanisms of 
control are concealed and spread throughout the management migration continuum from their 
countries of origin to Canada. Canada’s land border and non-territorial extensions of the border 
have prominent security imperatives which only some can successfully clear. Opening up the 
Canada-US border as a discursive terrain to examine its function in relation to control of human 
mobility and asylum seeking is a necessary move. The next section will provide a framework on 
Canadian humanitarianism and its relation to exclusionary practices. 
 
Canadian humanitarianism and exclusionary power 
 
Canadian generosity towards refugees has been recognized internationally, especially after 
the UN gave Canada the Nansen Medal in 1987 for its contribution to the refugee cause. However, 
 42 
Canadian bordering practices have raised questions pertaining to how generous the country’s 
refugee system really is.  
Tightened immigration and border control has caused violent and deathly outcomes for 
migrants during their journeys and at the border crossing (Gazzotti, 2020). This has led to the 
formation of a “humanitarian border” as a way to respond to the strict –and often disturbing– 
strategies of control and access that make crossings a matter of life or death (Walters, 2010). 
Migration, and human mobility in general, has been directly related to humanitarian practices, as 
these are often created as a moral imperative to relieve suffering (Fassin, 2011). For example, in 
the humanitarian border there is now an increased presence of humanitarian organizations aimed 
to help asylum seekers in need. 
A rich body of literature has emerged to study the reinvention and development of the 
border as a space of humanitarian governance. Scholars have studied the role of NGOs in re-
politicizing the border (Cuttitta, 2018), the expansion of humanitarianism to re-assert the states’ 
liberal and moral order (Pallister-Walkins, 2020) and the exclusionary power of humanitarianism 
(Ticktin, 2005, Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). Originally, the idea of a humanitarian border seemed 
contradictory as this concept goes against what the regime of migration control has tried to assert 
in the last decades: control, selectivity, and exclusion. Nonetheless, humanitarianism has an 
ancestral relation with the exception (Agamben, 2005; Gazzotti, 2020). Scholars have shown that 
humanitarianism can be compatible with restrictive measures and migration control practices (see 
Ticktin, 2005; Williams, 2016). Thus, although the humanitarian rationale should be motivated by 
altruistic desires to provide relief, most of the times these practices compel more political action 
through which stricter policies become justified (Walter, 2016). Moreover, some humanitarian 
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practices become instrumental to policies that exclude people from territories or rights (Cuttitta, 
2017).  
Duavergne (2005) notes that humanitarianism often tells us several things about those who 
offer it and little about those who receive its benefits. In Canada, humanitarian migration laws 
have been part of the country’s national identity. Their moral duty is politically fulfilled by 
assisting outsiders through resettlement support. However, following the body of literature on 
exclusionary humanitarianism, Canadian liberal humanitarianism is often based on inequality 
rather than justice. Humanitarianism is central to Canada’s character; however, its history of 
human rights’ abuses is obscured in policy and discourses, particularly to Indigenous Populations. 
Offering protection towards certain refugees is key to maintain Canadian humanitarianism 
narrative; however, it seems paradoxical when discrimination against and marginalization of 
Indigenous People continues to be rarely addressed (see Dimytriw, 2014; Murdocca, 2019).  
Refugee claimants’ precarious status is still reproduced on Canadian soil, in spite of 
Canada’s humanitarian and welcoming discourse.  This precarious status is maintained after they 
have crossed from the US, through practices and policies that invisibilize the Canadian border. 
These practices act through selectivity and neglect towards refugee claimants, challenging the 
Canadian humanitarian narrative. Canada uses selectivity based on colonial categorizations of 
refugees to provide protection and basic services to different types of refugees once they are in 
their territory. Thus, these practices are put in place once refugee claimants arrived at Canada and 
made asylum claims. Moreover, Canada often fails to provide sufficient resources for refugee 
support directed to refugee claimants. This shows how the invisible border act in a local and more 
intimate scale.  
Humanitarianism often highlights inequalities and reinforces the idea of “us” versus “them. 
Humanitarian narratives in migration only work due to the profound inequalities between members 
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and non-members of the state. As Dauvergne explains “when we are humanitarian, we bestow, as 
a gift, something upon others who have no rightful claim to it” (2005:72). In this sense, 
humanitarianism classifies people creating hierarchies of legitimacy and deservingness (Connoy, 
2018). Thus, under this premise the refugee experience is different between those who are patiently 
waiting to be resettled  –and the state believes lack agency and mobility– and those who actively 
ask for asylum at their land border. For the state, both experiences are unequally valued and 
respected, one being more deserving than the other. In practice, Canada uses selective exclusion 
as a way to provide services to those who fit the idea of a deserving refugee (i.e. resettled refugees). 
When asylum seekers cross the Canadian border, Canada deploys this categorization practices 
revealing new legal limits under the premise of them having to demonstrate their refugeeness. This 
perpetuates the cycle of precariousness until the state recognize them finally as deserving of the 
label of refugee. 
Moreover, as this is part of the invisible dimension of the border, it also appears like that 
to the eyes of the international community. Canada’s concealment of its border allows it to 
maintain a humanitarian narrative while also keeping safety determination standards based on 
colonial categorization of refugees. This helps Canada to re-articulate its own humanitarianism 
and control how their humanitarian strategies should be perceived. By determining who the “other” 
is and who rightfully deserve Canadian aid, they can uphold the discourse that they had fulfilled 
their obligation of protecting refugees. Also, I show that Canada’s humanitarian refugee policy is 
based on the approach of resettling people who come from major crises in the world, while building 
an interdiction system that deviates the country’s obligation to offer protection to asylum seekers 
in Central America.  
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This thesis aims to demonstrate that Canadian practices of categorization and selectivity 
are at the core of their humanitarian discourse. Some scholars have studied how migrants are 
subjectified through borders and humanitarianism; for example, Connoy (2018) demonstrates how 
humanitarianism subjectifies refugee claimants as irregular, Ilcan (2013) shows how UNHCR’s 
refugee camps registration practices subjectifies refugees, making them visible for governing 
apparatus, and Lacroix (2004) studies the role of the refugee determination process in defining and 
altering specific spheres of refugees’ lives, like work and family. I aim to contribute to this 
discussion by showing how colonial categories of refugeeness are used to strip refugees out from 
their rights of protection. In Chapter 6, I also expand this by showing an under-researched side of 
the discussion. By using the “new refugee paradigm” (Hadjiyanni, 2002) I show the construction 
of refugeeness from the perspective of the refugee claimant. I demonstrate that refugeeness is not 
something imposed but a matter of becoming through the development of their struggles.  Chapter 
6 also shows how refugee policy limits the becoming and expression of the refugee identity.  
 
Selective exclusion and the Canadian welfare state 
 
In Canada, most newcomers have the right to access certain settlement services upon 
arrival delivered by a network of community-based, non-profit agencies. Accessing settlement 
services is key for refugees to have a sense of stability and start their integration process. While 
settlement programs in Canada cover the basic needs of some groups of people, they are not 
consistent in meeting the needs of this vulnerable population (Simich, et. Al., 2003). This is more 
evident when there is a spike in newcomers’ arrival, as settlement programs and funding become 
insufficient for all arrivals. In addition, access to these services is determined by legal status. 
Therefore, some, including refugee claimants, do not have the access to the broad spectrum of 
 46 
services available for newcomers. Chapter 3 shows in more detail the different access to services 
refugees have depending on their legal status. 
In this thesis, I aim to show not only how settlement services are insufficient for all groups 
of refugee arrivals, but to also understand the underpinnings of this situation. In Canada, factors 
like immigration status and the type of refugee claim determine the services that are accessible for 
these individuals. This practice is part of a selective exclusion tactic, in which the state offers 
certain services to immigrants depending on their legal status and type of claim.  
Numerous scholars have studied the foundations and consequences of immigration and 
refugee policy and border enforcement to manage human mobility (Hyndman, 2000; Mountz, 
2010; Anderson, 2013; Brigden, 2018; Jones, 2016). Some of these scholars have asserted the 
relevance of externalization practices to govern mobility beyond national borders (Boswell, 2003; 
Walters, 2004; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Hiemstra, 2012), while others have studied how 
domestic practices and discourses in immigration and refugee law shapes individuals’ access to 
rights and services and structure their experiences (Ashutosh and Mountz, 2012; Griffiths, 2014).  
Following this scholarly foundation, I apply the term selective exclusion to demonstrate 
the complex relation between immigration and the welfare state. Although the term “selective 
exclusion” has been used in other disciplines (see Schuilenburg, 2015) as a way to study exercises 
of power based on inclusionary and exclusionary ways of governance; I advance its usage by 
applying the term to demonstrate the different approaches in the reception of asylum seekers and 
the different degrees of access to the welfare state associated with individuals’ status. The strategy 
of selective exclusion refers to the process of providing certain services and resources to 
immigrants depending on their legal status and/or type of claim. Thus, the state is selecting refugee 
claimants and excluding them from important services and social assistances due to their temporary 
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status. This strategy also acts as a form of immigration control that seeks to ensure that access to 
welfare does not provide an incentive for asylum seekers to arrive to sovereign territories (Geddes, 
2000). 
I draw on Koning’s (2019:15) selective solidarity that “refers to the general support for a 
redistributive welfare state, but also a desire to restrict its benefits to native-born population”. 
Therefore, some parts of the native-born population are unwilling to share the welfare with 
immigrants. While Koning focuses on the state’s unwillingness to grant equal rights and services 
to newcomers and emphasises the distinction between newcomers and native-born populations, 
the term “selective exclusion” is focused solely on the categorizations and distinction between 
different types of newcomers. Moreover, by naming this process as selective exclusion, it puts 
emphasis on border policing and restrictive state practices rather than altruism and solidarity. Thus, 
it sheds light on how humanitarianism can be exclusionary even through altruist acts. 
Selective exclusion implies a restricted humanitarianism that benefits some immigrants 
over the others. Both resettled refugees and refugee claimants access state support at different 
times of their settlement and integration process. However, Canada marginalizes one class of 
refugee by narrowing the opportunities to access this support for refugee claimants while 
establishing specific welfare supports for resettled refugees; for example, through the Resettlement 
Assistance Program and the Client Support Services program. 
As asylum seekers and some types of immigration has been deemed as problematique in 
different countries, there has been increased power to monitor and control behaviour of asylum 
applicants through welfare state measures (Geddes, 2000). These immigrant-excluding welfare 
reforms, as Koning (2019) calls them, are established to marginalize asylum seekers, reduce the 
possibility of social integration, and seek to prevent settlement and facilitate deportation. Different 
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political and social context use excluding welfare reforms in different manners, including 
strategies related to the severity of exclusion and grounds of exclusion. Due to the purposes of this 
thesis, the latter is key to understand the imposed differences between types of refugees. 
In Canada, the grounds of exclusion between refugees are legal and residence status. While 
exclusions and differentiations also happen between native born population and newcomers, 
imposing different legal status to one class of newcomers goes against what they aim to promote: 
Canada’s humanitarianism helping to the refuge cause. The welfare state can act differently 
towards people with different legal status. For example, immigrants with permanent residence 
status are well-protected while undocumented migrants are barred from most social services. On 
the other hand, migrants on temporary permits tend to enjoy more rights than refugees. In this 
respect, Sales (2002) studies how the UK government limited welfare for asylum seekers by 
removing their right of housing and other cash benefits while only giving them a stipend in the 
form of vouchers with a small weekly payment (10 pounds). Apart from the small amount of 
money they receive, the voucher system is not a secure form of income as the UK government can 
remove the economic assistance if the applicant has support from other sources such as family and 
friends (Sales, 2002). 
Although different types of newcomers and their respective legal status determine access 
to welfare depending on how “deserving” they are, the selective exclusion towards refugee 
claimants is based on which characteristics makes a refugee less deserving of Canadian protection. 
Thus, which actions and practices, like their journeys and the means they use to cross their border, 
make people underserving of refugee protection. This perception is then attached to a label 
(refugee claimant) disguised as a humanitarian category, as refugee claimants are allowed to enter 
the Canadian refugee determination system, but with important limitations in their settlement 
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experience. More importantly, these judged actions and practices become more relevant than their 
identities and their construction of their refugeeness. 
Canada is already perceived as having a welcoming attitude towards refugees; however, 
Canada’s humanitarianism should include stronger and more inclusive refugee systems and 
structures to welcome more spontaneous arrivals. This thesis aims to contribute empirically to this 
statement. The next section will introduce the concepts of refugee identity and refugeeness in 
Canadian context to understand the role of categorization and selectivity in Canada’s refugee 
policy. To understand how the colonial perception of refugee could be undermined, it is relevant 
to know what a refugee means in liberal western countries. 
 
The figure of refugee in Canada through the lens of feminist geopolitics 
 This project employs critical and feminist geopolitics to understand Canada’s responses 
and discourses towards flows of refugees arriving at their borders. This thesis moves across scales 
diverging from state-centric views towards the experiences and identities of refugees (Dixon and 
Marston, 2013). It aims to situate the migrant at the centre of policy and border enforcement 
discourses, disrupting the dominance of top-down power perspective in geopolitical landscapes 
and discussions.  
After the initial findings chapter (Chapter 4) which focuses on the geopolitical relations 
between the US and Canada and the border as a site of contention, I scale down in the last two 
findings chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) of this thesis to study the impact of Canadian policies and 
discourses on the experiences and identities of refugee centers and refugee claimants. My research 
engages with multiple scales as it recognizes that refugee claimants’ experiences are influenced 
by actions undertaken at multiple geographical scales. For example, decisions at the federal, 
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provincial and municipal level play into the negotiation of the provision of adequate services for 
refugee claimants. Moreover, provincial decisions of cutting social welfare for refugees affect how 
service providers offer settlement support.   
Critical geopolitics was born as a subdiscipline of political geography in the last two 
decades of the 20th century. It started by challenging classical geopolitical assumptions in 
international relations, rejecting simplistic cartographies and state-centered hierarchies. Critical 
geopolitics questions the role of geopolitical language and discourses in the formulation of foreign 
policy. It also focuses on the role of discourse in building power (Dalby, 1991; ÓTuathail, 1996; 
Dodds, 2001). Critical geopolitical scholars’ work focuses on identifying the “master narratives” 
of international relations and uncovers the role of intellectuals and institutions in the production of 
knowledge. It also confronts and analyses the geopolitical imagination of the state, “its 
foundational myths and national exceptional lore” (O’Tuathail, 2002:12). Critical geopolitics 
explores nationhood as a geopolitical act which involves “ensembles of acts to create nation-space 
and nation-time, the projection of imaginary community, the homogenization of nation-space and 
pedagogization of history” (O’Tuathail, 2002:12).  
Moreover, in contrast to traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics considers the plurality 
of space; thus, how multiple performances make possible the political construction of space. For 
example, the states’ boundaries are not only about the outside but the construction of boundaries 
in relation to the other (inside versus outside). Thus, states and nationhood are constituted in 
relation to an outside against which they define themselves. Critical geopolitics also pays particular 
attention to boundary-drawing practices and performances that characterize the everyday practices 
of states.  
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Scholars of critical geopolitics argue that geopolitics is a plural representation of practices 
that diffuses through society; however feminist scholars critiqued the subdiscipline’s lack of 
gendered approach and lack of inclusion of analysis of everyday spaces and embodied practices 
(Staeheli and Kofman, 2001; Hyndman, 2004; Sharp, 2007). In 1994, Dalby, however, opened up 
the conversation by arguing that “unraveling these silences is a task for any approach to critical 
geopolitics that is sensitive to the complexity of power on the large scale, and to the discursive 
formations that represent and reproduce global politics in numerous locations” (1). Further 
scholarly research by feminist scholars began to situate geopolitics in the everyday and mundane 
practices, rejecting a simplified view of geography (Dodds, 2010). 
Feminist geopolitical scholarship builds on and extends this early work by contending with 
the traditionally masculinist “views from nowhere” predominant in geography as a way to 
categorize and bring order to the world (Staeheli and Kofman, 2004). The interventions of feminist 
geopolitics in the discipline helped to include the materialities of everyday life as they constitute 
the foundations of geopolitical tensions and conflicts (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001; 
Dixon and Marston, 2013). They also included more voices in geopolitical analyses as their work 
focuses on other ignored scales by prioritizing local experiences (Staheli and Kofman, 2004). This 
theoretical approach emphasizes the need to link multiple scales to understand unfolding relations 
of power, such as the body and the household. They help to bring to light “the embodied, every 
day, informal practices that make manifest the place of traditionally disempowered people- such 
as women, children, immigrants, asylum seekers, prisoners and others- within all manner of 
ostensibly geopolitical landscapes” (Dixon and Marston, 2013:1). 
The inclusion of other scales into the discipline opened new ways to study oppression and 
marginalization. As feminist political concerns lie in the personal experiences and interactions of 
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agents, they help to comprehend relations of power not only in formal arenas. Particularly, in 
migration studies, feminist scholars’ research includes the understanding of how multiple relations 
of power cross borders and different spheres through the migrants’ bodies. Hyndman (2012) argues 
that “mobility is a barometer of geopolitics” as the movement of people not only convey 
socioeconomic implications, as traditional geopolitics believe, but they are charged with powerful 
meanings that change the classical conceptualizations of space, place, and identity (Silvey, 1999).  
Most importantly, they seek to understand how relations of power are inscribed onto 
migrants’ bodies and how policies have important effects on migrants’ identities and experiences. 
In this project, the focus is on the categorization of refugees as a way to control people’s mobilities 
and access to social services. Consequently, these practices can also be considered as part of 
migration and asylum management. By taking the juxtaposition of resettled refugees versus inland 
refugee claimants, I aim to expose how the identities of claimants as refugees are constantly 
questioned by the Canadian state, situating them as inferiors from other types of migrants and 
limiting their access to social programs and services. Although their identities as refugees are being 
formed since they decided to leave their countries and seek asylum and protection, states’ practices 
of categorizations and selective exclusion become manners of re-asserting borders. From the point 
of view of the refugee or asylum seeker, borders correspond to “all the space and time covered 
during their journey. Physical difficulties, the threat of arrest, an constrains imposed on the right 
of residence, asylum and work, are all barriers that they come across all along the way, connected 
to strategies for crossing, avoiding, confronting and opposing these” (Mekdjian, 2015: 20).  
Using this theoretical framework, the remainder of this section aims to introduce the 
evolution of the figure of refugee in Canada. This conceptualization allows to better understand 
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the current position of the refugee claimant in the Canadian system and their struggles in getting 
their refugeeness recognized by the state.  
The figure of refugee in the Western world is based on a socially constructed character who 
is generously received and helped by Western nations, yet represents the Other, someone who still 
has to prove themselves as a contributing member of the society. Since Canada became a signatory 
of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, it has defended its commitment to social justice and 
attempted to honour its obligation to grant shelter to persons in need of protection. In accordance 
with that obligation, Canada has resettled 1,088,015 refugees since 1980 (UHCR, 2019b). The 
integration of refugees into Canadian society has been promoted as a source of pride and nation 
building, adding to the richness of the Canadian population (Olsen and El-Bialy, 2016). This 
humanitarian discourse has helped to create an international and domestic image of Canada as a 
welcoming nation. Nevertheless, there are counterarguments to this Canadian self-image that 
remind us that “the refugee” is not the same as being Canadian and that there are powerful 
differentials between them and nationals of the host country.  
Refugees are often recognized as a vulnerable population. While this perception helps to 
create channels and structures for support; it also informs inequitable policies and discourses. For 
some, refugees are people in need of help, even an object of charity; while for others, they are 
foreign, a threat and a burden for the Canadian society. As refugees become persons in need of 
protection, they in turn become the responsibility of those who signed the 1951 UN Convention 
that are able to provide assistance on the basis of humanitarianism. This practice entails “a 
dialectical relationship between the self-image of developed countries as humanitarian and 
charitable, and the construction of refugee as vulnerable and burdensome” (Olsen, et. al., 2016:61).  
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The ‘real’ refugee is that person who shows itself vulnerable, helpless and lacking agency. 
In this respect, Hyndman and Giles (2011) argue that those who wait and remain “in place” are 
feminized, depoliticized and considered as helpless while those who seek actively for asylum 
become potential threats, politically dangerous and underserving. I build on this argument to show 
that this construction is institutionalized through Canadian policy, which prioritize those who are 
part of resettlement programs and not those who arrive spontaneously at their borders. This 
perpetuates the construction of “the refugee” as vulnerable and foreign, who can access their 
system only if they embody the social construction of a helpless individual. This strategy is part 
of the invisible border that impact specifically refugee claimants’ experiences, and limits human 
mobility in general. Joining other scholars (Olsen et. al., 2016; Hadjiyanni, 2002; Johnson, 2011) 
who have challenged the idea that refugees should fit one definition, I demonstrate that the 
categorizations used in Canadian refugee law only harm their access to social services and, 
consequently, their chances to get protection in the country.  
More importantly, I examine the interaction of these practices with the identity formation 
process of refugees. During the refugee claimant process, their refugeeness is constantly 
questioned and it is only acknowledged when the state determines and approves it. Nonetheless, it 
is relevant to consider that the idea of refugeeness is challenging as it can also serve negative 
connotations of difference. Being a refugee can separate them from the host population and collect 
them as a group surrounded by boundaries that delays their sense of belonging to the host society 
(Kumsa, 2006). For example, my participants acknowledged that refugees are often seen as 
different and as burdens; thus, all of them expressed the need to work and prove that they can 
belong and become active contributors to the Canadian society.  
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Empirical studies of refugees’ identities and experiences are abundant (Hamilton, et. al., 
2020; Kumsa, 2006; Valetta, 2014; Tran, 2016). These mainly focus on relations of belonging and 
identity adaptation during the integration process; however, a few have focused on the construction 
of refugeeness and the impact of policies during this process. Refugee claimants often wait months 
or years to get a refugee decision. It is during these years that their identities as refugees are 
forming but constantly questioned at the same time. They are navigating a system that asks them 
to prove their refugeeness, even when their institutions perceive the contrary. The Canadian in-
asylum system forces refugee claimants to embody the characteristics of a “real refugee” 
(vulnerable and helpless); but at the same time, fails to recognize at once that their reasons of their 
displacement actually put them in a risky and vulnerable position. For example, after have to self-
proclaim as a refugee, they must convince the IRB of the legitimacy of their claim and prove that 
they were persecuted or that they fled from political turmoil, where their lives were, in fact, at risk.  
Nevertheless, in this project, I aim to show a different perspective on refugeeness, one that 
it is not imposed or that must be embodied by refugees to show their need for protection. The 
construction of refugeeness is a matter of becoming and forming identity, it is something that 
inherently develops through their struggles. I draw on Hadjiyanni’s (2002) “refugee identity 
paradigm” to demonstrate that the title of refugee is not earned by displacement, but an act of being 
a refugee as an identity in and of itself. 
In her work, Hadjiyanni, a refugee Greek-Cypriot refugee herself, explores an important, 
yet neglected aspect of refugee identities: the refugee consciousness individuals that do not fit the 
official category of refugee. She particularly highlights the need to shift paradigms to disassociate 
the idea of earning the title of refugee that follows the official criterion imposed by states. Her 
theoretical contributions come from her response to the “title paradigm” and the conceptualization 
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of an “identity paradigm” that aims to recover refugees’ voices and perspectives on the formation 
of their own refugeeness. For her, the “title paradigm” (i.e. official conceptualization of refugees) 
is highly problematic as it legitimizes the dominance of the receiving country, overlooks those 
internally displaced, and does not consider adjustment of timeframes during and after the refugee 
determination processes. More importantly, it undervalues the trauma of refugees as states often 
expect them to come to terms with their loss quickly, without acknowledging processes of healing 
and intergenerational trauma. For her, understanding and shifting paradigms is key to comprehend 
what being a refugee entails and to reinstill the individuality in refugees as each experience and 
expression of identity is recognized.  
By exploring how refugeeness is experienced in children of displaced people (i.e. second 
generations of refugees), she shows that there are different ways in which the refugee identity is 
adapted even when they have not gone through displacement and dislocation themselves. She 
argues against the end of the “refugee cycle” and discusses how the refugee consciousness is 
grounded in the act of not forgetting injustice and violence. Thus, she challenges literature on 
adaptation and explores new ways to see peoples’ struggles in the receiving country.  Apart from 
theoretical contributions towards different scholarly areas in sociology (e.g. childhood studies), 
her work is key in refugee studies as it helps to understand what “refugeeness” means for people 
outside the official categories of asylum and how they adopt to trauma and struggles related to the 
refugee experience.  
 This discussion is important for my work as it emphasizes a disassociation from official 
categories of displacement. It allows the inclusion of those who identify as refugees, but do not 
conform the official criteria for being a refugee. More importantly, it highlights the importance of 
individual experiences and the differences between each refugee path. Thus, this paradigm 
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acknowledges the identification of differences between refugees’ journeys for recognition, 
respecting each ones’ past and experiences and their response to trauma and displacement.  
In Chapter 6, I take three particular moments of the refugee claimant experience to 
demonstrate this: the moment of leaving their countries of origin, the moment of crossing the 
border and the moment of waiting for their refugee determination decision. I demonstrate that 
although refugeeness is constructed with every struggle, this, paradoxically, is not enough to 
comply with the official definition of vulnerable and helpless individuals. Therefore, Canada’s 
humanitarianism is based on maintaining refugees as vulnerable, foreign and without agency and, 
consequently, preserving their national self-image as charitable. As long as the state has someone 
to help under their terms, their ideals of humanitarians are sustained.  
Canada has put in place an institutional segregation between those who waited to be 
resettled versus those who appeared at their borders. The construction of a non-deserving refugee 
is perpetuated through lack of institutional and financial support for refugee claimant exclusive 
programs, lack of attention and neglect to fix the shelter system and through federal and provincial 
action to cut access to services, such as the cuts to legal aid in 2019 or the changes in 2012 to the 





This chapter discussed the theoretical and conceptual foundation of the dissertation’s main 
arguments. It outlined the approach I followed to study Canada’s bordering practices that often 
shrink opportunities to provide asylum for all refugees looking for protection. It also highlighted 
the relevance of studying the invisible dimension of the border to understand how less evident 
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bordering mechanisms can impact in deeper ways refugees’ opportunities to access protection as 
well as their settlement experiences. This analysis of the border is key to discuss Canada’s neglect 
and unprovision as part of their policing practices, discussed further in the finding’s chapters. 
These bordering practices, in turn, cause a fractured humanitarianism in which Canada becomes a 
safe haven but still maintain concealed practices that “unwelcome” refugee claimants.  
This framework also highlighted the relevance to study the implications of border 
enforcement and immigration policies at different scales. The political anatomy of the border refers 
to the border as a living entity which can expand and reach local and intimate spaces. For example, 
the discussion on selective exclusion is key to understand how exclusionary ways of governance, 
affect the provision of certain services and resources to immigrants depending on their legal status 
and type of claim. This, subsequently, hinders refugees’ capacity to integrate or to have a positive 
settlement experience. The last section of this chapter outlined the framework used to analyze the 
embodiment of immigration policies. Grounded on feminist geopolitics, this work aims to unveil 
the role of border enforcement in refugees’ identities formation process.  
The next chapter will provide a contextualization and historical overview of the project. It 
will explore the development of securitization practices at the US-Canada border, particularly after 
9/11. It will also provide a discussion on the Canadian refugee system and will introduce the facts 







Regulating refugee flows: securitization policy in the Canadian refugee system 
and its border 
 
Recent scholarship in the discipline of geography has shown how mobility is regulated and 
shaped by relations between states and boundaries, making asylum flows inherently geopolitical 
(Ashutosh and Mountz, 2012). States seek perpetually to establish new ways to control the 
movement of people, particularly those deemed undeserving and dangerous. By trying to keep out 
asylum seekers, governments stretch borders beyond their territorial line using tools such as 
interdiction, offshore detention, third country agreements and increased visa requirements 
(Boswell, 2003; Walters, 2004; Hyndman and Mountz; 2008, Hiemstra, 2012; Gilbert, 2019).  
As borders become detached and states push immigration enforcement beyond territorial 
limits, asylum seekers become regulated even before reaching their country of intended 
destination. This causes a re-spatialization of asylum in which immigration enforcement becomes 
a web of elements limiting mobility and protection inside and outside the territorial borders of the 
states’ enacting them. For instance, Hyndman and Mountz (2008) analyze how states limit the 
access of asylum seekers to sovereign territory, where they can access protection, through different 
tools such as offshore processing centers and bilateral readmission agreements. Other scholars 
analyze interdiction practices and offshore detention that are used to prevent non-desirable 
migrants to make refugee claims in their territory (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Mountz, 
2011). Canada is not the exception in these practices of mobility governance. While prized for its 
welcoming attitude towards refugees, Canada’s immigration and border policies show the 
influence of securitization practices to protect the state’s sovereignty towards undesired 
immigrants. 
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Canada has been attracting immigrants and newcomers through different streams 
throughout the years. As a settler country, immigration has been a vital part of Canada’s social, 
economic and cultural formation. Although known for its leadership in efforts to protect and 
promote cultural diversity, immigration, and refugees’ rights; Canada’s immigration and refugee 
system has faced criticism due to interception practices to avoid spontaneous arrivals and policies 
that privilege economic migrants (Mountz, 2010). Moreover, various scholars have shown the 
difficulty for asylum claimants to request and obtain status in the country due to the complexity of 
the asylum system (Falconer, 2019).  
The extra territorialisation of the Canadian border has been the focus of discussion among 
North American scholars. Some scholars have studied how the Canadian border has stretched its 
limits and tightened visa requirements, implemented greater security screening for refugee 
claimants abroad, enhanced technologies and personnel in offshore airports, and established the 
Safe Third Country Agreement in its border (Arbel and Brenner, 2013; Silverman and Molnar, 
2016; Gilbert, 2019). Other few scholars have given particular attention to the political 
implications of the Canadian policies on mobility, access, and regulation (Andreas, 2005; Bhandar, 
2008; MacIntosh, 2011; Smith 2019).  It is this last set of knowledge that I intend to focus and 
expand on this thesis. The geographical position of Canada, while convenient in limiting access to 
migrants’ arrivals, permits the transnational consequences of US security and immigration policy.  
While the transnational effects of policies can be traced in between different countries, the 
US-Canada relationship holds particularities that make it worthy of scholarly attention in the 
discipline of geography. As stated in Chapter 2, this border is usually seen as less chaotic compared 
to the governance of borders in other parts of the world; nonetheless, it has been demonstrated as 
a site of contention for people looking to seek asylum in Canada.  The results of the deep 
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cooperation in matters of border security between US and Canada have generated a continuum of 
policies that create precarity in both sides of the border. I aim to reveal the nuances of these 
connections by understanding how US policies reverberated across Canada, creating mechanisms 
intended to increase visible border enforcement, but that became intertwined with invisible 
policing practices at the same time. 
 This chapter will contextualize asylum dynamics at the US-Canada border before and after 
9/11. The goal is to illustrate through a historical perspective the development of Canada border 
securitization and its relationship with US policies and practices. I will start this chapter by 
discussing one of the most relevant historic events of asylum crossings using the US-Canada 
border: the Central American border rush in the 1980s and 1990s. The aim is to show how 
important inland asylum flows coming from the US caused changes in Canadian refugee policy. 
Then, I will discuss some of the key policy implemented by the US and Canada after 9/11 to secure 
their border. This chapter will also contextualize refugee policy in Canada and the implications of 
differences imposed on refugee categories and labels. The final section will discuss the most recent 
asylum flows that happened during the Trump administration. This chapter will thus provide 
context for the next –first findings– chapter that focuses on US policy reverberations and Canadian 
responses to refugee flows after 2017. 
 
Central Americans turning to Canada during the 1980s and 1990s  
While the Smart Border Plan of 2001 symbolized an unprecedented harmonization of 
border enforcement between the US and Canada, bi-national negotiations and transnational policy 
pressures were also a fundamental part of previous migratory movements in the region. To 
understand policy choices in North America, and particularly geopolitical relations and 
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transnational dimensions of policy-making, it is relevant to study previous refugee crises in the 
region. The recent increase in arrivals after changes were made to US policy is not unprecedented. 
In 1980, discrepancies between the US and Canadian refugee determination led to a “border rush” 
of Central and South American asylum seekers (Smith, 2019). This “border rush” caused a backlog 
in Canada’s asylum system which led to the creation of the Immigration Refugee Board and 
motivated the country to seek a safe third country agreement with the US.  
The political upheavals in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s left a devastating human 
toll and thousands of persons internally displaced. People of countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua 
and Guatemala sought temporary refuge in neighboring countries such as Honduras and Costa 
Rica; however, when their safety and economic survival were threatened again in these countries, 
they traveled further north to Mexico, the US and Canada. Each of these countries reacted towards 
this crisis supporting their own interests, instead of creating a collective regional response. Due to 
the lack of harmonized responses, these states were forced to readjust their strategies to adequately 
adapt to the consequences of each their neighbors’ policies (Garcia, 2006). For example, stricter 
US policies made Canada adjust and increase capacity-building to receive thousands of asylum 
seekers. 
Before the 1970’s, Canada’s presence in Latin America was limited, until Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) increased the number of embassies and consulates and 
developed institutions to oversee trade and investment in the region. Canada’s first experience in 
receiving large numbers of Latin Americans began when the country offered asylum to Chilean 
refugees fleeing the dictatorship in the 1970s and then, less than a decade later, when hundreds of 
Salvadorians arrived at the country’s borders. Although the decision to seek asylum in Canada 
consists of a series of assessments in the individual’s decision-making process, Canada’s generous 
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policies played an important role in attracting this group of people. Canada granted asylum to up 
to 30 percent of applicants from Central America, in contrast to the 2 percent in the US (Hernandez, 
1987). 
After years of accommodating refugees from Central America, Canadian politicians faced 
a new challenge as US policy became harsher in 1986. The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) was signed by President Reagan, creating a series of measures to restrict the number of 
undocumented workers in the country. Increased border security was among these provisions, 
along with the establishment of penalties for employers who hired unauthorized immigrants and 
the legalization of unauthorized migrants who had been in the US for more than five years (Chishti, 
et. al., 2011). These attempts to control illegal migration in the US culminated in thousands of 
refugees appearing at Canadian borders asking for asylum. Some sought assistance in Canadian 
consulates while others entered the country without authorization. Refugees used churches and 
civil organizations as safe heavens in the US while they waited for their interviews with Canadian 
officials. Ultimately, between 1981 and 1990, more than 45,000 Central Americans arrived at 
Canada to seek asylum, most of them Salvadorian (Garcia, 2006a). 
This border rush caused a backlog in Canada’s system, which at that time was based on 
multiple reviews and appeals (Bisset, 1987). Moreover, shelters were full, and services were scarce 
due to high demand. According to Garcia (2006:131) the “Salvation Army and Red Cross shelters 
in Montreal and Toronto [were] filled to capacity, and the Canadian National Exhibition Grounds 
became an emergency shelter for refugees coming via the United States”.  This situation 
highlighted the need to develop a system which could surpass the limits of their asylum 
determination process.  
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The reverberations from US IRCA to Canada were evident in policy as the Canadian 
government had to reorganize its asylum system to accommodate claimants’ petitions. They 
introduced new legislation that offered an appropriate framework to deal with existing refugee 
movements and allowed Canada to respond to refugees’ needs. For example, the implementation 
of the Immigration Refugee Board and the Immigration Appeal Division helped to manage the 
backlog on petitions, which subsequently, was eliminated in 1993 (Garcia, 2006). Additionally, 
the few services available for this group of people were expanded and more were created in 
different parts of the country.  
At that time Canada started to recognize how the establishment of harsher immigration 
control in the US would reverberate into its territory, affecting its own border governance  and 
asylum system. Canadians also realized that their generous policies became popular among 
refugees and migrants who had already migrated to another part of the continent and then needed 
to relocate due to changes to US policy. The geographical position of Canada had limited migrants 
to choose this country as their first option of asylum; however, transiting through the US gave 
them the opportunity to reach Canada by land.  These impacts, which had not been deemed positive 
in Canadian politics, caused a strong policy shifts in border and immigration control. 
In the late 1980s, the Canadian government discouraged migration by revoking 
permissions to work and to receive social services for those awaiting asylum decisions. More 
importantly, asylum seekers at the border were being sent back to the US while they waited for 
their preliminary hearing date, which was usually months away from when they first crossed the 
border. Many Central Americans were deported once they returned to the US, while others were 
obliged by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to sign a voluntary departure form to 
facilitate automatic deportation if Canada later rejected their petition (Garcia, 2006). Moreover, 
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the increase in asylum petitions raised the mistrust of Canadian officials towards this group of 
people. Many officials would refer to them as “queue jumpers” who tried to take advantage to the 
Canadian generosity. Thus, asylum petitions in Canada became a highly politicized issue after the 
1980s. Some scholars argue that these measures were implemented to protect Canada’s system 
(Bisset, 1987); however, these provided new — and harsher — ways to impede an overload of 
asylum seekers arriving at their border. This response was far from the perception of Canada as a 
safe haven.  
At the time the Immigration Act was passed in 1976, the government created a 
bureaucratically cumbersome process under the Refugee Advisory Committee and the 
Immigration Appeals Board (Garcia, 2006); however, it was enough to process the number of 
claims filed during the end of the 1970s. Nonetheless, the “border rush” made evident that this 
system would fail after the backlog rapidly increased when hundreds of claimants arrived at their 
borders in a short period of time. In this case, Canada decided to impose more restrictions, expand 
the border in more interior and exterior places rather than increase the capacity of its refugee 
protection systems and consider itself as a potential country of first asylum. Through these 
mechanism, Canada was putting the invisible border to work.  
Canada was neglecting the processes that could make refugee claimants arrivals and 
settlement less difficult and onerous. The Central American border rush demonstrated that Canada 
was falling to provide resources and protection to one type o refugee (people arriving actively at 
their borders) by not acting on their humanitarian need. By not investing the resources to increase 
their capacity to receive and process inland refugee claims, they ended up constraining human 
mobility as a whole.  In Chapter 4, I will discuss how this pattern was repeated in 2017, when 
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refugee claimants encountered several and similar deficiencies in the refugee determination 
system. 
 
The US-Canada border after 9/11  
Nowadays, Canada is known for its leadership in efforts to protect and promote cultural 
diversity, immigrants’ and refugees’ rights. However, historically, Canada’s practices were not 
always considered as such. Canada’s history demonstrates that exclusionary policies were 
established to select and attract certain types of people while deterring others to enter to their 
territory. Some examples of exclusion-based policies are the Chinese head-tax, the continuous 
journey regulation to restrict South-Asian nationals, and the turning away of hundreds of Jewish 
during the Second World War. As a settler nation, Canada has a long history of immigration; 
however, it was not until the late 1960s when the category of refugee was recognized in Canadian 
society after its adherence to the United Nations Convention on Refugees, and the subsequent 
establishment of the refugee resettlement program in 1978. After the openness of its borders during 
the 1970s through the 1990s for those seeking protection; the terrorist attacks on September 2001, 
represented a turning point on how Canada controlled the entrance of immigrants and asylum 
seekers to its territory (Murphy, 2007). 
Strict immigration control and criminalization of migrants existed before 9/11. Important 
legislation governing migration was established during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, 
Coleman and Stausse (2014) studied IRCA’s passage in 1986 as an important element of the 
origins of US biopolitical control against undocumented migrants. Moreover, Razack’s work 
(1999) demonstrated that legislative changes in Canada increased border policing in the 1990s. 
She, importantly, identifies the role of Canada in policing bodies of color, using racialized 
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discourses.  Due to the terrorist attacks’ crucial impact in securitization,  9/11 became a foundation 
to study contemporary migration. However, overstating or overgeneralizing its impacts can 
become a risky endeavour, which I try to avoid in this study. Although Canada showed in 
legislation important policing practices and race-driven categorization in the 1990s; my study 
focuses on the amplified security measured after 9/11.  
I analyze post 9/11 operations as these considerably expanded the Canadian border and 
immigration enforcement through cooperation with the US government. In addition, the results of 
this cooperation are tactics that govern most of refugee land border crossings (e.g. through the 
STCA). In this section, after a brief discussion on how securitization has guided immigration 
policy in the Global North during the last decades, I will explore the changes in Canadian 
immigration and border control after 9/11. 
Discussions about security and immigration for at least the last two decades have been at 
the forefront of the social sciences. Several scholars have argued that border control across Europe 
and America have strenuously tightened since the declaration of the “war on terror” (Bigo, 2002, 
Bosworth, 2008, Coleman, 2009). Particularly, scholars have studied the impacts of the terrorist 
attacks on states’ security practices and how immigration and the openness of borders became a 
true concern for Western nations after 2001.  
The previous dynamics of welcoming displaced individuals after the WWII, changed 
drastically as more scrutiny was given to people on the move.  Places such as the US, Australia, 
Canada and western European countries, which offered sanctuary to refugees fleeing from 
Communist countries during the 1960s and 1970s (Wasserstein, 2017), started to enforce tighter 
restrictions to those wishing to enter their territories during the 1990s. These restrictions expanded 
with the conceptualization of “illegal” immigrants and the declaration to the war on terror in the 
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next decade. In the global north, states’ adopted harsher border control in the name of national 
security (Andreas, 2009; Amoore, 2006). The desire to reduce and monitor people on the move 
became a normalized factor which was materialized in the form of border walls, wired fences, 
drones, interior policing, and also the so called “e-borders” from countries that sought to close off 
entry points (Anderson, 2006; Huysman, 2006; Coleman, 2009).  
Nonetheless, during that time another worldwide force was causing a rearrangement of 
different types of movements. Globalization was now shaping the development of free trade and 
cross-border movement of goods and people. Thus, the measures aimed to control mobility were 
competing against a force that required large-scale mobility of populations (Bosworth, 2008; 
Johnson, et. al., 2011). The need for immigrants flows and the need to protect states’ territories 
against threats initiated a response from Western countries that caused the differentiation among 
types of migrants: “valid” refugees and economy-contributing immigrants versus illegal 
immigrants and “bogus” refugees. The people who suffered the most the consequences of this new 
system were asylum seekers and unskilled migrants as their access to these territories became very 
limited.  
The brief, optimistic talk referring to the opening of world borders in the 1990s during the 
peak of globalization, was replaced in the 2000s by an anxious discourse of securing states’ 
boundaries against international threats. At the beginning of the twenty first century scholars of 
disciplines like International Relations and Geography substantially increased their attention to the 
studies of borders as a way to show how borders were transforming, multiplying, and extending 
instead of disappearing following the promise of a post-Cold War borderless world (Johnson, C., 
et. al., 2011). The idea of borders as territorial fixed lines was contested in scholarly research as it 
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was demonstrated that borders were not only found at traditional border crossings but also in 
ephemeral, non-visible and non-territorial zones (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, et. al. 2009).  
The securitization of borders and the new immigration enforcement landscape had 
implications on migrant populations.  Governments set up a sharp distinction between deserving 
and undeserving foreigners (Bosworth, 2008) and promoted practices from the criminal system to 
punish those deemed as dangerous immigrants. Particularly, after the terrorist attacks, the 
immigration systems became governed by fear and unease towards this particular group of people 
(Bigo, 2002).  
Canada’s practices in immigration followed these global trends in the governance of 
migration. More importantly, its geographical position –neighbouring the United States–, forced 
Canadian politicians to create stricter guidelines to control its borders after the attacks. The events 
of September 11th, 2001 certainly did not start the country’s immigration debate, but they did alter 
the course of policy and debate by introducing terrorism as a threat for the Canadian society. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, Canada increased its security through several channels and became another 
key player on safeguarding US territory by implementing harsher border controls (Murphy, 2007).  
Before 9/11, Canada’s policy on immigration was moderate and less restrictive and its 
approach to its southern border was low-profile (Andreas, 2005).  The Canada-US relationship 
was characterized by a harmonious dynamic that was guided by economic ties. The bilateral 
relationship focused on expanding trade relations and rarely caused cross-border tensions. 
However, the disturbance of 2001 caused a shift on this relationship as the US security concerns 
extended northwards and Canada began to experience intense US political scrutiny (Andreas, 
2005). This caused the establishment of an unprecedented system of security at the US-Canada 
border (Gilbert, 2012).  
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Post 9/11 securitization measures in Canada focused on limit the and control of unwanted 
migration. The measures taken by Canada, and other countries, were not necessarily new but their 
amplification and limited judicial review were. In addition, Western security heuristics focused 
more intensively on ethnicity and religion as markers of threat and dangers. Thus, the shift to a 
security paradigm in border and immigration control included racist and xenophobic practices that 
resulted in increased policing, restriction of human rights and harsher treatment of irregular 
migration (Crépeau and Nakache, 2006).  
Race is an undeniable marker of differential treatment and exclusion in migration and 
border regimes (Crosby, 2021). Processes of racialization differentiated outsiders from insiders for 
decades before the terrorist attacks; for example, racist practices against Roma refugees in Europe 
(see Fekete, 2009). Nonetheless, 9/11 enabled an institutionalization of anti-Muslim racism as 
security agencies in North America and Europe started to view that Islam per se constituted a 
“threat”. These markers of difference related to race and religion were expanded to other ethnicities 
as well, particularly those coming from the Global South.  
After 9/11, race and religion were particularly linked to terrorism; however, these elements 
were then related to the production of dominant and subordinate identities and discourses. Thus, 
new border and immigration practices were implemented under the logics of white supremacy and 
hierarchies of racism (Crosby, 2021). Those who were at the bottom of the scale were considered 
unwanted migrants. Particularly in Canada, in the post 9/11 period, the discourse of race and racism 
increased as signifiers such as religion, education and looks took a heightened meaning (Dua, et. 
al., 2005).  
Scholars who have studied US-Canada relations, particularly after 9/11, generally agree 
that the extent of securitization at the border was exceptional as the level of cooperation between 
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both countries was unprecedented. After 2001, cooperation in border security became one of the 
cornerstones in the US-Canada relations (Gilbert, 2012). Although mutually negotiated and 
willingly established, these practices also caused an inherent linkage between US policy and 
Canadian positionality to receive asylum claimants. Canada not only became another key player 
in securing the US border, but its asylum and immigration system became subjects of US changes 
in immigration policy.  It is not my intention to argue that Canada did not show sovereign power 
in these negotiations, but to demonstrate how mutually accorded security practices after 2001 
caused a deep linkage between both immigration policies and systems. As Nicol mentions “there 
is still an American presence in the Canada–US relationship that goes beyond the bounds of normal 
relations between states” (2015: 19). The following timeline describes some of the key practices 
and policies that Canada implemented to secure their border right after the terrorist attacks: 
Table 2.  
Timeline of key Canadian border policies after 9/11 
 Securitization practices 
September to December 2001 Canada gives an initial allocation of $280 million for border 
policing. In addition, they announce the allocation of 5-year 
7.7 billion for “national security” (Wark, 2006). 
October 2001 Canada introduces its Anti-terrorist Act (Bill C-36). 
December 2001 Smart Border Declaration Plan was implemented. Including 
the expansion of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
(IBETs). 
April 2002 Creation of the Canadian Air and Transport Security 
Authority. 
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December 2003 Creation of the Canada Border Service Agency as an 
independent unit. 
2003 Expansion of IBETs to include joint maritime operations, 
creating the Shiprider initiative.   
2004 The Safe Third Country Agreement entered into force.  
 
The first wave of Canadian policymaking after the 9/11 attacks occurred almost 
immediately, from September to December 2001 to meet the crisis and to respond to new threats 
(Wark, 2006). Nonetheless, these measures were still deemed weak as they did not have a 
particular strategic direction. The Canadian government tried to change that after forging new 
legislation, particularly with the passing of the Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-36). This, as one of the 
key pieces of Canadian legislation related to 9/11, combated financing of terrorism and introduced 
more funding towards detection technologies and personnel to strengthen their security. The bill 
was heavily criticized for its impact on Canadian citizens’ fundamental rights and civil liberties 
(ICLMG, 2003) and therefore ended up being revised. 
Up until today, the Government of Canada specifies a few key responses that were taken 
to address the threat of terrorism “both within and beyond Canadian borders” (Government of 
Canada, 2015) after 2001. They created the Canadian Air and Transport Security Authority, which 
is responsible for more rigorous screening of passengers and baggage, they broadened the level of 
information sharing among agencies involved in detecting terrorism financing, and they created 
an operational headquarters that allowed the coordination of military resources available for 
domestic security, safety, and security. More importantly, they created the Canada Border Service 
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Agency, separating border enforcement from the other immigration mandates and agencies, like 
what was previously called Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Government of Canada, 2015).  
Moreover, the efforts of the US and Canada to create a secure perimeter against 
international threats culminated in the US-Canada Smart Border Declaration, signed in December 
of 2001 by US Governor Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy Minister John Manley. This plan was 
aimed to create a regime that would balance the needs of trade and national security at the border 
(Gordon, 2006). After the implementation of this plan, the border became a “zone of confidence 
against terrorist activities” which was the preferred term of Canadian politicians instead of 
“security perimeter” (Andreas, 2005; Kitchen and Sasikumar, 2009).  While the 9/11 attacks were 
not directly related to the US-Canada border, they had long-lasting ripple effects on border 
governance.  
The impact of these measures was also felt in how the Canadian border was perceived 
domestically and internationally. The territorial border was now expanded and seen as a continuum 
causing a spatial and temporal stretching of control and restrictions against undesired people 
(Johnson, et. al., 2011). As Arbel and Brenner (2013) argue, Canada’s border strategy, including 
the STCA, closes the border to refugees by deflecting, deterring and blocking asylum seekers to 
make lawful claims. In this respect, this is how the Canadian Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration recommended to the Parliament to address issues of border security after 2001:  
It has become clear to the Committee that when addressing the issue of security, the border 
must be viewed as a continuum (emphasis added). We must not focus solely on individuals 
presenting at a port of entry. We must look at the entire process involved in international 
travel, trade and migration. From the time that someone purchases an airline ticket or 
applies for a visa, our security procedures must be in effect. Working with the United States 
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and other allies, we must focus our collective resources ― particularly intelligence 
resources ― to meet the challenges facing our nations (House of Commons, 2001:1). 
The Standing Committee recognized the Smart Border agreements as an attempt from Canada to 
proactively design a policy that expanded the border and limited the access of some to Canadian 
territory. 
The Smart border declaration intended to facilitate the legitimate flow of people and 
commerce in a world under threat from terrorists (Gordon, 2006, Gilbert, 2012). The declaration 
had four supporting pillars, to: 1) secure flow of people, 2) secure flow of goods 3) secure 
infrastructure and 4) coordination and information sharing in the enforcement of these objectives 
(US Department of State, 2001). The specific measures included the development of infrastructure 
to exchange information on immigration related-issues, the exchange of criminal records 
information, visa policy coordination, the development of common biometric standards, the 
deployment of US and Canadian immigration offices overseas, harmonization on commerce 
processing to relieve congestion at the border, physical and technological infrastructure 
improvements at the border, deployment of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams3, joint training 
and exercises, and the management of asylum and refugee processing through a Safe Third 
Country Agreement. This action plan made it clear that future border security measures would be 
driven by harmonization of policies and integrated efforts (Wark, 2006).  
While the free flow of goods was being addressed positively, the flow of people was being 
restricted in the same plan. Both countries implemented the “Government of Canada and the 
 
3 The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS) were transnational teams that focused on criminals and 
terrorists that may attempt to cross the US-Canada border. The five core agencies that integrated these teams 
are: The Royal Mounted Police, the Canada Border Service Agency, US Customs and Border Patrol, the US 
Immigration and Customs enforcement and the US Coast Guard.    
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Government of the United States of America for Co-operation in the Examination of Refugee 
Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries” agreement (known as the Safe Third Country 
Agreement), that would control peoples’ mobility at the border. Through the Smart Border 
Agreement, the Canadian and US government were differentiating “safe” people, who could be 
pre-cleared through programs like NEXUS, and “non-safe” travellers who were controlled by 
policy like the Safe Third Country Agreement. The STCA would not enter into force until 2004. 
After this initial smart border plan, both countries promoted and implemented more cross-
border strategies in subsequent years. For example, in 2011, Canadian Prime Minister Harper and 
the US President Obama issued and signed the declaration “Beyond the border: A Shared Vision 
for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness” which established a newly and renovated 
long-term partnership built upon a secure perimeter approach and economic competitiveness 
(Public Safety Canada, 2011). Today, these geopolitical projects still define the dynamics of the 
Canada-US border, not only to Canadian and North American citizens but also to asylum seekers 
coming from the Global South aiming to reach one of these two countries.  
 
Refugee policy in Canada: Refugee rights under IRPA 2002 and 2010 
The regulation of mobility is a geopolitical exercise as it involves territorial and spatial 
strategies to control mobilities and contain international threats (Nagel, 2002). The geopolitics of 
the US-Canada border and immigration relations often make their way into refugee claimants’ 
mobility, representations, and experiences. Particularly, the harmonization between Canadian and 
American policymakers in cross-border management reflect the impact of states’ geopolitical 
relations in constraining migrants’ mobility in North America.  
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 In Canada, the effects of the terrorist attacks and subsequent border enforcement were 
reflected in how immigration and asylum was politically and socially perceived. In this regard, the 
report drafted by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in December of 2001, 
highlighted that the movement of goods and people was essential to Canada; however, they were 
also keen to clarify that “the September 11th clearly demonstrated that the threat of terrorism is, 
in part, an external threat and the response to it must therefore be addressed in the context of our 
immigration system” (Canada Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2001:4). 
Thus, control of immigration and asylum seekers became crucial to the fight against terrorism.  
In this section, I will track two of the key legislative changes after 9/11 that impacted 
asylum seekers’ rights and were implemented due to security concerns. I will focus on the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which came into effect in 2002, and the  
amendments made to this legislation in 2010, under Bill C-11, as they were particularly relevant 
for the refugee community.  
The implementation of IRPA in 2002 was not exclusively a response to the terrorist attacks. 
A key event that informed the discussions about refugee rights in Canada occurred in 1999, when 
four boats carrying Chinese nationals were intercepted off the coasts of British Columbia. After 
being smuggled into Canada, this group of people attempted to move to the US and work in 
irregular fashion. After being apprehended in Canada, the Chinese nationals decided to make 
refugee claims in Canada instead. This event raised concerns among Canadian politicians about 
refugee claimants exploiting the Canadian refugee system. At that time, the concerns were not 
centrally about terrorism, but they were associated with the economic impact of people working 
illegally and with smuggling as a way to enter their territory. As these concerns were something 
that were previously on the table of Canadian politicians (Gilbert, 2012), the terrorist attacks only 
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served to reinforce the idea of needing policies and legislation to control the movement of people. 
As Dobrowolsky (2007:635) argues “while im/migration and security concerns were already 
interlaced by states prior to 9/11, as IRPA in Canada illustrates, the knot was tightened post 9/11”.  
It is also relevant to note that previous efforts to control migration also involved attempts 
to draft and sign a safe third country agreement between 1995 and 1997 (Macklin, 2003). Although 
Canada admitted that there were differences between US and Canadian refugee systems, they still 
pursued the agreement under the justification that the UNHCR considered that the US met 
international standards (Faulkner, 2003). In May of 1996 a preliminary draft was published; 
however, the attempt to get the agreement signed failed in the following year (Canada Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2002). The long-standing interest from Canada in 
concluding the agreement was fulfilled years later, in 2001, when both parties signed the US-
Canada Smart Border Plan which included the implementation of the STCA. 
The implementation of IRPA impacted different elements of the immigration and asylum 
systems, particularly the appeal and detention schemes. Among some of the most important 
changes introduced was the criminalization of people procuring and possessing fraudulent travel 
documents. Under IRPA, officials had the right to detain those who failed to provide rightful 
identification. The power to detain due to identity concerns became exercisable not only at ports 
of entry but at any time and place. In this sense, the multiplication of the Canadian border induced 
a shift from fixity to a multi-location strategy where individuals would encounter border practices 
beyond the territorial limits (Szary and Giraut, 2015). Although this was a preventive measure to 
avoid people with malicious intentions to enter their territory, it was particularly troublesome, as 
claimants often carry false documents or do not carry documents at all when fleeing from their 
home countries.  
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There were two other particular concerns linked to asylum seeking in Canada implemented 
through IRPA 2002. First, the fact that refugee determinations were now made by one member of 
the tribunal sitting alone, replacing the two-member panel regime where only one member needed 
to find in favour of an applicant for refugee status to be awarded (IRPA, 2002). Although 
authorities considered this a “logical” transition as members rarely disagreed with each other, it 
removed a layer of protection to claimants (Dauvergne, 2003). Second, the new laws changed the 
appeal process. Under the old Immigration Act of 1976, individuals ordered to be removed from 
Canada were granted the right to appeal on the basis of law, fact, mixed law, or on the ground that, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, they should not be removed from Canada (Chan, 
2005). However, under IRPA 2002, individuals that were found inadmissible on considerations of 
security, violation of human rights and criminality were no longer allowed to appeal to the 
Immigration Appeal Division (Government of Canada, 2002). This change also affected the former 
discretionary powers of panel members to determine whether an individual should or should not 
be removed based on the circumstances of their case.   
As mentioned previously, some of the provisions included in IRPA 2002 were based on 
already developed concerns before 9/11. Nonetheless, this act became a stricter resource to control 
and avoid the entrance of people suspected to be a threat to public security after 2001. Some 
scholars argue that IRPA 2002 did not change substantially the structure of asylum laws 
(Dauvergne, 2003) and that the amendments proposed to IRPA in 2010 were more concerned with 
refugees and freedom of movement (MacIntosh, 2011). In 2010, the Ministry of Citizenship, 
Immigration and Culturalism introduced Bill C-11, known as the Balanced Refugee Reform Act. 
As a result, IRPA was amended to give the Minister the authority to “set processing time limits in 
the regulations and to designate countries, parts of countries or classes of nationals of countries 
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that do not normally produce refugees, for the purpose of further expediting the processing of 
claims” (Government of Canada, 2011, para. 2). The most important provisions concerning 
refugees were the expedited processing at the appeal stage and the Designated Countries of Origin 
Policy, which aimed to fast-track refugee hearings of people coming from countries that did not 
normally produced refugees. This legislation was particularly keen to detect unfounded claims and 
to reduce pressure in Canada’s asylum system; thus, “contributing to a system that is able to 
provide faster decisions to those who are in need of protection” (Government of Canada, 2011, 
para. 2).  
While some of the amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Bill- C11) 
were considered constructive and encouraging (CCR, 2010; Sanctuary Coalition of KW, 2010), 
others raised concerns among several civil organizations.  For example, the Canadian Council for 
Refugees, Amnesty International and the Refugee Lawyers Association of Ontario argued that 
speeding up the line for refugee claimants waiting for interviews would only infringe refugee 
rights. Particularly, the Designated Country of Origin policy caused controversy as most 
organizations believed refugee determination needs an individualized assessment and refugee 
cases should not be based on their country of origin. This strategy, based on making a more 
efficient refugee system, became problematic as it empowered the government to designate a list 
of countries considered safe but from which a number of well-founded claims are made. Moreover, 
these organizations urged for a mechanism to review that countries do not remain designated when 
conditions have changed to ensure the full protection of refugee rights. The amendments were 
aimed at relieving the pressure on an overburdened refugee determination system; however, the 
burden was pushed onto refugee claimants whose cases provided a convenient opportunity to 
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prioritize efficiency over fairness (Atak et al., 2018; Neylon, 2015). A faster immigration system 
does not always equal increased rights for refugee claimants. 
Moreover, as this thesis aims to show the impacts of securitization in refugee rights, I will 
also explain one of the most contentious policies, to the present, established as part of the Smart 
Border Plan: The Safe third Country Agreement. Refugee rights, such as having their claim 
determined, not to be detained and freedom of movement were largely restricted through this 
legislation. This restriction was promoted as necessary for Canada to be able to protect its society 
from criminality and international security threats (MacIntosh, 2011).  
 
Restricting refugee rights through the STCA 
 
Canadian borders are now being reterritorialized, de-territorialized and extra-
territorialized. Their fixity is questioned as states extend their legal reach to maximize their 
opportunities to prevent “undesirable migrants” to enter their sovereign territory (Gilbert, 2019). 
This way of governing migration was included in the post 9/11 US-Canada harmonization of 
border security, particularly through the establishment of the Safe Third Country Agreement in 
2004. This agreement prohibits asylum seekers from making claims at the official Canadian ports 
of entry when coming from the US on the premise that the US is considered a safe country and 
that asylum should be claimed at the first country of landing. This agreement draws on the concept 
of “safe third country” which originally developed in Europe and its mechanism are contained in 
the Dublin III Regulation of the European Union (Gil-Bazo, 2015). In the North American context, 
this agreement applies only to land crossings and not to arrivals by air or sea, a contradiction often 
criticized. Furthermore, the Agreement only applies with respect to those claims made at a land 
official port of entry and not to those made inland as it is impossible to determine whether inland 
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claimants arrived via the US. As MacKlin mentions (2003: 3) “refugee claimants who wish to 
pursue their claim in Canada have no incentive to disclose that they have passed through the US, 
and every reason to conceal it”. This section aims to show how this specific agreement altered the 
dynamics of the Canadian border, jeopardizing refuges’ access to asylum while causing disorder 
at the border. This section draws on Emily Gilbert, Efrat Arbel and Alleta Brenner’s analysis of 
the STCA. Their work provides a useful framework for understanding how Canada’s strategies to 
stretch their border reworks its jurisdiction as border controls are now attached to non-traditional 
spaces.  
Under domestic and international law, Canada is obligated to extend legal protections to 
asylum seekers present at or within its territorial borders. However, it is a different story for those 
who have not yet reach Canadian territory. As Arbel mentions (2013: 2) “Canada’s legal obligation 
towards asylum seekers outside its territorial border [however] are ill defined”. Canada’s strategy 
of pushing the border out through visa restrictions, offshore interdiction and deflection measures, 
restrict asylum seekers to lawfully reach Canadian’s frontiers by air and water. As of 2004, the 
Safe Third Country Agreement completed the set as asylum seekers were also restricted to enter 
by land. All these measures were aimed to facilitate Canada’s interception abilities towards 
“undesirable” migrants in places away from sovereign territory. Although the STCA was put in 
place after 9/11, Canada had tried to introduce legislation that limited refugee arrivals since a 
decade earlier (Canada Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2001; Gilbert, 2019).  
Different factors prompted the implementation of a safe third country agreement between 
Canada and the US. The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration highlighted in 2001 
that refugees preferred making claims in Canada due to the differences between the Canadian and 
the US refugee determination system (Canada Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
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Immigration, 2001). This preference relies on the premise that the US process for asylum claims 
is more complicated and unjust and, consequently, there are fewer chances to obtain regular status. 
With the STCA, Canada is not only closing the doors to potential refugees before arriving in their 
territory, but it has also deemed “safe” a country whose refugee system is more restrictive and that, 
often, fails to ensure fundamental protections to asylum seekers (CCR, 2018). Accordingly, this 
has always been and remains a major point of contention and contestation to the STCA, and it was 
the subject of a court decision in 2020 finding the agreement to be unconstitutional by the Canadian 
Federal Court. This was later appealed by the Federal government and the STCA still is in place 
today resulting in asylum seekers routinely being turned back at the US-Canada border (Keung, 
2021).  
Several aspects of the US asylum system have raised concerns as it fails to comply with 
international standards. According to the Canadian Council for Refugees some of the concerns 
include: 
1. Expedited removal processes: Numerous studies have shown that US authorities 
fail to efficiently identify a “credible fear” in their first interview, making them 
subject to an expedited removal. Trump’s has expanded this provision by denying 
some groups entry and court hearings (CCR, 2018; Abu Alrob and Shields, 2020). 
1) One-year bar: People must make an asylum claim within one year of arrival; 
nonetheless, due to lack of information and legal representation, many people miss 
this deadline (CCR, 2018). The latest proposals by the US federal government have 
made this element an adverse factor that would ordinarily result in the denial of a 
claim. 
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2) Immigration detention: Many asylum claimants who lack proper documentation 
are held in detention. While this has happened routinely in the US, Trump 
expanded criteria to detain eligible asylum seekers, including those having 
legitimate fears of prosecution and that are highly vulnerable (CCR, 2018; Abu 
Alrob and Shields, 2020). A report from the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Human Rights Watch and the National Immigration Centre found that since 2017, 
more than 40 detention facilities have opened and that those detained are held in 
inhumane conditions. Moreover, in 2019, the detained population per day 
exceeded 56,000 people, approximately 50% more than the previous highs during 
the Obama administration (Cho, et. al., 2020). 
These concerns have remained unaddressed by US politicians, and Canadian officials implemented 
the STCA knowing of these aspects, minimizing options for hundreds of asylum seekers. Before 
the STCA, individuals had a safety valve as “deserving asylum seekers denied or barred from 
asylum in the United States successfully obtained protection in Canada” (Arbel and Brenner, 2013: 
9). After 2004, this chance was eliminated, diminishing rights to seek asylum not only in the US, 
but also in Canada. 
Gilbert (2019) and Arbel (2013) suggest that the STCA is a strategy that causes legal 
violence as it allows the state to evade human rights and deny accountability. Both scholars show 
that the Canadian border shifts and stays static at different stages, limiting migrants’ rights. Gilbert 
(2019) finds this “elasticity” of the border is enforced by Canadian government agencies; thus, 
refugee rights are often dependant on the implementation, operationalization and interpretation of 
the law. These scholars analyses are based on the assessments and decisions of the STCA from the 
Canadian Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal a few years after the agreement’s 
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implementation. While the first ruled against the STCA, in 2007, on the basis that the US could 
not be considered a “safe” country, that Canada was participating in indirect refoulment by 
returning asylum seekers to the US and, that the STCA violated two sections of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the later, struck down the Federal Court ruling and the STCA 
was reinstated a year after (Gilbert, 2019).  
The main argument from the Court of Appeal was that someone who was denied entry 
under the STCA at the border was considered not to have reached Canada and, therefore, the 
Charter of Rights did not apply to them. Following this reasoning, Arbel (2013) argues that the 
Court of Appeal considered the border as both a static and shifting element.  While the Court 
believes that constitutional protection should be given only to those who physically cross the 
border [turning it into an immobile and static line]; it also conceives the border as a shifting barrier. 
In this sense, the STCA becomes a moving barrier outside Canada’s formal boundaries making it 
impossible for an asylum seeker to even reach Canadian territory and disallowing “refugee 
claimants from claiming constitutional protection” (Arbel, 2013; Gilbert, 2019). Thus, the 
jurisdiction of the STCA reaches both the territorial land border and the bodies looking to enter 
Canada but that are positioned way outside the country’s geographic perimeter line.  
According to these scholars, the contrariety of the static and shifting principle and its 
simultaneous application by the Canadian government becomes problematic as it deprives 
potential refugee claimants of actionable rights and strips them of recourses under Canadian law. 
As Gilbert mentions “Here we have two contradictory principles in place simultaneously: the 
border is elastic in that it is distended when it comes to ensuring interdiction but snapped back in 
place in order to limit access to constitutional rights for a certain category of migrant: asylum 
seekers” (2019: 429). 
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The STCA hat unintended consequences as it often causes disorder at the border. 
According to the Standing Committee, in the fiscal years of 1999-2001, 10,967 asylum seekers 
entered the territory coming from the US, representing 34% of all refugee claims; that number, 
increased to 37% in the following year (Canada Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration, 2001). Although the implementation of the agreement reduced those numbers to an 
approximately 20% (Moens and Callacot, 2008), it also caused the increase of irregular arrivals to 
Canada. Scholars in geopolitics have studied how these types of measurements are not entirely 
successful in deterring migrants but, more often, they cause migrants to look for more dangerous 
places to make crossings (Massey & Sánchez, 2010; Angelucci, 2012).  
Irregular migration in Canada has not been a prominent issue in governmental debates; 
however, it has become the focus of public and political discussions over recent years, particularly, 
at moments of crisis (Squire, 2010). This is also part of a larger trend in which ruling parties in 
western countries emphasize the need for stricter border control to mitigate irregular migration. 
For example, one of the most recent policy mechanisms established towards the reduction of this 
type of migration is the European Union New Pact on Migration (2020). This pact aims to address 
irregular migration through harsher EU’s external borders and through a better strategy for an 
integrated border management. The Pact builds upon three dimensions: cooperation with countries 
of origin and transit, robust management of the EU’s external borders and more internal rules to 
achieve a more balanced distribution of asylum seekers between EU members (European 
Commission, 2020). 
 In the case of the US-Canada border, since the Agreement denies access to Canadian 
territory to asylum seekers at the border –which circumvents Canada’s international obligations– 
people risked their safety by crossing, mainly, at places like Roxham Road (NY-Quebec). These 
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irregular crossers have been able to use a so-called “loophole” where the STCA does not apply, 
places away from official ports of entry. The “irregular” nature of their arrival causes them to be 
subject to diminished legal protection once they enter Canadian territory. However, it is important 
to note that even though these people use irregular means to enter the country; they generally 
present themselves as soon as they can to the law enforcement officials to make their claim. Thus, 
their intention is not to live in irregularity or to avoid examination but to avoid being sent back to 
the US (CCR, 2017).  
The violence inscribed in establishing mechanisms that can cause injury or death by re-
routing migrants’ journeys, like the STCA, show that states consider seeking asylum as security 
issue rather than one of protection (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Vogt, 2013). Particularly, for 
Canada, the STCA calls into question Canada’s generosity and re-frames de debate about the 
compassion of its refugee protection system (Macklin, 2003; Arbel and Brenner, 2013). 
 
Present-day structure of the refugee protection system 
 
After the historical contextualization of Canada’s securitization practices, this section will 
discuss shortly the present-day structure of the refugee protection system. I will focus on 
presenting the differences between refugee claimants and resettled refugees. In Chapter 6, I will 
discuss the implications of these categorizations that lie at the core of Canada’s refugee protection 
system. This is relevant to further understand the consequences of Canadian refugee policy at other 
scales, like the bodies and the identities of refugees.  
Canada’s humanitarian obligation towards refugees is guided by the 1951 UN Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees. Canada signed the Convention in 1969, 18 years after it was 
adopted by the United Nations and 15 years after it entered into force (CCR, n.d.). Until 1976, 
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Canada’s legislation recognized refugees as a special class of immigrants in the Immigration Act. 
More advances were made in Canada regarding the protection to refugees after 1985 Supreme 
Court’s Singh decision, in which refugees’ fundamental rights became protected by the Canadian 
Charter Rights and Freedoms. After the Singh decision, refugee claimants were now entitled to an 
oral hearing, in accordance with international law.  
Under the Convention, signatory countries’ obligations to protect a refugee come into 
effect only after an asylum seeker has entered their territory. Countries are also obliged to the 
principle of “non-refoulment” which means that they must not send back someone into a situation 
of possible persecution. They also should not penalize asylum seekers for entering the county 
illegally. However, this thesis provides empirical examples of how the punitive system for 
irregular arrivals can be enacted in many ways, must of them hidden and concealed.  
The Convention imposes no obligation on countries to assist refugees until they have 
arrived at their territory, it also does not impose requirement for burden sharing between states 
(Millbank, 2000). While there is no requirement to do that, Canada’s humanitarianism has been 
legitimized by its openness and commitment to the refugee cause. Canada has a strong resettlement 
record; however, it does not provide the same opportunities to people actively seeking asylum at 
its borders (Hyndman and Reynolds, 2015). Canada has implemented mechanisms that actively 
pushes the border out in order to preclude the arrival of asylum seekers. Thus, although they are 
signatories of the 1951 Convention, Canada’s practices result in a devaluation of certain types of 
refugees.  
 In Canada, individuals who ask for refuge must adhere to the provisions of the UN 
Convention for Refugees and they can apply through two different programs: 1) the Refugee and 
Humanitarian Resettlement Program and the 2) In-Canada Asylum Program. The former is for 
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people who need protection from outside Canada. These are Government Assisted Refugees 
(GARs) who are referred by the UNHCR or private sponsored refugees. The latter is for people 
making refugee claims once they are within Canadian territory. The next table show the differences 
between these programs: 
Table 3.  
Differences between Canada’s refugee protection programs 
 Refugee and Humanitarian 
Resettlement Program 
In-Canada asylum program 
Subjects  People who need protection 
from outside Canada. 
People who ask for protection 
from within Canadian 
territory. 
Status upon arrival Refugees (either as GARs or 
as sponsored refugees). 
Refugee claimants. 
Agencies that promote and 
help refugees for resettlement 
UNHCR, private sponsors, 
provincial and federal funded 
agencies. 
GARs are enrolled first in the 
Resettlement Assistance 
Program and then in the Client 
Support Services program. 
The aim of both programs is to 
support a positive settlement 
experience in Canada. 
Agencies mainly funded by 
municipal governments and 
by limited federal financial 
programs. No official federal 
program has been created to 
cover their needs, except for 




Key services before and upon 
arrival 
Refugees can access 
Immigration Loans Program 
to cover travel costs. 
Welcoming them at the airport 
or other port of entry. 
Helping to find a temporary 
place to live. 
Helping to find a permanent 
place to live. 
Settlement agencies offer 
basic need to refugee 
claimants like transitional 
shelter, settlement assistance, 
accessing education4, and 
support in their refugee claim 
process. 
Financial aid   Canada provides income 
support for up to one year or 
until they can support 
themselves. 
Claimants can apply for 
welfare after their arrival.  
Means to cross the border  Mostly by air.  By land (irregularly or on 
Ports of entry) or by air 
(overstaying their tourist 
visas).  
 





4 These services are also offered to resettled refugees through the Client Support Services program, created to 
meet the needs of Government Assisted Refugees in their first 12 to 18 months (National GAR case management, 
n.d.) 
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The resettlement program is intended for those refugees who meet the definition of the Convention, 
but “who do not have a durable solution5 and therefore have a continued need for international 
protection” (UNHCR, 2011: 20). This program is also unique as it is aimed at those who are 
already located in a country with an asylum program, but are looking to be resettled in a third 
country due to a continued need of protection. The resettlement program in Canada is not inclusive 
for all asylum seekers, and can only be accessed by certain groups who have access to UNHCR 
programs in their home or transit countries.  
On the other hand, the process of becoming a refugee once you are in Canadian territory –
through the inland asylum system – is lengthy and complex. The steps to getting status can become 
a source of emotional distress and frustration among claimants. To make a claim, an individual 
needs to declare their intentions to ask for asylum at a Port of Entry; or, once inside Canada they 
should go to their nearest IRCC office. In both cases, the individual is required to complete 
application forms which will be revised by the Immigration Refugee Board. An eligibility hearing 
is conducted where an official determines if they are suitable to make a claim. For PoE claims, 
these initial hearings are usually done on the spot by a CBSA agent; but for inland claims, officials 
can ask individuals to return at a later time. If the individual is eligible to make a claim their case 
is referred to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), and they will be given a Confirmation for 
Referral and await a hearing date. If the claim is allowed, the claimant can apply for permanent 
residency and family reunification. If it is denied, the claimant can appeal the decision to the 
Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). If this recourse fails, the claimant will be scheduled for 
deportation (IRB, 2018). 
 
5 For the UNHCR the durable solutions accessible for asylum seekers are voluntary repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement in a third country. 
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The status of a refugee claimant is only given after the initial eligibility hearing is 
conducted. This hearing is particularly important as the officer will give refugee claimants a 
Refugee Claimant Protection Document (RCPD) which shows that the individual has been found 
eligible for a protection hearing. This document is helpful in accessing services, such as health 
care and job permits. Therefore, this initial encounter with authorities is not only required for 
permission to stay in Canadian territory, but to access essential services while awaiting the 
decision.  
In Canada, factors like immigration status and the type of refugee claim determine the 
services that are accessible for these individuals. For example, refugee claimants are not eligible 
for federal settlement provisions, except for health services, until they receive a positive refugee 
determination. There are no formal support services for refugee claimants; therefore, most of times 
they have to overcome obstacles throughout their entire determination process without the 
resources that others type of refugees may have (GARs and sponsored refugees). Thus, it is 
important to explore the implications of Canadian categorization of  refugees.  
 
Seeking asylum during the Trump era 
US immigration policies have always been intimately linked to powerful narratives of 
securitization, racialization, criminalization and social control (Hiemstra, 2011). After the end of 
the Bracero Program in the early 1960s and the consequent increase in undocumented arrivals, the 
US began the establishment of enforcement which aimed to remove those who were not welcomed 
in the country. As an example, Operation Wetback (1954), approved by President Eisenhower and 
known as the largest mass deportation in American history, was one of the first policies aimed to 
deport a large quantity of members of a racial group using military techniques and coordinated 
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tactical operations. As many as 1.3 million Mexicans and Mexican-Americans were sent back to 
Mexico (Blakemore, 2018). This type of enforcement was intensified in the 20th century, 
particularly after 9/11, which allowed more restrictive measures to be used to control the 
movement of people. In the US, discourses of crisis and national security had served to justify the 
use of tactics like deterrence, detention, and deportation.  
This negative view of undocumented migration and the fear of bogus refugees guided US 
enforcement policies during the decades since the Bracero program, escalating cyclically or at 
historical moments (Loyd and Mountz, 2018). In particular President Trump sought to deter people 
from reaching the US by implementing aggressive policies based on racially charged discourses 
against certain populations such as Muslims, Mexicans and Central Americans. During his years 
in office, Trump proposed, and established policies aimed to 1) prevent new immigrants and 
asylum seekers from arriving at the US and 2) destabilize the life of immigrants that already live 
in their territory. During and after his campaign, he made immigration the centerpiece of his 
discourse, appealing to the use of securitization as his primary strategy to combat US international 
threats (Pierce & Selee, 2017). Trump’s nationalistic and populist views, particularly those related 
to keeping migrants away, perpetuates the idea in the contemporary world of the US border as a 
hard line and heavily militarized, that aims to make a racial distinction between US "good" citizens 
versus "bad" outsiders (Jones, 2016). Thus, Trump’s immigration agenda relies on the functional 
approach of borders aimed to separate and categorize populations based on race and ethnicity. 
Trump’s changes to immigration policy also show how bordering practices are even more 
dispersed across the US territory. His policies touched on a wide range of immigration issues as 
his administration took more than 400 executive actions on different issues related to immigration, 
from refugee resettlement to visa processes (Pierce and Bolter, 2020). During his first week in 
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office, he banned travel from seven Muslim-majority countries and temporarily blocked refugee 
resettlement. Months later, he increased immigration enforcement and rescinded the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Stillman, 2021). He also separated 3,900 children from 
their parents at the southern border (Spagat, 2021), 540 of whom had not be reunited with their 
families at the end of 2020 (Pilkington, 2020). This section will expand on some of the most 
significant policies that impacted immigrants and asylum seekers looking for protection in the US 
at that time.  
Trump’s administration enabled the hardening of previous traditional strategies, such as 
the border wall and employers’ raids, but he has also proposed policies that include population 
groups that were not considered high-risk in previous administrations. For example, the federal 
government ordered to terminate the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) of Salvadorians, Haitians, 
and Sudanese, when the TPS designations of these countries had been repeatedly extended under 
the three previous administration. Although the TPS designations were to end in 2020, this order 
did not go into effect and their temporary status were extended through October 4th, 2021 (USCIS, 
2020a).  
Trump’s administration also aimed to terminate DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals). Multiple lawsuits were filed by DACA recipients and advocates achieving the issuance 
of preliminary injunctions by district courts to temporarily stop the order. While the case was 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services was not accepting 
new requests (US CIS, 2019a). In June of 2020, the Supreme Court rejected Trump’s petition to 
end the program, letting Dreamers to continue their lives without the fear of being deported. These 
traditional immigrant communities in the US have been affected by the federal government 
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aggressiveness in implementing changes in immigration policy, raising fear and vulnerability by 
destabilizing their lives.  
The status of these communities protected them from immediate deportation and detention; 
however, the undocumented community was even more vulnerable as the number of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids increased, as well as arrests and removals. After Trump 
signed an executive order that gave ICE broader authority to detain unauthorized migrants in the 
interior of the country, these arrests rose 30% in 2017 (Bialik, 2018).  The number of migrants’ 
apprehensions at the US-Mexico border also increased. From October 2018 to September 2019, 
there were 851, 508 apprehensions recorded which were more than double the number the year 
before as there were 396, 579 apprehensions (Gramlich, 2020). In response of the rise of Central 
Americans families seeking asylum in US, Trump implemented policies to discourage migrants to 
enter their territory. One prominent change is the “Remain in Mexico” policy that force migrants 
to wait in Mexico while their claims are adjudicated. Implemented through a process formally 
called Migration Protection Protocols (MPP), this policy aimed to deter sharping rising flows from 
migrants from Central America (Chishti and Bolter, 2019). 
As more Central American families were travelling north to seek asylum, the US 
implemented one of the most criticized policies since Trump took office: the separation of families 
at the border. As part of the “zero-tolerance policy”, 3, 900 children were separated from their 
parents (Spagat, 2021) and held in facilities near the border in poor conditions, making evident 
how these strategies are used to dehumanize people. By the beginning of the Biden administration, 
the border had been extended even more outside and inside US territory: from the bodies of those 
people unable to travel there due to immigration restrictions to the bodies of children who were 
waiting in detention living in substandard conditions.  
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In 2020, almost one year after my interviews were completed, the Trump administration 
proposed new regulations that make it more difficult for migrants to make claims. A draft rule 
released by the Department of Homeland Security and Justice in June of 2020 enlists a series of 
changes that would have to face those seeking for asylum in the US. Among these changes is 
greater scrutiny for those individuals who have travelled through at least one country while on the 
way to the US but not asking for asylum. A similar rule was already applied to migrants travelling 
to Mexico from Latin America (Alvarez and Sands, 2020). Moreover, judges will be allowed to 
dismiss cases without court hearings if they think the evidence is too weak and they can declare 
the case as “frivolous”6. The regulation also mentions that other adverse factors –that would 
ordinarily result in the denial of a claim– are criminal convictions (even if they were reversed, 
vacated or expunged), failure to file taxes and the “unlawful presence [in the US] of more than 
year’s cumulative duration prior to filling an application for asylum” (USDHS, 2020: 74).  
The regulation also proposes redefining “membership a particular social group”, which is 
one of the categories that people can be persecuted for, and therefore, a valid reason why they can 
ask for asylum. The draft argues that because the phrase has not been defined by the Congress or 
the UN Refugee convention, it lacks “the benefit of clear legislative intent” (USDHS, 2020: 50). 
Their intention to narrow the definition could mean that more claims will be rejected, such as those 
made by victims of gang or domestic violence.  Although this will not take effect immediately as 
it still has to undergo a public comment period (USDHS, 2020), it demonstrates that implementing 
harsher immigration and asylum measures was still a priority in Trump’s administration until the 
very end of his term.  
 
6 An application is frivolous if: 1) contains fabricated essential element, 2) it is premised upon false evidence, 3) 
it is filed without regard to the merits of the claim or 4) it is clearly foreclosed by applicable law (DHS, 2020).  
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Seeking asylum during Trump administration became more challenging for many people. 
His administration was clear in limiting refugees’ mobility and protection rights. The policies and 
bordering practices mentioned, caused important changes in North America, as asylum seekers 
redirected their journeys to Canada. Although these executive actions could be undone by the 
current and future US administrations, the way they were implemented –through a layered 
approach between regulatory, policy and operational changes and a rapid pace of chance–, makes 
it possible that the Trump administration will have long-lasting effects (Pierce and Bolter, 2020). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided background on the geopolitical relationship between the US and 
Canada as it pertains to the governance of their shared border. I focused on how US policy changes 
impacted the increase in border crossings to Canada and on the Canadian government responses 
towards migratory movements at different historical moments. The development of Canadian and 
US border enforcement after 9/11 was addressed in this chapter as it determines how asylum 
movements became restricted in subsequent years. Particularly, the role of the Safe Third country 
Agreement is relevant to understanding current controls, and their subsequent impact on migrants’ 
decisions to cross irregularly by land. The STCA, although highly criticized by civil society 
organizations, is one of the pillars of Canadian immigration policy. 
I also contextualized Canadian refugee policy by showing important changes in policies 
related to refugee protection and how these became more restrictive for asylum arrivals; 
particularly, after the “border rush” during the 1980s and 1990s and the implementation of stricter 
provisions for refugees in IRPA 2010. This chapter also presented the current lengthy and complex 
processes that claimants have to experience to gain refugee status, as well as the services they are 
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entitled to upon arrival. More importantly, I discussed key differences between refugee protection 
programs in Canada which create uneven categorizations among individuals seeking protection. 
This context proves relevant to understanding how Canada’s humanitarian practices are 
determined by hierarchies and categories of membership that lie at the core of its refugee system. 
The last section provided a contextualization of seeking asylum during the Trump administration. 
Discussing the changes in US policy is key to understand the refugees’ decision-making process 
to extend their journeys to Canada. It is also relevant to recognize how specific changes to US 

















Contrasting dynamics: Canada’s border policing and the visible/invisible 
games 
 
A surge of irregular arrivals into Canada from the US began in the summer of 2017 when 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reported an increase in irregular crossings at Roxham 
Road in Quebec. Over a period of two weeks, the RCMP intercepted more than 3,800 people who 
aimed to enter the country in an unofficial manner (Smith and Laframboise, 2017). The surge in 
asylum arrivals can be attributed to many factors. Every immigrant journey has its own nuances 
as people travel for several reasons and choosing their destination country is part of a larger 
decision-making process. However, the interviews conducted during field research in the summer 
of 2019 suggest that US policies, after Trump’s administration came into power, were a major 
driver for irregular and regular migration to Canada during that time. As stated previously, since 
entering office in January 2017, Trump proposed and implemented policies that affected several 
aspects of the immigration system, from asylum to deportation, the refugee resettlement program 
and admissions from certain majority Muslim-countries.  
In this first findings chapter, I explore the relation between reverberations and the 
invisible/visible border dichotomy. I analyze how US immigration policies impact Canadian 
border enforcement practices, while becoming intertwined with mechanisms that shift the visibility 
of the border at different times. In times of crisis, Canada’s responses aims to make the border 
visible and clear to deter those wanting to make asylum claims in their territory. It does this by 
introducing harder immigration policies, like the creation of a Task Force on Irregular Migration 
or by introducing the Bill C-97, which makes refugees ineligible to make a claim if they had 
already made one in another country that Canada considers safe. This type of policy was evident 
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at the national level, when the influx of asylum seekers from US was at its highest in 2017 and 
2018.  
However, more often Canada reconstructs the meaning of its border by diffusing policing 
throughout its refugee and settlement system. Thus, Canada aims to invisibilize their border at 
different scales. I demonstrate this in this chapter by exploring three particular situations: atrophy 
and negligence on the Canadian refugee determination system, lack of commitment to cover a 
humanitarian need in the region and by the (in)actions to modify the Safe Third Country 
Agreement. Although making the border visible has important effects in migratory patterns, I aim 
to demonstrate that the invisible dimension of the Canadian border reach and impact refugees’ 
lives in more pervasive ways. I follow Rumford’s idea (2012) that borders need not always to be 
visible in order to function. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on discussing the transnational effect of US policies 
in the region. In this section I apply Hiemstra’s (2012) concept of reverberations to analyze how 
US changes in policy caused both changes in roles and positions of US and Canada in the region 
and the reorganization of Canada’s refugee and settlement system. “Reverberations” is one of the 
most relevant concepts in this chapter, and I argue that there is a need to expand on  its meaning 
by considering how policies not only reverberate in peoples’ everyday lives, but also within the 
systems controlling them.  
The following section explores how US reverberations caused harsher responses towards 
asylum seekers in Canada. I focus on the specific Canadian political changes and responses in 
more detail through a discussion of changes to immigration legislation after 2017. In this section 
I show that Canada’s responses that made their border visible were intended to provide reassurance 
of control and protection to the electorate and the opposition. While the visibility of the border is 
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relevant for some and even deemed desirable, Canada used this approach mainly in times of crisis 
when normal asylum-seeking dynamics are disrupted.  
The rest of the chapter focuses on the politics of the invisible border. It will analyze how 
reverberations are intertwined with policing that attempts to invisibilize the border. While US 
reverberations are more evident when analyzing the Canadian practices of making the border 
visible, these also have important implications on how the politics of the invisible border is put 
into place. For example, one evident way of intertwining US reverberations and invisible border 
policing is through the relation between backlogs and inefficiency in the Canadian refugee system. 
A consequence of US harsher policies was the rapid increase of refugee claims backlog in Canada; 
however, this was also paired with a malignant neglect of Canadian bureaucracy that impeded 
faster and adequate ways of accessing protection.  
This chapter also touches on the traditional geopolitical system that Canada has been 
relying on. Traditionally, US has been the main receptor of irregular and “non-conventional” 
arrivals, particularly from Central America. Although different waves of immigrants arriving to 
Canada to make claims demonstrate that there is willingness to seek asylum in the country; Canada 
limits their opportunities to obtain protection in the country. The final section will focus on one of 
the most relevant border policy for Canada in this context influencing asylum seeking in Canada: 
The Safe Third Country Agreement. It will discuss how Canada’s (in)actions, as part of the 
invisible border, to modify the accord is shrinking its commitment to protect asylum seekers.   
 
Tracing the US-Canada connection in security matters 
It is undeniable that the US and Canada share a connection on matters of immigration and 
border security that has been forged over decades and by geographical proximity. Both share the 
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role of receptors of immigrants and asylum seekers from different parts of the world, and 
particularly from Latin America. This link intensified with the unprecedented harmonization 
between Canadian and American cross-border management after 2001. The nature of this 
interconnection has raised questions among academics asking if what happens in the US in 
international policy matters is an omen of what could occur on Canadian territory. In this respect, 
some scholars have researched the extent to which US and Canadian values converge and how US 
changes in policies impact Canadian government decisions (Kitchen and Sasikumar, 2009; Adams, 
2017). In my study, I show that while many of the Canadian values and decisions are different 
from those experienced on the US, issues of security and counterterrorism represent a unique case 
in this discussion. 
In recent years, US and Canadian societies have shown marked differences in high profile 
public arenas such as the Kyoto Protocol, control of greenhouse gasses and the legalization of gay 
marriage (Robinson, 2006). Moreover, authors like Kitchen and Sasikumar (2009) demonstrate 
that issues of national identity play a role in Canadian decisions to cooperate with the US, 
particularly on counter-terrorism matters.  Their analysis shows that, although we expect to see 
convergence between the US and Canada due to geographical proximity, vital economic ties and 
shared cultural identity; there is a fair amount of distance between US preferences and Canadian 
choices on several issues. They argue that Canada usually seems to enlarge its sphere of 
independent action to the largest extend possible as Canada have a profound sense of difference 
from the US. Particularly after 9/11, Canada’s national identity determined the parameters of the 
country’s response against terrorism, although they always expressed profound solidarity with the 
US.  
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Nonetheless, their analysis also demonstrates that Canada is often responsive towards US 
decisions about security issues, as Canada has to consider how US choices impact their own 
sovereignty and security. This creates a type of policy behaviour in Canada in which their own 
strategies are based on considerations of American security imperatives. This helps to ease 
concerns of the US taking Canadian security in their own hands by implementing policies that are 
contrary to the Canada’s interests. Thus, Canada’s sovereignty and interests must be protected by 
considering important implications of US shifts in policy.  
The Canadian economic interdependence with the US also plays a role in creating this 
particular bond between both countries. As the war on terror and economic profits are two 
interrelated fronts, Canada usually depends on US responses and interpretations of national 
security to avoid potential collateral harm to its financial interests. For example, the costly 
ramifications of heavily securitizing or partially closing the border, similarly to what happened 
right after the terrorist attacks, would greatly affect Canadian economic interests. However, in this 
respect, both countries uphold a mutually beneficial relationship as Canada’s strategies to maintain 
strong security against terrorism provides US a sense of relief and, therefore, releases pressure at 
the border. Canada’s strategies, including expanded legal powers for anti-terrorist laws, increased 
intelligence and surveillance, interdiction measures and closer coordination with allies have helped 
maintain “Canadian economic security by reassuring the US that Canada is enforcing adequate 
security standards on its own” (Whitaker, 2003: 254). Even when Canada aims to differentiate 
their own values and identity to those of their southern neighbors, Canadian counter-terrorism 
enforcement is interdependent of the US decision-making processes. 
As human mobility has been included as part of the security debate in the international 
arena, I argue that migration is also a unique case in the US-Canadian relationship. Abrupt changes 
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in migration policy that occur in the US act as catalysts to changes in Canadian policy. Their 
similar position in border security has forged an intrinsic geopolitical link that connects both 
countries’ political decisions. Nonetheless, the uniqueness of the relation between both countries 
comes not only from their similarities, but also from their divergences. For example, because of 
the differences in their refugee and settlement systems, asylum seekers often prefer to expand their 
journeys to Canada in moments of crises in the US. Asylum seekers’ decisions to move to the next 
option on the continent usually highlights this particular connection. Similarly to immigrants’ 
routes, this link associates various relational nodal points in policy, from US implementation of 
harsher immigration policies (e.g. travel bans and threats to end Temporary Protected Status) to 
Canada’s backlog in their refugee appointments and the lack of accommodation for new arrivals. 
This imbalance due to new arrivals in Canada is, consequently, re-organized by policy 
implementation. 
To demonstrate this interconnection between the US and Canada on issues of mobility and 
border security, I follow Hiemstra’s approach in her work on transnationalism and reverberations. 
In her work, she explores how US detention and deportation practices reverberate in Ecuador as 
they impact everyday realities of migrants and their family. She uses geopolitical research on 
borders to discuss how enforcement has become disengaged from state territorial borders that 
shapes the lives and mobilities of asylum seekers even before they have left their countries of 
origin. What it is more informative in her work is that she extends these theories to argue that the 
performance of borders and the remnants of bordering practices enforced on migrants’ bodies does 
not stay inside US territorial limits, but has a transnational impact on the everyday realities in 
countries of origin after they have been deported. I apply her ideas as it illustrates how immigration 
enforcement is “made a tangible reality thousands of miles away from US land borders” (Hiemstra, 
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2014: 294). The next section will take this theoretical framework to explore how harsher US 
immigration strategies reverberated increasing –irregular and Ports of Entry– arrivals in Canada, 
causing a re-organization in Canada’s border policing.  
 
The reverberations of US policies in Canada  
 
Reverberation: A continuing effect; a repercussion 
Oxford English Dictionary  
 
The United States witnessed one of the most dynamic policy periods in the immigration 
arena after Trump’s administration came into power (Pierce et. al, 2018). Trump made use of 
executive powers to reshape many facets of the immigration system, always using violent and 
xenophobic rhetoric against unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers. He frequently used world 
events, particularly terrorist attacks, to support his discourse against immigration since he declared 
his candidacy for president in June of 2015. For example, after a series of coordinated ISIS terror 
attacks in Paris in November of 2015, he tweeted “Everyone is now saying how right I was with 
illegal immigration and the wall. After Paris, they are all on the bandwagon” (Trump, 2015). 
Trump’s narrative is based on demagogic and dehumanizing language along with subtle discursive 
strategies like representation of the “us” versus “them” and metaphorical constructions to create 
fear (Quinonez, 2018). Making immigration a centerpiece of political agendas and violent policy 
shifts caused disorientation and fear among immigrant populations either living in the US or 
considering the US as a country of destination.  
Hiemstra’s (2012) work illustrates how immigration enforcement is made tangible away 
from US borders. By using this theoretical framework, I show that the reverberations of 
immigration policies are not only seen at immigrants’ places of origin, but in every other fragment 
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of their journeys (see Collyer, 2010; Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016), even after they settled in 
their destination countries. I argue that Trump’s policies reverberated in the bodies and minds of 
asylum seekers through distress and fear, which caused a subsequent change in their perception of 
US as a country of destination and leading to the decision of reaching Canadian territory. The 
thought of having any of these harsher policies enforced on them or their families reinforced the 
idea of Canada as their only option in the continent where they could access protection.  
Trump’s policies changed the reality and perceptions of thousands of people who were 
considering the US as their first country of destination. When I asked my participants the reasons 
why they left the US or why they decided to use it merely as a transit country, most agreed that 
the US was no longer a safe place for them. One participant from Nigeria expressed to me, “I 
arrived in the US, but I did not feel quite comfortable because of the immigration policy of Trump’s 
administration which is no favourable to immigrants, that is why I did not seek for protection 
there” (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, July 15, 2019). Another interviewee from 
Colombia told me that the reason that made him leave the country was “the unpredictability of 
Trump’s administration”(Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019). These 
statements encapsulate how my participants perceived asylum seeking in the US during the Trump 
era. That is, the uncertainty caused by several and continuous changes in immigration policies 
since the beginning of his administration made some people feel anxious enough to leave even 
when they had already built a life in that country.  
For those transiting through the US, they preferred to face other –often unknown–
immigration restrictions as they had to continue their journeys up north rather than staying there. 
Some people perceived that the risk of detention and deportation increased after 2017. Although 
the previous administration deported more than five million immigrants from 2009 to 2016 
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(Chishti, et. al., 2017), Obama’s administration focused on deporting new arrivals and people 
convicted of serious crimes. This made undocumented people feel safe enough to go on with their 
lives during that time. In contrast, Trump’s xenophobic comments, unpredictability, and violent 
discourses against migrants caused a sense of cautiousness and unease among the undocumented 
immigrant community.  
It is important to explore how a country’s immigration system is transnationally impacted 
as asylum seekers will also have to face these policies and responses as they expand their journeys. 
Bordering process are not isolated and can extend from one country’s immigration system to the 
refugee settlement experience in another territory. Thus, it is relevant to expand the discussions on 
political power beyond the territorial line of the policy-making country, as it will ultimately impact 
local and everyday spaces of refugee claimants (Hiemstra, 2001). 
In this case, Canada’s border visibility increased to respond to US changes as they had to 
promote an image of security. However, US reverberations were also interlinked with concealed 
mechanisms of policing in Canada; particularly those related to inefficiencies in their refugee 
system. These adaptations after 2017 were accelerated and not always optimal for asylum seekers 
refugee processes and everyday lives. In addition to years of institutional disregard for certain 
types of claims, asylum seekers ended up being in the system for longer period of times. Thus, US 
harsher migration policy and Canadian responses towards this situation had an important impact 
in claimants’ minds and bodies. In Chapter 6, I will explain in more detail how these responses 
and reconfiguration ended up being embodied by refugee claimants inside Canada.  
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Canada’s tightened immigration responses: making the border visible  
Trudeau famously tweeted in 2017: “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians 
will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada” 
(Trudeau, 2017). This tweet was not only a political response towards Trump’s executive orders 
on travel bans, but an invitation for the world to see that Canada was following its tradition of a 
welcoming and open country. Nonetheless, responses subsequent to the mass arrivals to its borders 
demonstrated that the government’s attitude was not as welcoming as it appeared.  
The US changes in policy after 2017 were viewed with outrage around the world; media 
was covering every Trump speech, particularly on immigration matters. Although Canada was 
watching how things were shifting and, possibly knew that these were to affect their own domestic 
policy, the government did not make any changes to prepare to potential mass asylum seekers’ 
arrivals. In this section, I explore how US changes reverberated in Canada, by discussing Canada’s 
first approach to make their border visible, after pressures from the opposition and the civil society; 
as well, as unconformities expressed by provincial governments.  
In 2017, Canada faced the irregular arrivals of 20, 593 individuals and had to process more 
than 50,000 asylum claims7 (Statistics Canada, 2019). Irregular arrivals in Canada caused concern 
among politicians, particularly among  Conservatives who questioned the efficacy of the Safe third 
Country Agreement. Conservatives like Michelle Rempel called on the Liberal government to 
close the loophole on the STCA and to designate the entire border as an official port of entry to 
end irregular arrivals (Rempel, 2018). During the 2019 election, Conservatives campaigned on the 
promise to end irregular border crossings by allowing asylum claims to be made only at official 
ports of entry (Kirkey, 2020). For example, Andrew Scheer, the Conservative Party leader pledged 
 
7 This number of asylum claims includes people making petitions at the CBSA and IRCC offices. Among these 
are people arriving irregularly and those making claims at official ports of entry (maritime, land and air).   
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to close the loophole if his party was elected (Osario, 2019). Another conservative candidate, 
Arpan Khanna, argued during his campaign that irregular border crosses are not “real refugees” 
(CBC radio, 2019). 
These critics sewed doubts regarding the Liberal government’s management of the border, 
reflected in the results of the Angus Poll 2019. More than half of Canadians (56%) said that the 
Liberal government’s management towards asylum seekers was too soft, more than twice the 
number of persons who say that they have handled the issue in a good manner (26%). Moreover, 
to the question on who would be the most trusted on the issue of migration going forward, the 
Conservative Party leader, Scheer, was chosen by 28% of respondents, a slight advantage over 
liberals Trudeau and Singh with 22% of respondents choosing them.  
Although most of this discontent came from irregular arrivals crossing at Canada’s border, 
claims made at official ports of entry were also a relevant part of the backlog in the IRB system. 
Particularly, according to a director of an organization located at an official crossing, the Province 
of Ontario saw a significant increase in regular arrivals of persons that did not want to make claims 
in the US but whose cases fell under one of the exceptions of the STCA. In addition, secondary 
migration also played an important role in increasing pressure in the province. While the 
geography of Ontario does not allow easy access by land as it is delimited by lakes, settlement 
organizations and shelters reported a significant increase of refugee claimants accessing their 
services. Ontario reports, particularly from the City of Toronto, showed that many refugees arrived 
from Quebec, where they had originally crossed. 
The backlog of asylum claims also caused discontent among Parliamentarians and 
provincial governments. The government was not being able to process claims on time, which 
gave an image of disorder and a system out of control. In addition, the backlog created a chain 
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reaction that impacted the settlement systems in provinces like Ontario and Quebec. Although 
Ottawa has led asylum issues in Canada, the provinces and cities also play an important role as 
they provide social services and resources to this group of people. Refugee claimants are 
considered a very challenging population as there is not a shared responsibility between the three 
levels of government to covers their needs. 
 Therefore, the reverberations of US policy created a chaotic condition in the federal 
management of claims, which in turn caused concerns about adequacy of the Canadian refugee 
system. As Schertz and Paquet (2019) mention “the sharp increase in asylum seekers in the past 
two years has exposed the weak points in the system and led to considerable federal-provincial 
conflict”. These concerns also reverberated in provincial governments as Quebec and Ontario 
fiercely pressured the federal government for financial recovery, after they spent significant 
amounts of money to provide services to refugee claimants.  
As Smith (2018) mentions “crisis demands action”. After 2017, Canada developed a 
strategic plan to decrease the irregular arrivals and to manage the claims that had already been 
made in their territory. Trump’s administration and US shifts in immigration policies became a 
point of reference to implement their own strategies, particularly those which made the Canadian 
border more visible. Predominantly, the plans to end the Temporary Protected Status of 
Nicaraguans, Haitians and Salvadorians became a reference to develop a national response plan 
(IRCC, 2017). After 2017, cooperation between national and regional agencies in matters of 
immigration was unprecedented as agencies like the Canadian Border Service Agency, the Royal 
Mounted Police, and Immigration Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) intended to work 
together with regional and municipal organizations. As an example, the government created the 
Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task on Irregular Migration, where members of the national and 
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provincial governments planned to ensure a “coordinated approach across governments in 
response to irregular migration” (Government of Canada, 2018). The following table shows some 
of the key pieces of immigration during Trump administration and the subsequent Canadian 
actions and responses: 
 
Table 4.  
US key policies and Canadian responses from 2017 to 2020 








of influx of 
asylum 
seekers) 
Issuance of travel bans to 
seven majority-Muslim 
countries.  
Attempts to end the Deferred 
Action for Childhood 
Arrivals Program (DACA). 
Executive order banning 
refugees for 120 days unless 
they were already scheduled 
to travel.  
Increase of interior policing.  
Lack of intergovernmental 
coordination.  
Sense of crisis at their borders 
after first wave of asylum 
seekers. 
Opening of temporary shelters 
(e.g. Olympic Stadium in 
Montreal). 
Outreach programs to US. 
Creation of the Ad Hoc 
Intergovernmental Task Force 











2018-2019 Attempts to terminate 
Temporary Protected Status 
of different nationalities. 
Separation of children at the 
border. Trump announces it 
will prosecute parents who 
cross the border illegally 
with their children. 
US takes a risk-based 
approach to refugee 
admission (USCIS, 2020b). 
The screening process 
became more rigorous.  
Creation of Ministry of Border 
Security and Organized Crime. 
Greater allocation of funding 
($174 million over two years to 
process claims). 
Increased processing capacity 








2019-2020 Remain in Mexico policy 
(CBP returns migrants to 
Mexico to wait for their US 
court hearings). 
Transit country asylum ban 
(third country provision). 
Increase of federal-provincial 
engagement. 
Amendments to IRPA through 
Bill C-97. 
Greater allocation of funding 
(1.8 billion five-year 








8 Numbers decreased substantially due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent closure of the US-
Canada border.  
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Lack of real engagement to 
offer protection to Central 
Americans. 





The first wave of strategies implemented in Canada focused on international outreach and 
on tackling misinformation about the asylum system. Members of Parliament, as well as consuls 
in the US, engaged with local leaders and influencers of the Hispanic ad Haitian communities to 
ensure a full understanding of Canada’s immigration system.  Member of Parliament, Randy 
Boissonault visited Miami and Members of Parliament Pablo Rodriguez and Emmanuel Duborg 
visited New York to held meetings with key immigration organizations and numerous media 
outlets. In addition, the former Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Hussein 
reiterated that Canada’s Embassy in Washington DC and its network of 12 consulates “have 
engaged over 40 U.S. decision-makers including members of Congress, governors and lieutenant-
governors, and have met with more than 300 community leaders, non-governmental organizations, 
diplomatic representatives, as well as municipal, county and state-level officials in communities 
across the country” (IRCC, 2017).  
As Canada rapidly understood how US policy changes reverberated in immigrant 
communities and in their decisions to travel up north, their main concern was to address gaps in 
knowledge about Canada’s immigration system and potentially discourage them to start their trips 
to their country. This outreach program aligns with the increasingly used strategy by the Global 
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North to externalize domestic tools of immigration control to prevent migrants reaching sovereign 
land and making asylum claims (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008).   
The continuation of harsher US immigration policies jointly with the increase of arrivals 
at its borders made Canada turn to its domestic policy to increase capacity building, particularly 
with the creation of more restrictive measures in matters of asylum and immigration. In 2018, 
Prime Minister Trudeau announced the creation of the Ministry of Border Security and Organized 
Crime under the administration of Minister Bill Blair, a tough-on-crime ex-police chief from 
Toronto, as a way to ensure that Canada’s border is well managed and prepared for the arrival of 
irregular migrants. This Ministry was also charged with regulating crime, drugs, firearms and 
smuggling as all of these are considered threats to Canadian society. The association between 
drugs, crime, and irregular migration that is addressed in the ministry’s mandate stands to deepen 
narratives of crisis and criminalization of refugee claimants. This became a key element to 
visibilize their border, as they created an agency exclusively to tackle and discourage the arrivals 
of irregular migrants. 
The government of Canada also revaluated its own Immigration Refugee Act as a way to 
protect its system from potential mass arrivals. Included in the Budget Implementation Bill (Bill 
C-97), there was a proposed change that makes refugees ineligible to make a claim if they had 
already made one in another country that Canada considers safe. These countries include Australia, 
US, UK and New Zealand; however, the policy was aimed to impact those people coming from 
the US.  Following this proposition, people would be deported without a hearing, violating the 
Charter affirmed by Sigh v. Canada, where the Supreme Court determined that Charter rights 
extends to anyone in Canadian territory and guarantees every asylum seeker to get a full hearing 
(Urback, 2019).  
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This widely criticized strategy was proposed when the number of irregular crossers was in 
decline. In April of 2019, the month that the Bill was announced, the RCMP interceptions were 
1,246; while there were 2,560 apprehensions the same month last year. Some Canadian officials 
had confirmed that this was a pre-emptive measure “in case US policies that might spur more 
migration, particularly in the lead-up to the 2020 US presidential elections” (Smith, 2019).  
Although this particular policy goes against Canadian humanitarian commitment to refugee 
protection, the liberal government deemed it essential due to the rapid changing circumstances in 
the US. This becomes even more problematic as the US and Canada have different perceptions on 
what they consider grounds to make asylum claims. For example, domestic violence is not 
considered a valid reason to make a claim in the US, while Canada accepts this motive as a cause 
for petitions (OCASI, 2019). Therefore, the reverberations in the Canadian system are not only 
temporary but are long-lasting and pervasive in a structural manner. These responses also 
demonstrated that changes in US immigration policies, and the subsequent flow of arrivals across 
Canadian borders, increased the potential of implementing more restrictive measures in Canada, 
affecting the chances of individuals to get protection in the entire region. The extension of 
restrictiveness and limitations does not stop in the US but reverberates in Canada, causing North 
America to gradually stops being a safe haven for those seeking asylum.  
Trump, throughout his presidential term, aimed to make US immigration and asylum 
policies more rigorous and stricter. In the case of Canada, their responses became increasingly 
tightened with time. During the first phase, Canada’s responses included soft cooperation with the 
US and outreach strategies. Eventually these responses became part of a more active intervention 
to stop asylum seekers at their borders (e.g. Bill C-97 and the Creation of the Ministry of Border 
Security). Thus, at this point their border was becoming more visible to provide a sense of security 
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to the Cabinet and their own citizens. This is also paired with a sense of “having things under 
control” as the backlog of petitions was rapidly rising (see Table 4). The next section shows how 
Canada put into action the invisible border during this round of changes and configurations in their 
refugee system.  
 
The role of the invisible border and the Canadian refugee determination system 
While the previous section discussed how Canada’s government had to increase the 
visibility of the border to a certain audience to promote an image of control, the rest of this chapter 
will focus on the politics of the invisible border. Invisible bordering mechanisms or practices 
include regulation of the spaces, places and practices in which Canada uses a certain type of border 
policing which is not evident at first look. 
After 2017, the Canadian government implemented new strategies to face the backlog in 
their IRB system prompted by the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers. To tackle the backlog 
the federal government reconfigured their hearing scheduling process. Instead of prioritizing 
newer claims versus old ones –as it has been done since 2012– they are now hearing claims in the 
order in which they are received.9 After the 2017 surge, fewer than 20% of claimants received a 
decision within 60 days; therefore, to enable efficiency, the federal government decided to set 
aside the 60-day rule and hear claims in the order in which they were received (Audit General of 
Canada, 2019).This strategy had unintended consequences as newer claims are now facing longer 
waiting times.  
 
9 In 2012, the Parliament passed legislation to reduce the backlog which set new mandatory timelines to process 
refugee claims, as most categories of claimants were supposed to have a hearing within 60 days and earlier 
hearings (30-45 days) for claimants from Designated Countries of Origin. That left 32,000 cases already in the 
system to be bumped to lower priority for scheduled hearings (Audit General of Canada, 2019).  
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On April, 2019, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada published a report which 
focused on whether the CBSA, the IRCC and IRB processed asylum claims in an efficient and 
timely manner. Their findings concluded that the refugee determination system could not respond 
efficiently as it is not equipped to process claims according to the required timelines. Therefore, 
despite of the reforms introduced in 2012 to speed up decision making, the system was again facing 
a significant backlog as it is not flexible enough to respond in timely manner to higher volumes of 
claims. This highlights the invisible border in Canada, as this clearly shows an institutional neglect 
that hinders the adequate and efficient processes to access refugee protection.   
In addition, the rigidity of the system meant that Canadian agencies could not access funds 
or resources to cover their needs in responding to higher volumes of claims. In this section, I will 
discuss how the negligence towards Canadian refugee determination system acted as a way to 
invisibilize their border. Canada did not cover in time the needs of the institutions that facilitate 
protection to refugees, thus, processes became inefficient affecting progress in asylum claims and 
settlement processes This is also relevant as fairness and speed are two key principles in Canada’s 
refugee determination system; elements which evidently are not completely embraced in their 
current system. In this section, I will also discuss some of the reconfigurations made to lessen the 
burden of social services at the provincial level. As long as the inefficiencies continue, the 
provinces would have to cover the costs of those whose claims were not determined. This is 
relevant to understand how the reverberations of the invisible border impacted other local scales. 
It also provides another perspective of the situation: the need of intergovernmental cooperation to 
eliminate important constrains in refugee protection.  
I demonstrate that Canada is imposing an invisible border that hinders mobility by not 
providing sufficient resources for their refugee system to function; particularly when there is an 
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important influx of crossings at their borders. Their system does not allow for adequate 
adjustments when volumes of crossings spikes. Therefore, the invisible border becomes 
detrimental for refugee settlement in particular and human mobility in general.  
Although this inefficiency of institutions, caused by a neglect of bureaucratic apparatus, 
started before the 2017 influx of asylum seekers; the post-2017 policy was also not adequate in 
tackling the backlog. The following table shows the numbers of asylum claims and backlogs 
yearly: 
Table 5.  
Status of asylum claims from 2017 to 2020 































Note. Table created from IRB statistics https://irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/protection/Pages/RPDStat.aspx 
In 2018, the government of Canada announced the allocation of an additional $174 million 
over two years to help process the rising number of claims (Audit General of Canada, 2019). In 
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March of 2019, Budget 2019, announced investments of 1.8 billion over five years “to enable the 
processing of 40,700 asylum claims in the 2019–20 fiscal year and up to 50,000 claims in 
the 2020–21 fiscal year, as well as to strengthen processes at the border and accelerate the 
processing of claims and removals in a timely manner” (Government of Canada, 2019). 
Nonetheless, at the end of 2020, the backlog of claims had only decreased by 8.6% compared with 
the previous year. As mentioned previously, the backlog stopped increasing in this year as a result 
of the impossibility of asylum seekers crossing the US-Canada border because of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The Audit report findings are relevant as they show which are the main factors hindering 
the fairness and speediness of Canada’s refugee decisions. Among these are administrative 
inefficiencies, such as the use of different information systems to collect and share information by 
the three agencies, postponed hearings and organization’s delays. More specifically, they found 
that there are significant gaps in information sharing between the agencies involved in claims 
processes. Although information on claims is available electronically, the three organizations 
continued to use paper files and share these files between them by case or courier. This slows down 
the process and increase the risk of losing secure information.  
The report also found that hearings were increasingly postponed for administrative reasons, 
increasing waiting times for claimants. Over their audit period, 65% of hearings were postponed 
at least once before a decision was made. Although claimants themselves can request delays, most 
of these delays were requested by the administration. On average, postponements for 
administrative delays last nine months, more than twice as long as the average delay caused by 
claimants’ requests. The following table shows the reasons of delays: 
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Table 6.  
Reasons for postponed hearings after 2017 
Reasons for postponed hearings Percentage 
Board member unavailable  49% 
Claimant or claimants’ counsel unavailable  14% 
Security screenings result pending  10% 
Lack of time to complete a hearing  6% 
Need to hear family members’ claims together or separately 5% 
Waiting for documents or late disclosure of documents  4% 
Interpreter unavailable   3% 
Other  9% 
Source: 2019 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada 
 
According to the report, rescheduling hearings should be done within 10 days, however fewer than 
10% were rescheduled in that time frame. There was an important, unnecessary delay for some 
cases as some of them were postponed in error as the information that one agency has was different 
from the other. In regard to fast-tracking claims, the IRB was not using in regular basis the 
expedited process when it was available. Also, when they used the expedited resource, the Audit 
found that they did not resolve claims quicker than the regular stream.  Moreover, another 
administrative neglect is that although asylum claims vary each year, the system receives a fixed 
amount of funding to process them, not considering fluctuations in refugee arrivals. 
The audit report also found that the strategy of scheduling hearings according to when 
claims had been made, was increasing hearing times up to two years. Although the list of legacy 
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claims10 is clearing out, the past years had seen the highest volumes of refugee protection claims 
in the IRB history, exceeding the board’s capacity to offer efficient determinations (Wright, 2019). 
The burden is now over the shoulders of those who made claims after 2017, who will probably 
wait longer periods of time facing new challenges than past groups of immigrants, like provincial 
cuts and an overcrowded housing system in provinces like Ontario. These longer waiting times 
also potentially affect their final refugee decision as the situation in their countries of origin may 
change after months or years of the initial claim, providing grounds to the IRB to give a negative 
result (CCR, 2017).  
After re-evaluating its asylum system, the federal government aimed to implement 
solutions to improve the efficiency in claims management. For example, they implemented a 
small-scaled pilot project Claim Analysis Centre, hosted in Montreal, that permits claims to be 
systematically examined and for case-specific information to be shared with the IRB before 
scheduling a hearing. Moreover, the IRB implemented the plan “Governing the Streaming Less 
Complex Claims” to identify those claims which may be decided without a hearing or with a short 
hearing “because the matter does not appear to present complex legal or factual issues” (IRB, 
2019). These reconfigurations reveal how the consequences of US immigration policy became a 
catalyst of change in the Canadian refugee system. However, more importantly, it makes evident 
the lack of previous commitment towards these institutions that are key for the efficient process of 
claims. Although, there was a backlog before 2017, the government did not prioritize efficiency in 
the IRB and only made changes after they realized how mass arrivals in a short period of time 
could structurally affect their own system.  
 
 
10 Legacy claims are those claims referred to the IRB before December 15th, 2012, when the new refugee 
determination system came into place.  
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Lack of intergovernmental cooperation  
 
The lack of intergovernmental coordination constitutes a way in which the invisible border 
is also put in place. Adequate relations between the different levels of government are key to 
provide asylum seekers protection and a positive settlement experience. In this respect, Paquet and 
Shertzer (2020), offer analysis of the complexity of intergovernmental relations that complicates 
issues of immigration and asylum in Canada. Their work explores how Canada’s three levels of 
government were not clear in their respective roles and responsibilities with regard to receiving, 
screening, housing, and providing services for refugee claimants. This, evidently, shows a lack of 
real engagement to facilitate resettlement and protection for certain type of refugees. A major 
federal-provincial engagement was only achieved due to strong pressures for cost-sharing. 
However, provincial threats of not receiving more asylum seekers or eliminating financial aids for 
this group of people, demonstrated that protection of refugee claimants was not their priority but 
the recovering of financial means.  
On the other hand, Paquet and Schertzer (2020) show how the impact of the current influx 
of asylum seekers was immediately evident through the increased demand for settlement services. 
Cities like Montreal and Toronto arranged emergency accommodation to provide shelter to those 
making asylum claims, and municipal staff began to exhaust personnel, facilities, and financial 
resources. Issues of cost sharing and cost recovery appeared in the agenda of Canadian government 
as early as 2017. Their report shows how the financial pressures in Ontario and Quebec caused 
important tensions between them and the Federal government. As long as there was a backlog and 
the status of asylum seekers was not determined, they generated costs for the Provinces. While the 
surge in asylum seekers crossings needs an approach with increased intergovernmental 
cooperation, the opposite occurred in the first stages of asylum arrivals to Canada after 2017. This 
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lack of cooperation is also a part of the invisible border as strained relations between different 
levels of government becomes an important obstacle for refugee settlement and human mobility 
in the region. 
The financial issue became more polarizing after changes in the electoral arena in Montreal 
and Toronto (Paquet and Schertzer, 2020). The Liberal Government in Quebec, led by former 
Premier Philippe Couillard, wanted to pressure Ottawa to provide them with funding for recovery 
costs invested in refugee settlement. On the other hand, the newly elected Ontario Premier also 
focused on seeking financial compensation from the Federal government. Ford’s political thinking 
was that the influx of asylum seekers was a federal responsibility. The provincial and federal 
government feud escalated after Ontario publicly announced it would disengage from further 
collaboration (Benzie, 2018).  
As part of their “taking action on irregular migration” strategy, the federal government 
provided initial aid of $50m for accommodation: Quebec receiving $36m, Ontario $11m and 
Manitoba $3m (IRCC, 2018). While this initial funding relieved immediate pressure, the total cost 
will not be covered until further financial help is given and long-lasting investments are 
implemented. A director of a refugee shelter, explained: 
We wanted an investment in more refugee shelters and refugee houses, permanent ones 
that would be around …and be able to provide shelter and services to refugee claimants 
that are coming. Then, we want more investments resources and pathways to get families 
to be able to afford permanent accommodations (Interview with refugee center director, 
Toronto, March 6, 2019). 
The allocation of funds, although necessary, was not enough to recover from the strain; the lack of 
partnership and flexibility for rapid responses were evident in the eyes of public opinion. After 
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pressure from provinces and claimants themselves, the federal government also sped up the 
issuance of work permits for refugee claimants to lessen the burden on social services. Since 
October 2018, new refugee claimants can apply for a work permit by checking a box in the 
application form when they first make a refugee claim. Once the immigration medical examination 
has been completed, IRCC automatically generates a work permit application if the box is checked 
(CCR, 2019). These strategies implemented by the federal government were not in favor of refugee 
claimants but to respond to provincial requests and avoid more intergovernmental strains. In 2018, 
Quebec even threatened to stop welcoming new asylum seekers in provincial-run housing if 
Ottawa did not act (Paquet and Schertzer, 2020). 
The continued backlog, the lack of efficiency in the entire refugee protection system, and 
the lack of intergovernmental cooperation showed that there is a hidden system which limits that 
refugee claimants move along in the refugee protection process. These are concerns that should 
have been explored since years ago; however, the main revisions to their refugee system were 
made only as a result of the increase on arrivals from the US which originated a sense of chaos in 
Canada from that point. These events demonstrate how border policing is also related to the 
(un)provision of adequate and efficient resources to mobilize refugee claims.  
Paquet and Schertzer’s analysis of intergovernmental relations and cooperation during the 
last influx of asylum seekers in Canada is valuable, and my work aims to expand this by including 
the role of US-Canada reverberations and bringing the analysis to the scale of the body as well. 
Therefore, the intricacy of intergovernmental relations is a relevant piece of a complex puzzle 
which helps to understand the reverberations within jurisdictions and its impacts on refugee 
claimants’ bodies and experiences.   
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Canada and US geopolitical roles in the continent    
Traces of Canadian immigration control can be encountered at different parts of the 
physical border and in mechanism running in the interior of the state, such as local policing, and 
access to health and education. In this section I discuss another neglected dimension of border 
policing: the Canada’s lack of commitment to cover a humanitarian need in the Central American 
region. I show that this is also an element of their invisible border, as they offer very limited official 
protection mechanisms to those leaving the northern triangle and trying to reach Canadian borders.  
By discussing this, I aim to show how failing to adapt to humanitarian need imposes greater 
limitations to refugee mobility and access to protection. My findings also demonstrate that Canada 
is failing to provide options to Central and Latin American asylum seekers, while these people 
often consider Canada as their first country of asylum. This change in perceptions of US and 
Canadian positions in the continent as transit or asylum countries was evident after Trump’s 
rhetoric of immigration and subsequent policy changes. The US became a country of transit for 
many people trying to reach Canada’s protection. 
In 2017, 47, 425 persons made asylum claims in Canada. This represented a sharp increase 
from the previous year as only 23, 350 made claims in 2016. This number kept incrementing in 
2018 and 2019 (IRB, 2020a). The highest number of claims referred to the IRB was 58, 378 in 
2019. Thus, Canada became an option of first asylum for many people after Trump’s 
administration came into power. Some of these persons had family in the country and had already 
a support system in place which facilitated their arrival and settlement, others decided to try their 
chances and reach the country without any help or support. This was often the case for irregular 
arrivals.  
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Regardless of their journeys and the methods they used, almost none of my participants 
attempted to reach Canadian territory first. This made me question, throughout my entire field 
research, the reasons why their decisions included a stop in the US when their likelihoods of 
staying there were null or low. My findings showed that this decision was related to factors of 
familiarity and accessibility from US diplomatic missions. Most of my participants knew more 
about the US, either because they knew someone living there, they had travelled there or at least 
had planned vacations in that country; whereas most manifested a lack of knowledge on Canadian 
territory and traditions before living there. Moreover, they either expressed ignorance in the 
process of getting a Canadian visa or that the level of difficulty of getting one was higher than 
getting a US tourist visa.  
During the interviews, participants’ expectations, doubts and own queries were usually 
brought up. Most of them expressed disappointment about the denial of their Canadian visa or the 
difficulty to even request it. They highlighted these difficulties as one of the main reasons why 
they decided to fly to the US and then cross by land either in official ports of entry or by irregular 
means. In a few sessions, some participants even asked me how they could arrive to Canada by 
official means and ask for asylum without having to stop in the US, as if it was a very complex or 
impossible process to overcome.  Except for one of my participants, all of them had tourists’ visas 
to enter the US. A participant coming from Colombia expressed that they had their visas since 
years ago as they wanted to visit “New York, see the Statue of Liberty… see Mickey Mouse” 
(Interview with refugee, Toronto, June 26, 2019). I noticed that saying that statement made her 
laugh, as if visiting the US now sounded like a very distant idea, almost impossible to carry out. 
Another couple from Colombia also mentioned that their Canadian visa was denied but they 
already had US visas as they had planned a trip before they got threats from armed groups in their 
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home country. Other of my participants from the same country mentioned that because of “things 
that happened in their lives and the [economic] crisis” (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, 
May 25, 2019) they never used their US visas until then. 
Among my participants, there was the perception that US visas are easier to get than 
Canadian ones, due to major availability and accessibility of the process in Central and South 
American countries. When I asked one of my participants why they did not get a Canadian visa he 
responded: 
There was always the rumour that getting a Canadian visa was a difficult process, we never 
tried. We were in a moment when we urgently needed to leave the country, without any 
delays. Our departure was urgent to protect mine and my son’s life (Interview with refugee 
claimant, Toronto, July 11, 2019). 
This opinion was also shared by one of the directors of a refugee center, Alicia, as she mentioned: 
I was always told that there are more American embassies around the world where people 
can get a visa to travel to the United States with some ease. For every 10 embassies there 
that are American, there’s only one Canadian (Interview with refugee center director, Fort 
Erie, April 11, 2019). 
 These perceptions are not far from the truth. A comparison made from the list of US and Canadian 
diplomatic missions in the continent demonstrated that the US has more embassies and consular 
representations in Latin America. For example, Canada only has embassies in the capitals of 
Colombia and Honduras, when the US has its embassies plus consular missions in other smaller 
cities of these countries. Nonetheless, this situation is not merely a reflection of the approachability 
from the US in the region but a reflection of the Canadian interdiction system to stop spontaneous 
arrivals.  
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Canada’s position in the continent has allowed it to build an interdiction system which can 
deter and stop spontaneous arrivals and, subsequently, illegal migration. The Canadian approach 
to asylum has focused on accepting and resettling people who come from major crises zones in the 
world. This interdiction system plays often an important role in this migratory event, as many 
refugees did not find the chances to reach Canadian territory first before the United States. 
However, the stricter migratory policies in the US were also key in shifting asylum seekers’ 
decisions as the US became an unsafe place for them. Thus, US rhetoric against immigrants 
channelled immigrants to seek asylum to a territory that has strong interdiction mechanisms in 
place.    
As stated in previous sections, Canada has developed a strong humanitarian record for the 
refugee cause, particularly using partners like the UNHCR to resettle refugees. In 2018, Canada 
became the largest refugee resettlement country, resettling more refugees than the United States 
(IOM, 2020). Moreover, in 2019, Canada was ranked first among 26 countries in resettling 
refugees (UNHCR, n.d.). They have simultaneously implemented mechanisms to ensure that there 
are as little as possible asylum seekers arriving at their borders (Keller, 2018). It is relevant to note 
that the UNHCR focus is on Africa and the Middle East where the majority of submissions to the 
resettlement program come from. In 2019, the top nationalities that submitted resettlement 
petitions to the UNHCR and who were resettled in Canada were Syria, Somalia and Iraq (UNHCR, 
2020a). Whereas, the only UN program that operates in Central America is the Protection 
Transferred Agreement (PTA) that started in 2016 and that offers resettlement to a small number 
of high-risk individuals who are first settled in Costa Rica for a maximum of six months. However, 
as of 2018, from that program only 11 persons were resettled in Canada (Diehl, 2018).  
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The PTA is a mechanism implemented in response to high rates of immigration from the 
Northern Triangle. According to the UNHCR (2018b), it provides “individuals exposed to extreme 
risk with safe and legal access to a durable solution in a resettlement country, via a country of 
transit”. The process starts with the UNHCR interviewing eligible cases and referring them to the 
potential resettlement country. Upon review from the receiving country, the individuals that are 
accepted for further consideration are transferred to Costa Rica where they stay until the 
finalization of their case processing by the receiving country. In this program, countries like the 
US, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Australia act as resettlement nations. By 2018, 
Canada had one of the lowest rates of resettlement in the program with only 10 people, compared 
to 90 in the US, 30 in Australia and 20 in Uruguay (UNHCR, 2018b). Despite of the programs’ 
innovative approach in the region, some immigrants’ advocates have criticized the PTA for its 
strict qualifications and long waiting times to determine eligibility (Landerhom Immigration Law, 
2017).  
On the other hand, access to any of these programs is not an option for many, some are still 
living in their home countries, being displaced internally and trying to find other options before 
they uproot themselves from their countries of origin. As these programs are limited, this causes 
asylum seekers to look for other ways to reach Canadian territory and make an inland petition. 
This conveys another set of obstacles and challenges as they are not being supported or availed by 
the Canadian government or an international organization. For example, people being resettled get 
economic support to arrive to Canada and during their initial settlement, including cost of plane 
tickets, food, rent and day to day living expenses (Government of Canada, 2020b), while 
spontaneous arrivals have to take care of these payments by themselves as well as planning the 
entire journey. Although some of these costs are made through loans to resettled refugees which 
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they have to pay back, they still have the opportunity to do it once they are in a safe territory 
without the worry of how they would flee a situation of terror.  
As most of my participants mentioned, buying plane tickets and planning their trip to 
Canada was one of the most draining part of their journeys as they had to anticipate all the obstacles 
in their trip, like being questioned by immigration officials at airports or facing potential detention 
and deportation. This adds to the economic burden of acquiring plane tickets for themselves and 
their families and getting accommodation in the US and in Canada once they arrive. As Carlos, 
who came from Colombia, mentioned during his interview: 
We came by plane and we went into debt with our credit card. With my brother’s 
support…he covered what we had paid in our other [previous] travels [when fleeing 
domestically]. If you pay, the credit card becomes available again, that’s when we used it 
(Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019).    
Canada is often a responsive country when it comes to major humanitarian crises. As an 
example, the government of Canada resettled 25,000 Syrian between November 2015 and 
February 2016, including government-supported and privately sponsored refugees (Government 
of Canada, 2020c). Nonetheless, in Central and South America, Canada’s absence and lack of 
opportune responses has raised questions among the immigration community and civil society 
advocates. The lack of resettlement programs in these countries is aggravating, particularly as the 
government has not done much to ease the burden on countries like Mexico, which does not have 
the infrastructure to resettle asylum seekers and where many Central Americas are stuck. Canada 
has relied in a geopolitical system in which the US acts as the main receptor of irregular arrivals 
from Central America and the Caribbean, while Canada focuses its attention on resettling those 
coming from major crises around the world mainly through resettlement systems. For example, 
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only in 2019, Canada, with 11% of the US population, received 32% of the number of legal 
immigrants that the US received (Sanders, 2020). However, there is an estimate of 11,000,000 
unauthorized people living in the US, with the top countries of birth being Mexico, El Salvador 
and Guatemala (Migration Policy Institute, 2018). 
Nowadays, Canada’s interdiction system, the Safe Third Country Agreement, and the 
perception that real refugees are those who wait in UNHCR camps, not only deviates the country’s 
obligation to offer protection to asylum seekers but these factors also have a role in increasing 
irregular migration. Only those who can afford a plane ticket, who can get either a Canadian or US 
visa and whose cases fall under one of the STCA exceptions are able to make official inland asylum 
claims in the country. Even though these measures have been successful in discouraging migrants 
to reach Canadian territory, the last few years have shown that Canada and the US positions in 
North America are changing. Asylum seekers are now more actively seeking for ways to reach 
Canadian territory even if they have to use the US as a transit country. The next section will explain 
how this shift in positions is partly caused by asylum seekers perception of Canada’s welcoming 
attitude towards refugees, making it their first option of asylum. This perception is also a direct 
consequence of US evident and violent changes in immigration policy after 2017.   
 
Making Canada the first option of country of asylum  
 
The ways in which individuals internalize fears and concern varies depending on their 
experiences and conditions. For some, the distress caused by Trump’s announcements and actions 
on migration was not as evident as it was expected. When doing interviews with refugee claimants, 
I was presuming that their responses would clearly establish a direct correlation between the US 
policy changes and their decisions to extend their journeys to Canada. However, their responses 
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showed that these policies reverberated in their minds and bodies in more strategic and profound 
ways.  
When I asked my first interviewee why he decided to leave the US after years of living 
undocumented, he mentioned the difficulties of living as an unauthorized migrant in the US, even 
during the Obama era. However, later in our conversation he admitted that he had seen an increase 
in immigration enforcement in the last months that he had not seen before. Mario, from Honduras, 
particularly mentions:  
We thought about it [moving to Canada] for a long time. In the state that we were living 
there were many immigrants’ raids in the last few months and that’s what motivated us to 
come to Canada. They could have stopped me driving or at my job, leaving my family 
alone. That’s why we decided to come here (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, 
April 11, 2019).  
He and his family had lived in the US undocumented for several years; therefore, he had always 
seen how different administrations implemented policies affecting immigrants’ every-day lives. 
Nonetheless, their vulnerability became more evident only after they realized the potential results 
of Trump’s policies in their lives. Although his wife had family living in Canada for many years, 
their decision to migrate to this country only came after these policy changes.  
 The decision-making process for those people who used the US merely as transit to reach 
Canadian territory was different as they rationalized their decision before they started their 
journeys based on what they had heard.  News about Trump’s policies came through channels such 
as media and second-hand experiences (e.g. family or friends’ experiences). As Carlos mentions 
“In the US it is a lottery in this moment, immigrants are experiencing a very tough situation…the 
US is not an option” (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019). Another 
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participant, Martha, decided to leave Colombia and travel to US where his spouse was living as an 
unauthorized migrant. Once she met him, she convinced him to travel to Canada and ask for asylum 
where she has family, as she was worried about US immigration policies. As she mentions: 
We have seen things in the news. I saw that children are being separated from their parents 
at the border…just thinking that they could take my son…it did not incite me to stay in the 
US. If I or my spouse were deported my son would be alone or in the hands of the state, 
without me knowing about him anymore (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 
11, 2019). 
 The way that US policy changes were made and broadcasted by the media, had an impact 
on peoples’ perception of the US and, consequently, on their perception on Canada’s welcoming 
approach. After 2017, Canada became the best option in the continent for this group of people. 
Although Canada is usually seen as a multicultural and welcoming country, immigrants often 
preferred to arrive and stay in the US due to easier land access. Nonetheless, in moments of crisis 
when they felt their integrity at risk, they open up new paths to move their lives up north to settle 
in safer jurisdictions. For example, the work of Smith (2019) suggests that after Trump’s decision 
not to extend the Temporary Protected Status of Haitians in 2017 resulted in roughly 7.5% of all 
Haitians in the US with TPS to choose Canada rather than risking deportation, moving to a third 
country or remaining unauthorized in the US. David, from West Africa, explained why he decided 
to leave the US after a few months living there as an undocumented immigrant:  
Canada is a country, you know… I understand that it really has good immigration policies 
and assistance for refugees. The chances of you getting your refugee or protection in 
Canada are wider than in other countries. Process it is very smooth and transparent.  I could 
have applied in other country, the first country where I arrived but because of the buzz over 
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there, with Trump…everyone knows what he has been telling some of his elected members 
that they must go back to the countries. So, I chose to come to Canada because Canada is 
very peaceful. There is less violence, less violent than the US and the possibility of having 
your refugee claim rejected or delayed is minor. That is why I chose coming to Canada 
(Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, July 15, 2019). 
Another asylum seeker who stopped in the US en route to Canada from Nigeria mentioned, “I 
rather come to Canada, I feel they are more open to immigrants and their policies are supportive 
of immigrants” (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, June 25, 2019).  
These responses show that Canada’s attractiveness grew after 2017 when Trump made 
harsher immigration policies a centerpiece of his administration. Between President Trump’s entry 
into office and the end of calendar year 2017, more than 20,000 individuals were apprehended by 
the RCMP in between ports of entry in the US-Canada border; more than eight times the number 
apprehended in 2016 (Pierce et.al., 2018). The stricter policies in the US reinforced immigrants’ 
perception of Canada as a welcoming nation, prompting them to seek asylum in the country even 
by irregular means. The way they express themselves about Canada shows that they feel that this 
is a country that is more supportive of newcomers; however, they did not know with certainty if 
their petitions would actually be accepted or how long they would have to wait for their refugee 
claim resolutions. Moreover, most interviewees did not know how Canada’s immigration system 
worked, but they were still willing to make the crossing as they perceived the Canadian 
immigration process as fairer and more open to asylum seekers than US.  
The temporality of these crossings also demonstrates that sudden changes in the US 
immigration policies caused more crossings of the Canadian border. It is not my intention to say 
that asylum seekers had little agency in deciding their journeys, and that these are only determined 
 134 
by changes in policy. Some of my participants had always thought as Canada as their first option 
because of the presence of family there. However, Trump’s policies acted as catalyst to prompt 
and increase these movements as they did not feel the US was a viable option anymore.  
These US policies also caused the development of a system which enabled these people to 
more actively seek asylum in Canada. Thus, as people began to consider Canada as a country of 
destination, more conditions were created to facilitate the crossings. For example, the system of 
shelters and cab drivers making trips to the border were reactivated from the 1980s and 1990s 
Central American border rush and civil organization in Canada began to prepare themselves to 
receive more people as crossings were increasing.  This demonstrates that people in the region 
consider Canada as a potential country of first asylum; however, Canada is not providing official 
means or opportunities for them to reach their territory without first crossing though the US. Even 
when they do not intensify border policing directed towards Central and South Americans, they 
are imposing their border, in concealed ways, by failing to adapt to a humanitarian need in the 
region. 
 
The shrinking commitment to protect asylum claimants: The Safe Third Country 
Agreement  
As mentioned previously, politics has played a relevant role in the management of asylum 
seekers in the country. The Conservative Party has accused the Liberals of losing control of the 
border and much of the debate in the Parliament about immigration is centered in the discussions 
about closing the STCA “loophole”. Locally, refugee advocates, academics, and lawyers have 
called for Canada to suspend the STCA on grounds that the US is no longer a safe country for 
asylum seekers. Opinions on the STCA “loophole” are divided within Canada: the conservatives 
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advocate for closing the border accusing those using the “loophole” to be “bogus refugees” and 
“queue jumpers”, while advocates discuss the possibility of ending the agreement altogether. 
Nonetheless, the federal government response towards this situation is based on the fact that the 
US cannot be deemed as an unsafe country for refugees by Canada.  
Since 2017, actions on the STCA from Canada had been minor. Many of these reasons are 
grounded in the financial and administrative burden and costs that would develop if the accord is 
modified. As Smith mentions (2019), closing the loophole would mean vast funding for the police 
to place more agents along the borders and it will also damage Canada’s image and identity; 
however, suspending the agreement would result on an increase of asylum claims and a longer 
waiting time for IRB hearings. More importantly, the inaction from Canada to modify the STCA 
after the 2017 surge in flows reflects their unwillingness to offer better pathways and major 
protections to asylum claimants aiming to cross by land (most of them irregularly). This 
unwillingness and inaction are not visible or palpable, it is a way of border policing with less 
evident mechanisms but greater burdens for those trying to reach Canadian territory. Although the 
US cannot be considered safe for refugees, particularly during Trump’s administration, the 
Canadian government is not considering the possibility of amending the STCA, and instead 
shrinking its commitment to protect those who are in need of protection. 
A report from Abu Alrob and Shields (2020) demonstrates that the STCA has been 
challenged in courts of law since its inception in 2004. Most recently, in 2020, the STCA was 
challenged in court by Amnesty International and the Canadian Council for Refugees. After years 
of trying, this civil organization made it possible to have the STCA ruled as unconstitutional by 
the Federal Court of Canada in July 2020 (CCR, n.d.). Nonetheless, the federal government 
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appealed that decision, resulting in the Federal Court of Appeal suspended temporarily the Federal 
Court’s ruling. Nowadays, the STCA is still in place.  
Contemporary policy developments in the US reveal that its continuous designation as a 
safe country jeopardizes Canada’s commitments to safeguard refugees’ rights. Some of these 
concerns revolve around diminished refugee protection and significant failings in the US system. 
Further concerns are related to the differences between the Canadian and US asylum systems. For 
example, the procedural and capacity interpretation during the claim process, as well as gender-
based claims. While Canada recognizes the credibility of gender-based claims, the US does not 
acknowledge gender as a category of fear (Akibo-Betts, 2006).  
Suspending the STCA would cause a burden in the Canadian government and immigration 
system, however, nowadays this burden is on asylum seekers who might be risking their lives 
making unsafe journeys to reach Canadian territory. Although nowadays the majority of the 
irregular crossings are “manageable” as most of them occur in a well-monitored location in Quebec 
and rapidly intercepted by the RCMP, the perilous conditions and emotional strain are still 
experienced by asylum seekers. For example, in December of 2016, two Ghanaian asylum seekers 
lost part of their extremities due to severe frostbite after crossing in Manitoba during the winter to 
access Canadian territory (Grabish, 2017). In 2017, the debates surrounding the STCA resurfaced; 
particularly, after it was evident that the state of refugee protection in the US began to rapidly 
deteriorate during Trump’s administration. In challenging the designation of US as a safe country, 
the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Council of Churches and Amnesty International 
Canada particularly highlighted that the US asylum system and immigration detention fail to meet 
the Canadian standards (CCR, 2017).  
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After the increase of irregular arrivals, Canada focused on introducing new policies in 
response to these events aimed to prevent future migrant flows. Although the STCA plays an 
important role in causing irregular flows and limiting protection for certain groups of people, the 
Canadian government was short in contesting the accords’ provisions. Amending the STCA under 
the provision that the US is no longer a safe place would fracture the US-Canada relation with 
political implications. Contrary to what advocates were asking, the federal government response 
to opposition pressure was to engage in talks with the US to close the agreement’s loophole. In a 
press conference in 2019, Minister Bill Blair mentioned that the intention was to take border-
crossers to official ports of entry and processed as if they had presented themselves there directly 
(Rehaag, 2019). Thus, a smaller percentage of people would access asylum in Canada. However, 
Immigration Minister Hussen has clarified that although the dialogue with the US is ongoing, there 
were no formal negotiations underway. Moreover, US has showed little interest in taking steps to 
re-negotiate the agreement, as that would result in thousands of asylum seekers who would 
otherwise go to Canada remaining in the US (Rehaag, 2019). 
While Canadian political parties, advocates, and academics expressed varying solutions, 
all of them agree that the STCA is failing to address the current asylum as migration dynamics in 
North America. While it worked relatively well for ten years, accomplishing Canada’s objective 
to reduce irregular immigration, it could not prevent the mass arrivals of asylum seekers to 
Canadian borderlands after changes in US policies. More importantly, Canada is aware that the 
Safe Third Country Agreement reduced the opportunities of Central Americans to ask for asylum 
in Canada. In addition of willfully ignoring the humanitarian crises that happens in Central 
America; Canada’s government is also malignantly keeping in place an agreement that impacts the 
chances of protection that these people have. Even when the Federal Court ruled the agreement 
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unconstitutional, the Federal government pushed to re-instate it and, with that, a part of their 
invisible border as well.  
 
Conclusion  
In this section, I discussed Canada’s border policing through the dichotomy of the 
visible/invisible border, as well as how US reverberations interacted with this type of border 
enforcement. While Canada receives a small number of spontaneous asylum seekers’ arrivals 
compared to other countries and has a well-established settlement sector, immigration policy 
changes from its southern neighbour tend to cause instability and unsettledness. I have argued that 
the crossings of 2017 revealed that instead of implementing better capacity-building and longer 
term planning to welcome non-expected arrivals, Canada uses the invisible border to avoid a 
humanitarian need in the region.  
Although, at times, the federal government made the border visible to show that they have 
everything under control; they mainly used mechanisms that invisibilize the border. Therefore, 
they implemented strategies that make it more difficult for refugees to access protection; for 
example, through negligence in their institutions, unwillingness to offer more protection options 
for Central Americans and reluctance to change the STCA.   
Changes in refugees’ perceptions demonstrate that there are more people aiming to reach 
Canadian territory. Therefore, the status quo in the region is being altered by immigrants and 
asylum seekers that see in Canada a place with a just refugee determination system which they can 
access. Although the flow of immigrants that arrived at Canadian borders after 2017 was not 
unprecedented, it more evidently demonstrated the lack of policies and resources that Canada has 
to receive and accommodate spontaneous arrivals. This discussion has shown that the status quo 
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in North America is not incontestable and that Canada’s position in the region can be transformed, 
particularly after a turbulent administration like the one in power in the United States during this 
research. This chapter focused on the regional and national scale, the following two chapters will 























“We will keep serving no matter what”: settlement services in times of crisis 
 
Refugee organizations in Canada play an important role as they help refugees and refugee 
claimants with settlement assistance, legal aid, shelter, accessing food banks, clothing, and the 
refugee claimant process. They also do important advocacy work to improve services offered to 
this group of people and, consequently, improve their settlement experience. Moreover, some of 
these organizations’ work includes research and publication of reports that show current trends 
and emerging issues in refugee claimants’ experiences, as well as in the government and civil 
society capacity response. The interviews conducted with these service providers during my field 
research were particularly relevant as they are knowledgeable of both the politics and policy 
regarding refugee claimants in Ontario and the experiences of claimants aiming to settle in the 
province. 
The offering of services and resources by settlement organizations in Canada was altered 
as they faced structural challenges in the last few years. Apart from the increase in flows of refugee 
claimants, the lack of sustainable solutions from the three levels of government forced NGOs to 
implement new resources to respond to this last influx of crossings. Most of these organizations 
felt the pressure to react adequately with limited resources when the numbers of asylum claimants 
were rapidly increasing, particularly during the summers of 2017, 2018, and 2019.  
This chapter will focus on the local response to the arrival of refugee claimants in Ontario 
since 2017.  I will discuss how refugee organizations had to adapt their practices to face new 
challenges in responding to refugees’ needs. Throughout this chapter, I show the dynamics of 
Canadian bordering practices through the lack of adequate responses and lack of sustainable 
solutions to settlement needs, particularly for refugee claimants. This, in particular, affected 
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refugee settlement organizations as they followed a moral imperative to continue providing 
services to those arriving at their doors, even when their own resources became limited.  In this 
chapter, I shift scales to situate the invisible border at the local scale. I demonstrate that as part of 
their bordering practices, Canada acts through neglect and temporary mechanisms, which do not 
categorically solve settlement needs for claimants. Mechanisms of (un)provision are part of a 
larger bordering system in Canada which limits claimants’ settlement experiences and constrain 
human mobility. Although refugee claimants have crossed the physical border, they still encounter 
bordering mechanisms through which their arrival and settlement becomes constrained. 
This Chapter will open a discussion that continues throughout this thesis, on the complexity 
of intergovernmental relations in regards to refugee claimants’ arrival and settlement needs. The 
first chapters of this thesis focused on the state, Canada, and its responses at the federal level; 
however by shifting to a local perspective other elements and actors’ roles in this situation are 
exposed. I show that it is not possible to consider Canada as a single, homogeneous unit, but that 
other stakeholders, like provinces and municipalities and the relationship between them, also 
determine the level of access refugee claimants have to certain services. For example, 
disagreements between Ontario and Ottawa complicated finding real and immediate shelter 
solutions for refugee populations. Thus, the state becomes a complex entity with different 
jurisdictions that must adapt to a multilateral agenda in order to offer greater opportunities of 
protection and ensure the wellbeing of vulnerable populations.  
 In 2019, I interviewed fourteen persons involved in refugee organizations (between 
directors and case workers) and volunteered in two of them in Kitchener and Toronto. The 
interviews were conducted in Ontario, where more people arrived as secondary migration from 
Quebec to make or continue their claims in an English-speaking province. Although interviews 
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were conducted in second-tier cities including Waterloo, Kitchener, London and Fort Erie; it was 
the city of Toronto that incurred more unanticipated costs related to the refugee claimant response. 
For example, in April 2018, Toronto was asking the federal government for financial support and 
help to manage the surge in arrivals to the city, as they had already spent $65 million in direct costs 
related to providing shelter and resources to refugee claimants (City of Toronto, 2018).  
In this chapter, I focus particularly on the city of Toronto as this municipality offered a 
more comprehensive response that included investing more economic resources to mitigate the 
effects of the latest arrivals. After a brief explanatory framework on the welfare state and the local 
turn in settlement services, the next section will explore the responses from service providers. I 
will particularly demonstrate that the main factors that impacted negatively on the work of these 
organizations were the lack of affordable housing and the strain in refugee shelters. For example, 
the increase in arrivals to the province and the lack of spaces and rotation in the refugee-exclusive 
shelters caused them to turn people away due to room unavailability. My results showed that issues 
with housing and shelter dominated needs and service provision in the region.  
This chapter will also explore in depth the governmental responses and how these impacted 
service providers. I will show that the lack of sustainable solutions from the government impacted 
how help was delivered to this group of people. The responses from the Canadian government 
were implemented on a temporary basis, without any real commitment to solve relevant factors 
that affected refugee claimants. The final section of this chapter will discuss, using service 
providers’ opinions, how more intelligent and sustainable investments are better to develop a 
comprehensive refugee protection framework for unexpected spikes on refugee claimants’ arrivals.  
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Understanding the politics of control and the welfare state  
  When refugee claimants arrive at their intended country of destination, they need access to 
quality settlement services. This helps them not only to fulfill their basic needs but to feel less 
vulnerable at the moment of arrival. In Canada, once an individual is determined eligible by the 
CBSA or IRCC to make a claim, they may have access to social assistance, education, health 
services, emergency housing and legal aid. In Canada, the three levels of government, the private 
sector, and community groups play a role in helping immigrants settle. 
While immigration control is largely a national duty, welfare policies are often a shared 
responsibility (Spencer and Delvino, 2019). In regard to refugee claimants, the role of the 
municipal government is key as it is responsible for providing funds to non-profit organizations 
who offer settlement services directly to this group of people. Settlement organizations often feel 
pressure to offer adequate resources as individuals’ success on their claim may depend on their 
access to services such as legal aid or job permits. Although Canada has a positive reputation 
internationally for their refugee policy, its settlement programs are not consistently meeting the 
needs of this vulnerable population (Simich et. al., 2003).  
Politics play an important role in providing services to different types of newcomers as 
these will determine the degree of access they have to services which are often offered to the rest 
of the population (i.e. health and education). An area of research in migration studies has focused 
on showing how the selective exclusion of migrants act as a form of immigration control. As stated 
in Chapter 2, the selective exclusion refers to the process of offering certain services and resources 
to immigrants depending on their legal status and/or type of claim. According to Bommes and 
Geddes (2000), the objective of this strategy is to ensure that access to welfare does not provide 
an incentive for all asylum seekers to arrive to sovereign territories. Thus, selective exclusion is a 
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tool of the welfare state to control who can receive certain social benefits depending on their 
desirability under the state law. The governance of migration was extended from the external to 
the internal by using the welfare state as a device to deter potential refugees.  
Nonetheless, several scholars have demonstrated empirically that the decision of choosing 
a country of destination, rarely is based on welfare state benefits (Geddes, 2000). Most of the time, 
their country of destination is forced on them and, if they have options, their decision is limited by 
travel availability, visas, distance, and family relations. Therefore, the welfare restrictions 
implemented to deter asylum seekers are a political strategy unlikely to affect individuals’ 
decisions, but will, undoubtedly, cause precarity among asylum applicants encountering limited 
access to social services once they have arrived.  
As previously mentioned, in Canada, factors like immigration status and the type of refugee 
claim determine the services that are accessible for these individuals. Moreover, there are no 
formal support services for refugee claimants. Research has shown that non-status11 immigrants 
are often regarded as low priority, politically sensitive and a “risky” client group for certain official 
and civil society organizations (Zetter, R. and Pearl, M., 1999). This causes increased vulnerability 
among this population as they have a restricted access to a proper support network. 
 
The local turn in access to services  
Political geographers have stressed the relevance of the local scale as it plays an important 
role in the asylum seeking and refugee determination processes. For example, Darling (2016) 
explores how issues of containment, urban dispersal programmes, and re-scaling of enforcement 
 
11 For the purposes of this chapter “non-status” refers to those who are living in Canada and do not have a legal 
permission to reside there permanently.  
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are ways to encounter borders in an urban setting.  The role of the city is important as it represents 
an interior space that serve as a sub-state scale that actively pursues immigration enforcement 
(Coleman, 2007). However, Darling also highlights the idea of a “more progressive relation 
between cities and forced migration” (2016: 184), as cities also act as sanctuary for displaced 
people. Other scholars have also stressed the importance of the role of municipalities in settlement 
practices, as they often develop their own immigration and integration guidelines away from 
federal policy (Spencer and Dalvino, 2019).  
Moreover, while local spaces have been neglected in relation to immigration policy, several 
scholars have shown the relevance of including these contexts in examining day to day 
experiences. Issues like adequate housing, financial burden-sharing, heterogeneity among urban 
population and practical support for asylum seekers on a daily basis can be better explored in a 
local manner (Hinger, et. al. 2016). Despite being considered as mobile populations, immigrants 
find themselves situated in localized spaces where they carry out their daily lives. While some 
authors explore the cities as sites of marginalization in which the refugee is denied services and 
rights (Grabska, 2006; Daniel et. al., 1995; Sanyal, 2011); others have explored the role of the 
cities as providers of protection and humanitarian relief (Guterres, 2010; Zetter and Deikun, 2010).  
Cities have become a key site for resolving political restrictions and for building a more 
welcoming perception of newcomers. However, municipalities and local organizations often face 
different challenges than those at the national level. When asylum seekers arrive in a city, 
municipal governments usually confront challenges in need of urgent resolution, such as offering 
shelter and other basic needs to this group of people.  Moreover, cities tend to act as transit hubs, 
points of arrival and ultimate destinations for refugee claimants increasing the numbers of 
individuals in need of services. At the urban scale, public officials are inclined to provide services 
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to authorized and unauthorized individuals under the logic of “emergency”, as they have to 
urgently provide a form of temporary, partial or improvised form of membership based on human 
rights (Mayer, 2018).  
Even though cities are tethered to national immigration policy, sometimes their approaches 
diverge, leading to a decoupling of the multilevel governance relation. Factors like the number of 
arrivals and the slow reaction of national authority force cities to play a leading role without, 
sometimes, having the legal mandate or any specific budget to cover these events. In regard to the 
City of Toronto, the municipal government put in place a policy called Access without fear T.O. 
as a way to reaffirm its commitment to ensure that all residents, regardless of immigration status, 
are able to access city services without the fear of being asked proof of status (Hudson, et.al., 
2017). 
On the other hand, it is relevant to consider the challenges municipalities face in resettling 
newcomers are different in first and second tier cities (STC). Similarly, the challenges experienced 
by newcomers settling in first and second tier cities diverge in many ways. While cities like 
Toronto still received a large number of newcomers every year, empirical results of this research 
demonstrate that refugees and refugee claimants are settling in smaller cities like Kitchener, 
Waterloo, London and Niagara. These geographical shifts have been explored before (see Walton-
Roberts, 2011; Di Biase and Bauder, 2005) and represent a demographic change in immigrant-
receiving nations. The dispersal of newcomers can be beneficial for sharing the responsibility and 
increasing economic development in different municipalities. Other positive aspects are the 
dissemination of information about immigration to smaller cities, promoting refugee integration 
in smaller communities, and overall increasing Canada’s diversity outside of major urban centres 
(Goodbrand, 2016). In recent years, policymakers have considered it important to attract 
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newcomers to STCs as it represents a factor of economic development and growth. According to 
Walton-Roberts, cities have developed mechanisms and tools that focus “away from immigrant 
characteristics and, instead, towards understanding and enhancing the capacities of communities 
that want to attract and retain immigrants” (2011:454). 
Newcomers’ decisions to settle in second tier cities can vary. Previous research has linked 
the decision-making process with evaluating better opportunities, the desire to be close to family 
and friends, and dissatisfaction with community services in other cities (Krahn, et. al., 2003). More 
importantly, STCs are perceived as smaller, quieter, safer, and more conducive to family life. 
Overall, these cities are perceived as more welcoming and friendlier than other major urban areas.   
Nonetheless, attracting newcomers to STC has its own challenges as these should be ready 
to offer the basic services to this group of people. Since settlement services in several smaller cities 
are not readily available, newcomers who settle in these communities might undergo adversity and 
hardship. Funding for settlement services is not equal across Canada; thus, without adequate 
refugee support smaller cities can face problems with immigrant retention and will struggle in 
creating welcoming communities. While doing field research, it became obvious that the number 
of refugee centers and shelter-exclusive shelters in different cities varied significantly. For 
example, in Kitchener-Waterloo, there is only one refugee-exclusive shelter and two main refugee 
organizations that provide services to refugee claimants. One of these just extended services to 
actively support claimants after they perceived an increasing need due to higher arrivals.  
In addition, STC cities have to face growing diversification and expansion of labour and 
housing markets, particularly if there is a rapid pace and scale of arrivals. Finding suitable housing 
in two tier cites has become a problem in recent decades due to low vacancy rate and lack of 
affordable housing. Similarly to first tier cities, STC have to prioritize the creation of more 
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affordable housing and look for ways to accommodate these individuals. Some other acute 
problems that mainly affect newcomers in their search for housing in STC are lower levels of 
service provisions, shortage of units to accommodate larger households and a lack of specialized 
cultural and linguistic knowledge. 
The discussion of the local turn in service providing is relevant for this chapter as the 
municipal government is responsible for provision of funds to refugee organizations. Moreover, 
the decisions at the municipal level often impact the practices and resources of these centers 
depending on the City’s commitment towards refugee claimants. Most of the service providers that 
I interviewed agreed that the City of Toronto was their main contact point when advocating for 
refugee claimants or discussing immigration issues. With some support from their municipalities, 
refugee centers were able to alter their services to offer help to refugee claimants. However, as the 
next section will explain, they had to shift their practices to satisfy the demand as much as possible. 
 
Identifying refugees’ arrival and settlement needs 
At the time of field research, my hypothesis was that the top obstacle in claimants’ 
settlement experience was the long waiting times in getting a decision on their refugee 
determination process. I was particularly inclined to understand how waiting times were 
detrimental to several aspects of their lives, like securing a job, accessing health and education for 
their children. Nonetheless, another issue frequently emerged during my interviews when I asked 
about settlement obstacles: securing initial shelter and affordable housing.   
  Most of my interviewees explained that locating and securing suitable shelter when they 
arrived was among the most critical and difficult situations refugee claimants faced. Research has 
shown that finding shelter in their initial arrival and later long-term housing, is cornerstone of 
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reception and successful settlement for refugees and refugee claimants (Carey-Wood, 1997; Foley 
and Beer, 2003). Not securing shelter upon arrival and long-term housing can result in increased 
social isolation, resentment, and rise in irregular migration status (Abidi, et. al., 2006). 
  When claimants first arrive in Canada, they tend to live for the first few weeks with family 
or friends, in a refugee-exclusive shelter or transition houses12; however, it is not unusual that they 
end up living at a city homeless shelter when no other option is available. The increase in refugee 
claimants staying at city emergency shelters has been considerably high since 2017 as there is a 
lack of rotation in refugee-exclusive accommodation. All of the service providers I interviewed 
agreed that the length of stay for claimants in refugee-exclusive accommodation was increasing 
considerably, from a couple of months to up to one year as they could not find affordable housing. 
This has a ripple effect, as others looking for accommodation do not find available spaces and end 
up in city emergency shelters. 
After their initial weeks of settlement pass, these people are encouraged to find affordable 
housing as a place to stay over medium to longer term. Housing is considered “affordable” if it 
costs less than 30% of a household before tax income. It includes rental housing that is subsidized 
by the government and housing provided by private, public and non-profit sectors (CMHC, 2018). 
Nonetheless, finding accommodation has become a challenging task as newcomers face an 
increasingly costly housing market, as well as issues of discrimination and delays in their social 
services applications and payments. In this regard, Kisson (2010) argues that claimants’ 
homelessness experience has increasingly moved out of the shelter system (“visible 
homelessness”) and into low-end rental housing (“hidden homelessness”). Her categorization is 
 
12 Refugee-exclusive accommodation refers to those places provided by organizations that are only meant to 
welcome refugee claimants. This type of accommodation can be in the form of shelter or transition houses where 
they can stay longer period of time upon arrival.  
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based on Hulchanski’s identification of states of houselessness: “absolute (people sleeping 
outdoors or in shelters); concealed (people temporarily housed with friends); at risk (people at 
grave risk of losing their housing)” (2004: 3).  
On the other hand, a survey conducted by a Toronto Local Immigration Partnership agency 
in November 2018, shows that housing was the main emerging issue among immigrants in 
2017/2018. The survey was responded to by 23 organizations in the area.  While housing was often 
an issue in Ontario, and particularly in Toronto, it was not until the latest larger flow of asylum 
seekers that this became a priority for settlement agencies and government organizations. For 
example, in the survey, fifteen organizations indicated housing as an emerging issue in 2017/18 as 
compared to only nine in 2016/17. The arrival of asylum seekers was not the cause of a housing 
crisis, but it was their arrival that made evident into what extent the housing market was becoming 
a more problematic situation, particularly for vulnerable population. The following section will 
explore in detail refugee organizations’ responses and shifts in their practices to reduce situations 
of precarity among their clients.    
 
Shifting practices and responding to claimants’ housing needs 
     Four of the organizations where I conducted interviews acted as refugee-exclusive shelters 
or transition houses, and the others had connections with city shelters who could receive their 
clients. The access to accommodation for refugee claimants is pivotal when they arrive as they can 
start their settlement process and look for ways to access social services. My participants 
mentioned that usually people can find adequate information in shelters to start their claim, apply 
for a job permit or find organizations that would link them with the community. As Reid (2009) 
mentions, without a home, claimants will find extremely hard to integrate in many ways, from 
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finding employment to establish a social support network. These difficulties are compounded by 
the physical and mental health risks associated with homelessness and houselessness (Reid, 2009). 
However, the opportunity of accessing these services was hindered for many after 2017, as finding 
shelter became a stress factor instead of a relief in their settlement process. As Caroline, a director 
of a refugee center in Toronto, explains: 
Starting about two and a half years ago, the number of refugee claimants in Canada started 
to increase. So, from 2016 to 2017 it basically doubled, or more than doubled. And it has 
remained the same or higher since; then in 2018 we noticed a lot of people coming and not 
being able to access emergency shelter in the city of Toronto, they could not even access 
emergency funds from social services. It was quite a desperate situation in the latter half of 
2016 we saw people that had slept in parks, or overnight in a 24-hour Tim Hortons or 
McDonalds. Things were really bad and continued to be that way for probably about a year 
(Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, March 6, 2019).  
As a refugee center, one of their main objectives is to find accommodation for claimants; therefore, 
this situation became a pressure point for them. Most of these organizations had to look for ways 
to prevent claimants from sleeping in public places. In our talk, Caroline continues to explain how 
this situation impacted their own dynamics at their organization: 
We are just a small non-profit and of course, it broke our hearts to not have room for people 
and to not be able to find anything for people. So, there were times in 2016 and 2017 that 
we reached out to our constituents via Facebook and other social media channels, and we 
had our contacts, even personal contacts of mine that put up families in hotels. Churches 
would pay for hotels for people to stay at until they were able to find accommodation. I 
had a friend of mine that put a family up in her condo guest suite, which cost her money, 
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but she did it because she could not bear to see a family on the street. We had people even 
staying in the basement here and still do (Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, 
March 6, 2019).  
This kind of response was not unique to this center. Six out of the nine organizations interviewed 
implemented new resources as part of their services during that time, and the others were actively 
considering options to increase their shelter capacity and outreach to refugee claimants’ 
communities. The following table explains some of the specific responses of these centers in 2019:  
Table 7.  
Refugee centers’ responses in Ontario 
 City Responses 
Refugee center 1  Toronto  Talk to constituents, reach out to the 
community, use of social media, connection 
with churches. 
Refugee center 2   Toronto  Paying claimants’ last month of rent deposit, 
outreach to community, reliance on 
volunteers. 
Refugee Center 3  London  Reliance on volunteers, major outreach to 
local shelters, hiring more personnel. 
Refugee Center 4  Kitchener Creation of a comprehensive exclusive-
refugee claimant program, increased 
outreach and pressure to the municipal 
government, using their own money to pay 
for claimants’ shelter needs, outreach to the 
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community, attempts to formalize 
partnerships with other non-profit 
organizations. 
Refugee Center 5  Toronto  Use of their own installations as shelter for 
claimants, outreach to the community.  
Refugee Center 6 Fort Erie  Set up meetings with coalition of service 
providers to talk about shelter needs, 
allowing longer stays of claimants in their 
shelter. 
 
According to Hector, another service provider in Toronto, their clients usually expect 
difficulty in making their claims, getting children settled or finding employment; however, they 
do not anticipate that finding housing or shelter will be an extremely hard process. To respond to 
this situation, another refugee center implemented a pilot program when they saw an increase of 
people showing up at their doors. Melissa, a volunteer at the center, explained to me her duties as 
the Community Host program. This program was particularly created to fill the gap of housing for 
newcomers in Toronto. In Ontario, people who want to access a city shelter should go first through 
a system called Central Family Intake which will help people find emergency shelter. Nonetheless, 
as Melissa mentioned, most of the times these shelters are full, forcing claimants to look for other 
options. Their program was aimed to alleviate this situation by contacting members of the 
community who could host an individual or a family for a short period of time. She explains what 
her role was: 
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When people were interested, I explained the program to them. I take down their 
information about what kind of space they have, who they are able to host; then, if there is 
a family that needs hosting, usually the center interns are the ones who know about a family 
that needs hosting, they will contact me. I will sort of look at our list of hosts and see which 
the right family might be or who would be a good fit for this family. And then I contact the 
hosts, and I explain the situation. And then if they are willing to host, I put the host in touch 
with the intern and then the intern sort of make arrangements to get the family in with the 
host (Interview with volunteer, Toronto, June 14, 2019). 
This program in particular shows how important the community response is when the government 
neglects settlement need for vulnerable populations. Providing people with accommodation has 
become extremely hard for service providers, as sometimes subsidized programs require proof of 
status; however, many claimants wait for several months before they get any official document. 
Thus, the role of the community becomes key to offer them the opportunity to initiate their 
settlement and integration process.  
Existing studies in the area show that the difficulties faced by low-income individuals, 
including immigrants, have become more acute since mid-1990, as they often face cutbacks in 
social assistance payments, little new social housing construction, high rents in the private sector 
and reduction of public funding for non-governmental organizations that assist newcomers 
(Murdie, 2008). Nonetheless, this situation becomes more critical when there is an unexpected 
influx of asylum seekers at the border, looking to make claims, and consequently needing to access 
these services.  
While in 2017 the majority of arrivals were not expected, other resettled refugees in Canada 
(e.g. GARs) still faced the same issues with housing. For example, the Syrian community who was 
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resettled in 2015 as part of one of the biggest humanitarian operations in Canada, had difficulties 
finding suitable housing. In her study, Rose (2019) explains that the Syrian community faced three 
particular factors: lack of affordable housing, limited housing for large families and a mismatch 
between where housing and services are available. These issues were also widely mentioned in my 
interviews as factors that impede claimants to find housing in an adequate time frame.  
Given the intense affordability pressures in the housing market in Canada, it is natural that 
different immigrant communities, regardless of their legal and residence status, face challenges in 
finding an affordable place to stay. In addition, most refugees, either inland claimants or resettled 
refugees, tend to settle in mid-sized and large cities, which often face a worsening shortage of 
rental affordable housing for low incomes and little private construction for the lower end market 
(Rose, 2019). According to the study mentioned, all Syrian newcomers were settled into permanent 
housing within a few months. While the case of the Syrian population was positive, this shows that 
all refugees and low-income people confront various degrees of challenges related to accessing 
housing. The difference between these populations is the support they receive and the accessibility 
to well-paid jobs so they can afford permanent accommodation. The combination of these 
circumstances, in addition to having major physical and psychological issues, as well as not 
understanding or speaking English, forces refugee claimants to be in a more precarious situation.  
GARs and refugee claimants often face similar challenges compared with other low-
income households. For example, they often do not have the knowledge, customs and strategies to 
accessing housing. They also have limited financial resources upon arrival to Canada and may 
have few friends and/or relatives. However, refugee claimants in particular, need special forms of 
assistance in accessing good quality and affordable accommodation as they are not sponsored by 
governments or organizations and they often do not have financial support upon arrival (Murdie, 
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2008; Reid, 2009). Moreover, refugee claimants are an identified immigrant sub-group at high risk 
of homelessness. In addition, the refugee determination process may include periods of illegal 
immigration status for a number of reasons (Kisson, 2010). Not having status means more 
vulnerability and being excluded from many protection services i.e., social housing, social 
assistance, food banks, and provincial health insurance.  
 
Shelter and housing challenges 
Low-income people and, particularly, refugee claimants face several barriers in the housing 
market. The interviews conducted to service providers and refugee claimants helped to determine 
the main challenges when looking for shelter and affordable housing.   
The so-called emergency shelters are often used by people in the community who do not 
have any long or medium-term accommodation. They are intended to relieve them from 
homelessness although they are only to be used on a temporary basis. This type of shelters has had 
an increase in the numbers of refugee claimants accessing their service. Claimants usually arrive 
there as they cannot find accommodation in the transition houses or refugee-exclusive shelters. 
Since 2016, the shelter system in Toronto has been disproportionately impacted by the arrival of 
refugee claimants. As of October of 2019, approximately 36% of all shelter users in the city shelter 
system were refugees or refugee claimants, with an average of 15-20 new individuals entering the 
system each day. Moreover, average nightly number of refugees and refugee claimants in the 
shelter system has increased from a 643 per night at the end of 2016 to 2,357 in October 2019 
(City of Toronto, 2019a). This situation causes tension between levels of government as shelters 
are municipally funded, while refugee claimants fall under the jurisdiction of the federal 
government.  
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According to these numbers and my research findings, accessing the shelter system is 
important for claimants to prevent them from experiencing homelessness in the first days or weeks 
of arrival in Canada. Nevertheless, there are several issues that should be considered when 
analyzing the access of refugees and refugee claimants to these spaces. The nature of these shelters 
limits the number of people that can access this service. They rapidly become overcrowded, 
particularly after facing the arrival of hundreds of people in need of accommodation. It is relevant 
to mention that the problem does not fall under the lack of spaces on city shelters but on the lack 
of refugee-exclusive shelters.  
In my interviews with service providers in refugee centers that also acted as shelters or 
transition houses, they agreed that these places had limited spaces in the community. The number 
of spaces in exclusive refugee shelters usually vary but the highest number mentioned by my 
participants was space for up to 30 families. And for those who had transition houses, the highest 
number mentioned was 10 units, one for each family. Considering that the length of stay in these 
temporary spaces have increased up to one year, the newest arrivals have to look for other sites to 
spend their first few weeks or months, like city shelters. Hector explains:  
More refugee claimants are coming, and the ones who are in need to access shelter 
supports, and things like that, are not being able to move into their own accommodations 
as quickly which creates a backlog. More are coming in and it is taking longer for people 
to move out (Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, July 5, 2019) 
   Moreover, most service providers mentioned that these places were less than ideal for refugee 
claimants, as they could increase their emotional and mental problems. Emergency shelters are often 
used by people who have mental health issues or that have addiction problems; therefore, refugee 
families cohabiting with them could raise important concerns. Interestingly, some of my refugee 
claimants participants had a different perspective. Two claimants who stayed a long time in emergency 
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shelters, mentioned a level of satisfaction with the services they offered. When asking about their 
roommates, they mentioned that there were people staying with them who had gotten out of jail or who 
were using opioids; however, they clarified that this did not cause an extremely adverse impact in their 
experience. Nadia, who went through the Red Cross and YMCA shelters when she arrived in Canada 
explained that at these shelters “they just gave you instructions of what you needed to do for the first 
few days to survive….it was good because at the shelter you have basic accommodation, feeding, and 
you have services to contact your family” (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, June 25, 2019).  
She explained that their experience of sharing a room with addicts was “ok, but not ideal”. On the other 
hand, when I asked David about his experience in an emergency shelter in Toronto he responded:  
They (the Red Cross) called the shelter at downtown. So, when I went to the shelter, they 
put me in the paradise [laughs ironically]. It is part of the process, it was not wonderful, 
but it was an interesting one [experience], at least for the start (Interview with refugee 
claimant, Toronto, July 15, 2019) . 
He also clarifies that even though these places are not ideal for refugee claimants, he could not 
complain about what he received: 
As a refugee claimant, you are coming to a country where you do not have anybody, so 
you are homeless. You are not better than them [homeless/addict people]. It is just a 
temporary process that takes you to another one. If you have a vision for yourself, you can 
move out. But when you are there, do not expect too much because someone is giving you 
something you could not get where you are coming from (Interview with refugee claimant, 
Toronto, July 15, 2019) . 
Although most of those asking for asylum staying at city shelters are often appreciative of 
having a place to stay, the conditions they live in are not optimal. In this respect, Zetter and Pearl 
(1999) argue that whilst most refuge claimants are satisfied with their accommodation, this has to 
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do more with their low expectations rather than with any generosity of provision. As Camila 
mentioned when I asked her about finding accommodation: “the things that were basic for you 
before, like having a bed, a bathroom; in here they become the most treasured commodities” 
(Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, May 25, 2019). Mario, who was living as 
undocumented in the US reaffirms this thought:  
I come from the US and they do not give you anything over there. I am grateful with what 
they give me here. In the US, if you take water from the tap you even have to pay for that! 
There must be people that do want better things here in Canada, like a house or something. 
I do not because I am used to stay[ing] wherever I go (Interview with refugee claimant, 
Fort Erie, April 11, 2019). 
As the previous discussion established, accessing initial shelter is challenging; however, 
attaining affordable housing in Toronto is becoming the biggest challenge for newcomers. Many 
scholars argue that obtaining housing should meet the needs of the family in terms of size, quality, 
location, and services to be a successful part of refugees and refugee claimants’ re-settlement 
process (Silvius, et. al., 2019; Reid, 2009). Moreover, service providers see it as a human right, as 
housing is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of health, employment, and life quality (FCJ Refugee 
Center, 2019). Despite the importance of prioritizing housing, many claimants have a difficult time 
not only finding a place to call home but a place which will cover the needs of their families. 
Patricia, a refugee who was still living in one of the transitional houses at a refugee center in 
Toronto, reflects how searching for a home conveys different considerations, including distance 
from work, schools, and access to services:  
The difficult part is that you are trying to settle in one place [Toronto] but if you want to 
find something less expensive you have to move to the outskirts. You are trying to get a 
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family doctor, your health card…if you move you have to notify to every agency, send 
documents, restart the process. You are already settling in one place and now [when they 
move out of the transitional housing] you have to settle in a different one. It is constantly 
thinking ‘what else am I supposed to do?’ I have to do this and that, move your children to 
another school, look for a place to study, settle again. It is difficult. (Interview with refugee, 
Toronto, June 26, 2019).  
What Patricia mentions shows an important mismatch between affordability of housing, location 
and access to services. Transitional houses are often located near refugee centers which gives 
refugees security and confidence, although they know that their stay is temporary. Access to the 
supports these centers can offer is especially important for this group of people who have been 
already displaced from home and found themselves without any assistance (Murdie, 2008). After 
they have to re-locate and move to a more permanent accommodation, they often get a feeling of 
having to start their lives over again in a new environment without the close support of the case 
workers. Moreover, they have to face the challenging task of matching their income with 
accessibility, neighbour preference and reduce as much as possible the distance from their job 
sites. Patricia’s case demonstrates that this is an overwhelming task that they have to embark on 
while also navigating entirely new housing, banking, school, and employment systems.  
By the time this interview was conducted, Patricia’s family had not found housing and they 
had just a couple of months left in their transition accommodation. Unfortunately, this was not a 
unique case; most of my interviewees mentioned that their main worry after getting refugee status 
was finding adequate housing. Those who already started the search, mentioned two particular 
issues:  expensive rents and discrimination from landlords.  
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Affordability of housing in Toronto 
 
Although the housing challenge existed in every city where I conducted interviews, the 
situation was particularly acute in Toronto. The first studies about affordability in housing in 
Toronto were first published in the 1990s. After that, more studies explored the role of finding 
housing in the settlement experiences of refugees and refugee claimants (see Rose and Ray, 2001; 
Kisson, 2007; Logan and Murdie, 2016; Reid, 2009). These studies demonstrate that affordability 
is an important barrier that newcomers have long faced in their search for good quality housing in 
Toronto. Considering their income, which often relies on social assistance when newly arrived, 
they tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on shelter, with little money left for other 
essentials.   
Organizations’ reports and the results of my interviews indicate that affordability in the 
housing market in Toronto has been an issue for several years. However, it was not considered an 
urgent situation for newcomers’ integration until a few years ago. For example, a report from the 
Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) published in 2012 shows that the top 
four settlement and integration challenges reported by their participants were: finding employment 
(61.8%), limited English language skills (32.7%) social isolation (26.5%); and finding housing 
(23.4%) (OCASI, 2012). This complements the previously mentioned report from the Local 
Immigration Partnership that shows that a couple of years back, other concerns were considered 
as priorities before housing for the settlement of refugees and refugee claimants. A service provider 
encapsulates how housing became their number one priority in the last years: 
Even in the refugee settlement and the refugee claim sector, housing in the last five years, 
I would say, has gone from something that we kind of…I do not want to say we took it for 
granted, but it was kind of an afterthought. It was not our focus, our focus was immigration, 
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our focus was health care, the children and different aspects. Housing was something that 
families could go out and find and obtain when they were ready. Now it is become the 
number one challenge for us, which, it is actually the aspect of settlement that it is holding 
back a lot of other areas, whether it is education, employment, immigration (Interview with 
refugee center director, Toronto, July 5, 2019). 
Nonetheless the increase in demand and expensive rents have made this issue more 
pressing. In Toronto, it is getting more difficult for refugees, refugee claimants, and individuals 
with precarious status to afford a place to stay. According to a report from Rentals.ca, the average 
rent for all property types in Ontario is $2,090. It is relevant to consider that in 2020, the COVID-
19 pandemic put pressure on the rental market, and Ontario’s rent rate declined by 7.8% annually 
(Rentals.ca, 2020). Nonetheless, the average cost of a one-bedroom apartment unit in Toronto last 
year was $1,832, and the average cost of a two-bedroom reached $2,416 (Rentals.ca, 2020); still 
significantly high for low-income populations. In addition, the vacancy rate in the city hit its lowest 
levels since 2002 to only 1% (Bascarmurty, 2020).  
The lack of investment in social and affordable housing in Toronto has resulted in a housing 
and shelter crisis. However, as previously mentioned, this situation affects in different manners 
different groups of immigrants. Studies about the specificity of refugee resettlement have 
demonstrated that refugee claimants face a more difficult pathway to housing than sponsored 
refugees, as access to social capital and settlement services owing to legal status are a key 
differential factor (Rose and Ray, 2001; Murdie, 2008; Sherrell, 2011). According to a report from 
a refugee organization in Toronto, despite knowledge of these problems, the vulnerabilities of 
refugee claimants and precarious migrants are almost entirely absent from most government plans. 
Some studies refer to the concerns of “immigrants” and “newcomers”; however, the needs of each 
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group of immigrants are different as they are eligible for different services contingent on their 
status (FCJ Refugee Center, 2019).  
Depending on their legal status, immigrants are eligible for government funds to cover their 
basic needs including, shelter and food. In Ontario, a family of GARs would receive $1,250 a 
month and would be eligible for a bonus housing supplement of $200 (Bascarmurty, 2020). In the 
case of refugee claimants, they can access Ontario Works (social assistance benefits) which will 
depend on family size, housing costs and income. The monthly maximum shelter allowance is 
$844 when the family has six or more members (City of Toronto, n.d.).  However, this funding 
does not go very far as the average rent for a family surpasses the $2,000 mark. The inability to 
pay rent can not only prevent them from staying in an adequate place but can increase their 
probabilities of falling into an insecure housing situation, as landlords can evict them in a short 
period of time.  
Moreover, being on social assistance means a more limited range of search as landlords 
tend to reject applications when they are not sure potential tenants can pay rent. To avoid this risk, 
they tend to ask for documents like credit history; however not all claimants have these documents 
while they are still in the process of settling down. Maria, a refugee from El Salvador, mentions 
how this situation impacted their search for housing: 
It was very difficult because the rent in Toronto is very expensive. We went to see a couple 
of houses but because our status, the landlord did not feel reassured that we were going to 
be able to pay the rent. When our year in the transitional house was up, we were still 
studying. When we applied for a house, they asked us for credit history and proof of 
income; there were two landlords who rejected us because we did not have these 
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documents. We were not working so it was very difficult (Interview with refugee, Toronto, 
June 26, 2019). 
Questions about housing are intrinsically linked to issues of employment and income 
security. Reliance on social assistance, high unemployment and status were issues that prevailed 
among my participants’ answers. At the time of the interview, five out of eleven interviewees were 
not working, mostly because they were still waiting for their job permit and one had an expired 
job permit. Moreover, only six of my interviewees were living in their own space after getting out 
of their transitional house or shelter. Of these six, three had already refugee status and the others 
were waiting for their resolution. Nonetheless, all of those who had own accommodation either 
had a job income or an extra income apart from social assistance. Those who were receiving only 
Ontario Works as a source of income mentioned that it was not enough to cover rents in the 
prevalent housing market. The following table shows the relation between status, living condition 
and income of my participants:  
Table 8.  
Relation between status, living condition and income source 
 Status Living Condition Income source 
Participant 1   Refugee claimant Refugee-exclusive shelter  Ontario Works 
Participant 2  Refugee claimant Refugee-exclusive shelter Ontario Works 
Participant 3  Refugee Own accommodation Ontario Works and OSAP 
(students) 
Participant 4  Refugee  Transitional house Ontario Works and Job income  
Participant 5 Refugee claimant Refugee-exclusive shelter Ontario Works 
Participant 6 Refugee claimant Emergency shelter  Ontario Works 
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Participant 7 Refugee claimant Own accommodation  Job income  
Participant 8 Refugee claimant Own accommodation Job income  
Participant 9 Refugee Own accommodation  Job income 
Participant 10 Refugee claimant Own accommodation  Entrepreneurship (expired job 
permit–waiting on resolution 
while he built his business) 
Participant 11 Refugee   Own accommodation  Job income  
 
The shortage in shelter places and affordable units is the result of a combination of 
inefficient policies and lack of attention towards this situation; however, politicians often blame 
the influx of refugee claimants as a way to deflect responsibility. The challenges are not short, and 
the three levels of government should act to find appropriate solutions with the interest of 
precarious individuals in mind. Although there have been governmental initiatives intended to 
alleviate this situation, it is not until policy makers use a human rights-based approach and take a 
more proactive attitude that most vulnerable people will enjoy of adequate housing. Another 
important factor is education of landlords and those who rent properties; as the next section will 




Even when refugees and refugee claimants have saved enough money to rent a unit, they 
face another important obstacle: landlords’ discriminatory practices. In Ontario, discrimination on 
the grounds of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual 
orientation age, marital status, family status or disability is prohibited under the Canadian Charter 
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of Rights and Freedoms and the Canada Human Rights Act (Reid, 2009). Nonetheless, according 
to the Ontario Rights Commission report on housing discrimination, published in 2008, these 
practices are not unusual in the province. These are more often based on sex, disability and race. 
Although the report does not clearly state legal status as a ground of discrimination, it highlights 
that newcomers and immigrants are at risk because they are new and prone to be unemployed and 
living in poverty and rental accommodations. The report also highlights that immigration status 
intersects with race and race-related characteristics and, therefore, not having status tend to be seen 
as a negative condition for landlords to rent units to these individuals. Most of my interviewees 
had experienced race-based and status-based discrimination when looking for rental units. 
Remarkably, some of these discriminatory practices came from other immigrants’ groups. As 
David explains about his experience finding housing: 
There was this lady, she is also immigrant… interesting that people that discriminate most 
times are immigrant. She had a visible accent which could have been Italian. We talked at 
8 am and she asked me if I could come to look at the place. When I texted ‘I'm here right 
now’, she did not respond. I told my friend ‘let's just walk for a while, maybe she is inside’. 
Instinctively I turned and I saw someone who peeked, and I was like ‘Excuse me, are you 
the owner of this place?’, she said yes. I let her know that I have been trying to move there 
for a while, but she said, ‘sorry someone has taken the house’. Obviously, I knew why she 
said that it was no longer available. A lot of them are like that. There are people who only 
want tenants from their own country (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, July 15, 
2019).  
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Similarly, Camila and Eduardo, a couple who had experienced several shelter related issues when 
they arrived at Canada, mentioned that finding housing was not a better experience as they faced 
discrimination: 
There are people that discriminates you, not only because you are a refugee but because 
you are not from their culture. That happened to us several times…In particular, one of 
them made us feel terrible. When we finished looking at the apartment, we asked for the 
application form but….it was winter and we had travel one and a half hours to arrive to the 
place…he handed us the form and says ‘honestly, we prefer people from our own culture’. 
If they prefer that, they should say so in the advertisement. We know that might be 
considered as discrimination, but we really prefer that, so we do not waste our time 
(Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, May 25, 2019). 
Most newcomers in Canada do not know their rights which makes them even more 
vulnerable to experience negative issues when navigating the housing market, including 
discrimination and racism. However, refugee claimants face particular barriers, apart from racial 
discrimination, since their refugee status is not approved yet and they often rely on social 
assistance. Apart from race, one of the other most common forms of housing discrimination is 
source of income. The Ontario’s Right Commission report highlights that landlords tend to deny 
rentals to those that receive social assistance. According to their findings, advertisements for 
“working people only” or “professionals” are not uncommon, showing the extent to which 
discrimination against low-income households is normalized in Canadian society. Patricia 
describes her experience with discrimination based on household income:  
We had been looking since February because in August we will have to move from here 
(transitional house). It is very expensive. There are five members on my family so we will 
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need at least three bedrooms. Rents are not lower tan $2,500. Right now, we are only paying 
$600 in this house, so when we apply to rent a unit, landlords do not believe that we will 
be able to pay more than that and then we get their rejection. Even if you have a job, it also 
does not work. I tell landlords that my husband has a job, and my daughter gets Ontario 
Works, that we will get child benefit payments, we have different income sources, but they 
do not get it (Interview with refugee, Toronto, June 26, 2019). 
Following Reid’s work on housing discrimination practices in Toronto, she argues that 
refugee claimants is a sector marginalized simply by the design of the housing system. Therefore, 
refugee claimants face a structural and systematic discrimination. They often have to deal with 
complex application procedures, screening requirements, and eviction processes, that “while they 
are not intended to discriminate, [these] adversely affect particular vulnerable groups, reinforcing 
their exclusion” (Reid, 2009:35).  She argues that this discriminatory effect in the housing market 
is based on both lack of affordability and the power relations between the tenant and landlord. The 
affordability factor was explained in the previous section; however, the landlord-tenant relations 
also showed up and was discussed in my interviews with both service providers and refugee 
claimants. For example, Caroline, a service provider, highlights the balance of power in the 
housing market in Toronto:  
The housing market has just become so expensive. Yeah, it is definitely a landlord’s market 
right now. They can basically charge what they want and still get hundreds of applications 
for a unit. So, things are really not in favor of tenants, especially people with barriers, who 
might be on social assistance (Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, March 6, 
2019). 
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As the demand remains high and refugee claimants do not have other options, they tend to 
accept landlords’ requirements and rent prices. FCJ Refugee Centre, in an effort to bring attention 
to these issues, published a report in 2019 on the challenges that refugee claimants and precarious 
migrants face in finding a place to stay. Among other issues, their report concluded that 
criminalization and peoples’ vulnerable condition means that many be unwilling to challenge 
discriminatory or abusive rental practices. Being unaware of their rights leave claimants in a more 
vulnerable position for potential exploitation and abuse.  
Refugees, refugee claimants and non-status migrants have literally and symbolically, 
crossed borders to have their claims considered. Once people make a claim in Canada and think 
they found “safe haven”, they should find an efficient structure and facilities to access basic needs; 
nevertheless, these bordering practices keeps appearing in the form of discrimination and 
unaffordability related to their status and income situation. This burden becomes part of the 
invisible bordering practices that end up making more difficult for refugee claimants to start their 
lives in Canada. The following section will explain the limited responses from the Canadian 
government to improve this situation.  
 
Government responses to shelter and housing shortages 
As a volunteer in two different refugee centers, I had the opportunity to learn how things 
worked in terms of assisting refugee claimants with support as needed to find housing, start a job 
application, and complete the refugee claim process. In regard to housing, I had the chance to 
understand how the dynamics played out between these centers and different levels of the 
government.  
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During my time at the organizations, I often heard calls from other centers asking if they 
had space to host refugee claimants. One particular call between one of the case workers and a 
staff person from the Waterloo region stood out. The staff person called to ask if this center had a 
plan to get a specific family of refugee claimants out from the shelter system. The case worker 
responded that there was no plan at the moment, and that they could only help with the limited 
resources they had. Once the call ended, she mentioned that “the region should do their work”. 
The response of the case worker illustrated how the housing situation was a cause of tension 
between these organizations and the municipal government. Although the federal and provincial 
government also play an important role in delivering funding and guidelines for shelter and 
affordable housing, the municipalities are the first and main actors that provide beds in emergency 
shelters and operate social housing programs. For example, social housing in Toronto is managed 
by Toronto Community Housing Corporation, which is owned by the City of Toronto.  
This section aims to discuss the consequences of implementing non-sustainable solutions 
in times of crisis and the potential of having – alternatively – a real commitment that could lead to 
structural changes and improve refugee claimants’ accommodation options. These mechanisms of 
(un)provision are part of a larger bordering system in Canada which limits claimants’ settlement 
experiences and constrain human mobility. By neglecting these parts of refugees’ settlement 
processes, an atrophy in the entire system is almost predictable when more people arrive at 
Canada’s borders. For example, the lack of refugee-exclusive and city shelters becoming 
overcrowded, provide a sense of chaos and asylum claims being “out of control”. Moreover, with 
no adequate accommodation, less refugee claimants will have access to resources to start or 
continue their claims, increasing the backlog at the IRB. In addition, this sense of chaos makes the 
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federal government implement harsher immigration policies and shrinking the options of 
protection for many asylum seekers.  
The numbers of refugee claimants arriving in Toronto have fluctuated over the past two 
decades. After a considerable decline 7 years ago, there has been a marked increase since 2015 
which intensified in 2017. These surges create pressures on the shelter system, as the system’s 
capacity is often stretched beyond its limits (City of Toronto, 2017). Overstretching shelters’ 
capacity is related to the difficulties of finding affordable housing, as refugees and refugee 
claimants extend their length of stay in these places, delaying the rotation of clients. Recent 
research has demonstrated that emergency shelters are increasingly used as temporary housing by 
these groups of people (Access Alliance, 2003; Reid, 2009). As Diana, a public official, explains:  
There are other factors that influence [the increase of clients in shelters], for example, how 
difficult it is to find housing. So, if we are housing people more slowly or there are less 
available units for people to go to, even in the private market, then you might see more of 
a backup in the shelters, right? (Interview with public official, Toronto, April 9, 2019). 
In 2017, and particularly in 2018, the municipal government implemented a series of 
responses aimed to face this situation. Due to the urgency of matters, these solutions were often 
placed as temporary responses expecting that the arrivals to the city decreased again.  
One of the most relevant solutions that the City of Toronto implemented at that time was 
the placement of refugee claimants in hotels and motels. The hotel-based program is operated 
jointly by the City staff and COSTI Immigrant Services. It aims to “provides temporary 
accommodation, initial settlement services, and support during the refugee claimant process for 
refugee claimants in the City of Toronto” (City of Toronto, 2019a). To access this program, people 
are referred from the Toronto’s Central Intake System. As this is a joint initiative with a refugee 
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organization (COSTI), once clients are placed in a hotel-room, staff workers link them to health 
care and settlement support. More particularly, they get information on the refugee claimant 
process, referrals to Ontario Works, and assistance with housing search (COSTI, n.d.). The 
program is funded by the City of Toronto. 
Although the hotel-based solution aims to keep refugee claimants off the streets and to 
provide them with the necessary services, this system also has weaknesses. It is an expensive 
program, as it costs thousands of dollars to the City of Toronto without really addressing the 
housing situation in a long term. From 2016 to the end of 2018, the city incurred in $65 million in 
costs to fund over 2,500 motel beds. The annual cost of maintaining these beds is $45 million per 
year, a cost that was expected to continue in 2019 and onwards (City of Toronto, 2019b). It is a 
temporary solution which is often used in times of acute need. As Diana mentioned:  
The hotel program has been running from the very end of 2016. It was smaller, but we are 
taking more [people] now. The use of hotels is by expanding the contracts… it is not like 
opening a permanent building, right? So, we are just using it through this time of need, and 
then, if this would not diminish, we would contract the service again (Interview with public 
official, Toronto, April 9, 2019). 
On the other hand, Toronto asked the federal government to work with municipalities to provide 
funding for temporary housing and for the growing costs of social services since 2017 (Wright, 
2018). During the peak of arrivals and occupancy of shelters, the City of Toronto incurred in $15.6 
million in unanticipated, direct costs related to the refugee claimant response, including food, 
accommodation and staffing. Moreover, the Shelter, Support and Housing Administration’s 
(SSHA) base operating budget was increased by $18 million in 2018 to sustain the operations of 
the hotel program (City of Toronto, 2018).  
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Apart from the high cost involved in this temporary response, FCJ’s report (2019) found 
that accommodating refugee claimants in high-level hotels only hinders the process of making 
connections with the community, as their level of isolation increases. On the other hand, service 
providers can offer greater access to services if they live close to these centers or can travel easily 
to them. Moreover, when they settle far away in these hotel rooms, it is more difficult for providers 
to offer them protection against discriminatory and hateful actions. An example of a hateful action 
against this group of people happened in October 2018 when the Radisson Hotel in Toronto, a 
temporary home to approximately 570 refugee claimants, was the target of an arson attempt. In 
addition, the services provided at these places come short to address the real need. As Melissa 
explains:  
A lot of the people coming at this center were placed either in hotels or dorms, they did not 
have much access to a computer and did not have settlement support services or at least 
not enough settlement support services. I think somebody was giving them a list of places 
they could go for stuff like work permits. My center was one of the places on the list and 
some people would come to us. I think they were providing some support in the hotels but 
not enough (Interview with volunteer, Toronto, June 14, 2019). 
This demonstrates that the hotel room solution is not ideal from a settlement perspective. 
While they offer a roof that keeps refugees away from the streets, they still live precariously and 
in uncertainty. They are not fully equipped to support this group of people and often, refugees will 
find themselves without any help navigating all the implications of asking for asylum in Canada. 
In addition, being placed in a hotel can be an unpleasant environment for claimants as it might feel 
impersonal and detached from the community, when they are, in fact, looking for a welcoming 
experience.  
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Research on this type of accommodation has addressed how Canadian hospitality is 
redefined through the implementation of this practice. For example, Dawson (2014) argues that 
Canadian hospitality is an ambivalent concept as it emphasizes generosity and altruism, but the 
government  also use this discourse to justify anti-immigration policies. In his work, he particularly 
refers to incarceration of asylum-seekers and non-status migrants. Placing refugee claimants in 
hotels for the first weeks or months after their arrival gives the assumption that they are guests 
favoured by the Canadian hospitality. Nonetheless, this hospitality stops when they have to look 
for housing and usually find an unaffordable and discriminatory market, affecting every other area 
of their settlement process. At this point, they become a burden for Canadian society as their stay 
at hotels and reliance on social assistance has to extend, and therefore, they become “abusers of 
Canada’s generosity”. In addition, the accommodation of refugees in hotels gives the media 
grounds to exaggerate the crisis or focus on the negative aspect of the issue; making people believe 
that the government is paying for claimants to stay at “fancy” accommodations from the peoples’ 
taxes. Being a guest, as Rosello (2001) argues, is someone who is at the mercy of the host, who 
may be benevolent but has the power to revoke an invitation or decide to when the guest has 
overstayed their visit. 
While the hotel-based solution was enough to cover the arrival of refugee claimants during 
2017, the City had to implement an additional plan in 2018. This temporary solution involved the 
placement of refugee claimants in college dormitories during the summer, particularly, dormitories 
at Centennial College and Humber College. The temporariness of this response was even more 
evident as refugee claimants only had a few weeks to stay in these places before students returned 
to school and occupied their dormitories when classes started. In August of 2018, it was announced 
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that about 450 claimants who had been using this type of accommodation were to be placed in 
hotel rooms as colleges needed the dorm rooms for their incoming fall students (Wright, 2018).   
Temporary and ad hoc strategies are not new in Canadian policymaking. The usefulness of 
these strategies is valued as it allows policymakers to make decisions on case-by-case basis. This 
approach is often used in incidents of forced migration. For example, during the resettlement of 
Syrians in 2016 (Operation Syrian Refugees), when Canada identified, processed and resettled 
25,000 Syrians between November 2015 and February 2016 (IRCC, 2018). Another example is 
the response of the Canadian government after the earthquake in Haiti. They developed a 
temporary policy that facilitated the migration of Haitians to Canada. These measures were solely 
developed in response to that event in Haiti and were not part of a broader policy strategy relating 
to environmental migration (Omeziri and Gore, 2014). 
Canada often considers itself a country where immigration is developed systematically and 
ordered. The government often has time to organize their resources to welcome groups of migrants 
as the country does not face larger flows of irregular migration like his southern neighbour. 
Nonetheless, this approach cannot continue to be considered sufficient after it was demonstrated 
that changes in US policy usually causes an increase of formal and informal crossings to Canada. 
These events have demonstrated that more people are considering arriving and staying in this 
country; therefore, policymakers should not base their decisions in temporary measures to contain 
the effects of migration.  
The temporary and ad hoc responses result in fragmented policy that amounts to a “wait 
and see” approach (Omeziri and Gore, 2014). On other contexts, scholars have shown how ad hoc 
policies, particularly in times of crisis, often advance more enforcement-oriented agendas (see 
Mountz, 2010) and support the emerging system of crimmigration (see Sklansky, 2012). In this 
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case ad hoc mechanisms hindered the establishment of instrumental policies to effectively address 
issues in the refugee arrival and settlement experience.  The few policies that were implemented 
in 2017 and 2018 were not comprehensive and only increased the exhaustion of financial 
resources. While the approach of temporary measures allows flexibility and consideration of case-
by-case needs to forced migration events, the shelter and housing situation is a permanent issue 
that should have long-term polices to avoid precarity and homelessness among vulnerable 
individuals (not only refugee claimants). When I asked service providers about these emergency 
and temporary measures, they argued that the three levels of government could do more to improve 
this situation. As Hector explains, the lack of collaboration is one the biggest obstacles in the 
housing situation:  
Right now you would have to say that probably in very different ways all three levels of 
government are coming up short. They are not providing the support and that is impacting 
the families that we serve, it is impacting the sector, and it is making things in the long run 
even more expensive because now we are doing all these emergency temporary measures, 
and it is really putting pressure on all areas of social service (Interview with refugee center 
director, Toronto, July 5, 2019). 
At the time of field research, finding potential solutions for the shelter and housing problem 
was one of the main tasks asked to the government by service providers. The temporary solutions 
were supposed to last a few months, with a more detailed, long term approach for housing of 
newcomers to be realised in the interim. Although different levels of government proposed and 
established certain guidelines and provided funding for affordable housing developments since the 
beginning of 2017; the results of these strategies are still to be seen. As this is not a recent situation, 
some of these plans replaced others that did not work as expected to solve the “housing crisis”. In 
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the remaining of this section I will explore the proposed long-term solutions to improve the shelter 
and housing situation-particularly those suggested after 2017. I take plans proposed after 2017 as 
the country started to receive high numbers of arrivals since 2016 (e.g. with the welcoming of 
Syrian refugees) which further intensified in 2017 and 2018. 
In 2017, the federal government published its first ever National Housing Strategy and the 
Provincial government announced its Ontario Fair Housing Strategy. In the city of Toronto, they 
proposed the Housing TO 2020-2030 action plan, and investments for new affordable housing 
developments were made, and more importantly, a Refugee Capacity Plan was created.  
The National Housing Strategy, a ten-year plan, was created to meet the goal of making 
sure all Canadians can access housing that meets their needs. This plan includes building more 
affordable, accessible, inclusive and sustainable housing (CMHC, 2018). The federal government, 
in particular, created the Affordable Housing Innovation Fund of $200 million dollars which would 
help to support the development of innovative approaches to affordable housing, create inclusive 
communities and contribute to fight against homelessness. This complements the already 
established National Investment in Affordable Housing Funding Table, through which the Federal 
government had invested over 1.9 billion dollars over eight years to March 2019 (CMHC, 2018). 
On the other hand, in April of 2017 the Ontario government released a set of 16 measures 
to help Ontarians to find affordable housing through their Ontario Fair Housing Plan. This plan 
was introduced as the Province, and particularly the Greater Toronto Area and the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe, saw significant increases in prices in the housing market. According to the Ontario 
Chamber of Commerce “the average house prices in the Toronto region reached $916,567 in 
March 2017, up 33.2 percent from the previous year” (OCC, 2017). Among their proposed actions 
were a 15% foreign buyer tax and the expansion of rent controls to all private rent units in Ontario. 
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Also, the Provincial government announced actions to increase supply through a five-year program 
to encourage construction of new rental apartment buildings by rebating a portion of development 
charges. They also committed to work with municipalities to remove the barriers to get new homes 
and listing on the market faster.  
Similar plans were announced in the Housing TO 2020-2030 Action Plans. However, this 
plan takes a more human rights-based approach to combat homelessness and provide pathways to 
secure housing stability. For example, they plan to actively take actions to combat housing 
discrimination and take a gender-based and equity lens to support vulnerable groups of people in 
the housing pathways. In regard to affordability, they mentioned the commitment to encourage 
landlords to provide more supportive and affordable rental housing options. They plan to build 
40,000 more affordable rental units by 2030 (City of Toronto, 2019c). Among other strategies, the 
city commits to maintain affordability in housing by renegotiating new operating agreements and 
deliver housing benefits to vulnerable households, such as the Canada-Ontario Housing Benefit13. 
Nonetheless, the affordability problem is expected to be continued even after the 
implementation of these strategies as most average rent prices were and still are beyond many 
buyers and renters’ budgets. Although there is a series of programs in place related to affordable 
housing, other issues such as low vacancy rates, low incomes, and precarious employment play a 
role in the increase of homelessness and non-adequate shelter for vulnerable population. Other 
bureaucratic issues also hinder the improvement of affordable housing. As the Ontario Home 
Builders Association points out, the major constrains for the housing supply is attributable to the 
 
13 The Canada-Ontario Housing Benefit is part of the National Housing Strategy and it is intended to be 
developed by the three levels of government (City of Toronto, 2019b). The COHB is a monthly subsidy provided 
to low-income households to assist with housing costs. It pays the difference between 30 % of the household’s 




lengthy time it takes to get approvals for projects.  These bureaucratic problems are also found in 
other areas of affordable housing programs, as Jessica, a service provider in Toronto mentioned: 
There is a need to change their systems to be compatible with reality. Most people who 
live here or in the shelters are on social assistance. Ontario Works has a fund called the 
Housing Stabilization Fund to help people move out of shelters. That helps pay peoples’ 
last month’s rent, which is really helpful when you are trying to get a new apartment, but 
it will not be paid to you until you come to your case worker with a signed lease for your 
new apartment; but most apartments do not even let you apply unless you come to them 
with last month’s rent. And if you managed to borrow money for last month’s rent, like 
from your friend or from us or from someone to pay it, and then you go to Ontario Works 
with your signed lease and say, ‘now, can I have last month's rent?’ But they will not give 
it to you because the last month’s rent has already been paid. They have no reimbursement 
policy. So, these systems do not make sense and they are preventing people from being 
able to move into housing (Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, July 9, 2019). 
These bureaucratic issues hinder the process of getting social aid for housing purposes. It also 
becomes a frustrating experience as refugees have to jump from agency to agency and work with 
their local refugee center until they met the requirements to obtain financial help. There is a clear 
need in improving accessibility to these supports; however, it is equally important to increase 
social assistance benefits levels to which refugee support allowances are adjusted. These social 
benefits are often aimed to stop when the refugee claimant enters the work force; however, it rarely 
takes less than a year for refugees to reach a level of income high enough to pay for adequate 
housing without cutting into their budget for other essentials (Rose, 2019). Resolving the gap 
between income and housing costs in addition to make these supports more accessible, are key in 
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responding to housing needs. The next section will discuss other policy solutions proposed by 
service providers in Ontario.  
 
Taking action: Potential policy solutions proposed by service providers 
The interviews with service providers in refugee centers and with refugee claimants show 
that there is a lack of shelter beds and permanent housing options for refugee claimants. Although 
these issues often involve different vulnerable populations, refugee claimants face obstacles as 
they are new to the country and usually do not know their rights or the opportunities they might 
have access to. Most of my civil organization and members of the government participants agreed 
that a more comprehensive cooperation between the three levels of government was imperative to 
make the shelter and housing system work properly.  
While refugee claimants’ needs are often considered the responsibility of the federal 
government, the municipal government has a major role in shelters and housing programs. There 
is often a “pointing at each other” mentality in which none of the three levels comprehensively 
address the needs of refugee claimants. To properly address this situation, most of my participants 
mentioned that long-term investments should be made in refugee-exclusive places where claimants 
can stay. Only one of the centers that I interviewed acts as an emergency shelter (no transitional 
house) which is exclusive for refugee families. The director of this refugee center mentioned the 
need of more places like this: 
Certainly, we would like to see more of an effort to increase capacity on a more permanent 
sustainable basis, as opposed to spending a lot of money temporary measures. Especially 
because the hotel programs that have been set up, they do not have the same level of 
services that the permanent programs have. It is money that, with a bit more planning and 
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commitment, could be much better invested in creating places like this or other refugee 
houses that will be around much longer. That can stretch the money much further when it 
comes to services support (Interview with refugee center director, Toronto, July 5, 2019). 
While more refugee-exclusive shelters are needed, there are other short-term potential 
solutions that can be implemented to consider the vulnerability of refugee claimants in the housing 
market. For example, the FCJ report suggests providing workshops to the Central Intake System 
staff to sensitize them about the claimants situation, staff training on the Immigration Refugee 
process, end or shift the policy at shelters of refusing people who arrive at their doors14, being 
flexible in terms of funding agreements with any organization that houses refugee claimants, 
address safety concerns at shelters, stop the shelter policy of leaving every day and come back at 
5:00 pm as refugee claimants often do not have a place to go (FCJ Refugee Center, 2019).  
Making the housing and shelter system refugee claimant-friendly (from availability to 
rental applications) and establishing better connections with landlords were other solutions 
mentioned by my participants. Although penalization of landlords for abusive behaviour and 
discrimination can be a potential solution, my participants acknowledged that a better answer was 
to give them better information on the refugee claim process and on the Ontario Works system. As 
Mariana, a service provider from Kitchener, mentioned when I asked her about the limitations of 
housing for claimants: 
I think it has to do more with education and knowledge about who the refugees and 
migrants, in general, are…about peoples’ conditions. The fact that even if they come from 
other countries, this does not mean that they do not know how to live, or they do not know 
 
14 People access emergency shelter only through the Central Intake System. 
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how to use a washing machine, or how a kitchen works (Interview with case worker, 
Kitchener, March 13, 2019). 
On the other hand, the municipal and provincial governments can develop a refugee-
friendly housing system by increasing availability of affordable housing (particularly family units), 
having translation services available to communicate effective with tenants, having information in 
refugee centers about the housing market, and ensuring that housing is safe and located in 
communities where newcomers want to live. The Refugee Capacity Plan developed and proposed 
by the Coalition of Service Providers for Refugee Claimants in Ontario in 2019, addressed in a 
comprehensive manner most of these requirements. This plan was passed by the Toronto Council 
in April of 2019 and included:   
• establishing a 24/7 refugee claimant reception and referral centre where new arrivals 
can access information and emergency support 
• development of additional refugee claimant-specific emergency shelters  
• consider assess the current stock of Toronto Community Housing (THC) to increase 
the current options for transitional housing as long-term solutions (City of Toronto, 
2019d). 
These strategies offer an appropriate starting point and can provide the grounds to develop 
more refugee claimant-specific programs in Ontario. Although it passed in the City of Toronto, 
the other levels of government’ commitment is needed. Nonetheless, at the time of writing this 
thesis, the Federal government had not still committed to fund some of these initiatives (Edwards, 
2019). This shows that lack of governmental cooperation in matters of refugee claimants is one of 
the major obstacles for issues like housing and shelter. 
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One of the most recent projects that the Government of Canada funded to help the city of 
Toronto to address the housing of asylum claimants was announced in August 2019. The initiative 
consists of Toronto offering initial shelter to refugee claimants and transporting them to 
neighbouring cities, like the regions of Peel and Hamilton (IRCC, 2019). Although a triage system 
will be beneficial to decrease the pressure on Toronto shelters, there is still a housing crisis that 
should be addressed particularly to assist claimants who prefer to stay in the city for economic or 
personal reasons. Of all the implications of seeking refuge in Canada, attaining initial shelter and 
permanent housing should be a positive experience as possible instead of one detrimental of their 




Although Canada has established policies that build a welcoming attitude towards refugees, 
the events after 2017 showed that their settlement practices are not sufficient to cover the needs of 
refugee claimants. There is a gap that needs urgent attention from the three levels of government 
as more people are at risk of facing homelessness, houselessness, and poverty.  The interviews 
conducted with claimants indicated that most of them were appreciative and satisfied about having 
arrived in Canada and attained accessed certain services. However, this is interpreted as having 
low expectations from the host country, as similar resources in their home countries are limited 
and scarcer. 
I argue specifically that this type of (un)provision is part of a bordering system in which 
the government of Canada limits settlement agencies to provide adequate settlement resources for 
refugee claimants. While these organizations adapted their services, they were limited as funding 
and other important structural elements –like collaboration and assistance– come from the 
 184 
Canadian government. I argue that this is a concealed bordering practice which aims to invisibilize 
the border, yet it appears in every stage of refugee claimants’ settlement experiences. Therefore, 
refugee claimants have crossed the physical border; however, they still encounter bordering 
mechanisms through which their settlement becomes constrained. 
This chapter looked at these invisible bordering mechanisms through the perspective of 
service providers. The increase in arrivals and the –lack of– responses from the three levels of 
governments, forced refugee centers to adapt their own services. Relying more on volunteers, 
making connections with the community, implementing new shelter-exclusive services, hiring 
case workers, and creating refugee claimants-specific programs were some of the practices that 
they implemented to cover the needs of refugee claimants. In particular, the lack of space in 
shelters and the lack of affordable housing in Ontario, were the main factors that contributed to a 
reorganization of the refugee centers’ practices. Importantly, this research sheds light in 
understanding how NGOs often rely on civil society and volunteerism to balance the supply of and 
the demand for services. This cross-sector collaboration is particularly necessary when arrivals of 
refugee claimants increase significantly in a short period of time.  
Although shelter and housing challenges are caused by a series of factors, like landlords’ 
discrimination and low salaries; these become part of a bordering mechanism when Canada do not 
provide real humanitarian solutions for covering refugee claimants needs. In this chapter, the 
inefficiency of temporary solutions was discussed as a way to demonstrate that only a real 
commitment from the federal, provincial and municipal governments can mitigate the effects of 
the housing and shelter crises. At the time of writing, long-term plan solutions were drafted and 
proposed by the municipality; however, the implementation has been halted as there were not real 
approaches to fund these particular strategies in the City of Toronto. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Embodying the border: the intersection of policies, access to services and 
refugees’ identities 
Having close contact with refugee claimants as part of my volunteer work allowed me to 
understand more profoundly the many challenges they experience following their arrival in 
Canada. The need for volunteers to translate during legal counselling hours was imperative in the 
summer of 2019. In spring of that year, legal aid funding cuts were announced, whereby the 
Province would no longer fund refugee and immigration legal services. As part of my volunteer 
hours, I translated for a family that had just arrived from the Caribbean. Their concern and anxiety 
were constantly present as they discussed the process of claiming refugee status and wait times 
with their lawyer. Telling and reliving their story of persecution was also emotionally and mentally 
challenging for them. These experiences made me more aware of the power relations implicated 
in asking asylum in Canada. Seeing firsthand one of several arduous processes refugee claimants 
have to go through, profoundly shaped the methodological and theoretical approach of my 
research.  
Although, seemingly, this particular family was accessing fair legal representation which 
was partially covered by the Province, I realized how the invisible border impacted their ability to 
make and continue their refugee claim process. For example, the wait times and high costs were 
the major issues for them. After their initial funding for legal services ran out, they would have to 
cover other services such as preparation for their hearing. They did not have a job permit, and it 
would have taken at least a month before they got one. They also did not have any documents yet 
to prove they were making a claim as initial interviews were still being delayed. This meant that 
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they could not access health care yet. The budget cuts on legal aid only complicated further the 
situation.  
The process of getting legal counselling for the entire asylum claim process without legal 
aid seemed incongruous. After the cuts, legal aid covered only the first meetings to prepare initial 
documents and present them to the IRCC; however, they did not cover the preparation for the 
hearing, which is one of the most important parts of the process. In the process, after their claim is 
found eligible and referred to the IRB, they can prepare for their hearing. Due to the complexity 
of the process, legal aid is recommended before the initial interview since a lawyer can help with 
the preparation for the eligibility interview and filling out important forms. However, attaining 
legal aid for the hearing preparation is key in having a successful refugee claim. The lawyer should 
review and help gather important evidence for the case, which can take several weeks or months 
to complete. For the family, it took four two-hour sessions in total only to prepare the narrative 
and for the lawyer to complete the initial forms. After that, the claimant would have to pay $2,500 
for hearing preparation and hearing time.  
The family’s concern was palpable in the room, a small lawyer’s office with a narrow 
window through which we could barely see anything outside. The family of four had just arrived 
from the Dominican Republic where they faced persecution and now, they had to figure out how 
they would face that economic burden. It was evident that the border was appearing once again, 
and it would keep appearing during the entire refugee determination process. This chapter will 
focus on the experience of refugee claimants in their refugee and settlement process. Although 
upon arrival, all participants felt they were treated justly and respectfully by Canadian authorities, 
their situation became more vulnerable once their initial settlement started. They were constantly 
facing a system which was not built to support people waiting for their refugee decision. Similarly 
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to what happens to non-status migrants, refugee claimants’ presence is problematized and often 
questioned as deservers of rights. Moreover, refugee claimants are prone to live in a more 
precarious status compared to a resettled refugee as they have not yet received legal status from 
the Canadian government. Therefore, they are not entirely protected under Canadian law and they 
could be sent back to their country of origin if their status is denied. They are also often caught up 
in practices that put them in a state of legal limbo for possibly many years.  
This chapter aims to demonstrate that the Canadian government implements bordering 
practices that “unwelcome” this group of people. As discussed previously, this is evident through 
the lack of refugee claimants’ specific programs, limitation of funding for claimants and lack of 
real solutions that address their settlement needs. Although this has been an issue for several 
decades in Ontario, it became more evident after the Provincial cuts. These practices demonstrate 
that refugee claimants do not fit the idea of a “deserving refugee” until they are given official 
status. This is particularly problematic as people can stay long periods of time as refugee claimants. 
As of June of 2020, there were more than 90,000 cases pending with an average time of two years 
for their hearing (IRB, 2020a). 
This chapter draws on literature in feminist geopolitics to show how refugee policy is 
constantly present and embodied by refugee claimants. Feminist scholars show the relevance of 
studying smaller scales to understand relations of power (Hyndman, 2004; Dixon and Marston, 
2013). This framework is useful in discussing the hidden power structures in refugee claimants’ 
settlement experiences, which are often ignored spaces of analysis. This chapter will also discuss 
how the invisible border is represented by neglect and dismissal of refugee claimants’ experiences 
upon arrival as they have to constantly prove their refugeeness to Canadian authorities.   
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The first section will bring a short theoretical discussion on feminist geopolitics, which 
expands on the introductory framework discussed in Chapter 2.  The next section will discuss how 
refugee claimants’ refugeeness is constantly questioned as they did not wait outside Canada for 
their claim to be approved, like resettled refugees. Thus, applying for asylum while being 
physically present in their territory, gives them less credibility as “real refugees”. I will use 
Hadjiyanni’s (2002) paradigm on refugee identity, discussed in more depth in the following 
sections of this chapter, to show that the categorization of refugees only serves to determine who 
is a more deserving refugee between these two groups. The process of becoming refugees, which 
can last months or years, has an impact on who claimants are and who they will become.  
The last section will focus on the invisible border in claimants’ settlement experiences. 
Although refugee claimants seemingly access a just refugee determination system and social 
services, they usually live precariously while they do not have immigration status. I argue that this 
becomes a bordering mechanism as refugee claimants constantly encounter the border making 
their arrival and settlement process more onerous and difficult. This also limits humanitarian 
provisions towards these group of people as they have to live in a situation of a precarity for longer 
period of times, before they can have access to the full spectrum of government support. I will 
particularly focus on the provincial cuts made in 2019 which made refugee claimants feel 
“unwelcomed” and forced them into a more vulnerable situation.  
The discussion of this chapter is focused on the relationship between policy, discourse and 
materiality. Canada’s refugee system privileges those who fit the discourse of a helpless refugee 
who is waiting to be resettled, while those who arrive at their borders are considered as a threat for 
their system. The discursive and legal strategy of categorizing refugee claimants as “undeserving”, 
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has served to justify the reduced humanitarian responses, programs and funding in services like 
health care and legal aid for inland claimants.  
 
Shifting the scale of study in asylum and immigration 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, feminist geopolitical scholars have brought to the discipline the study 
of embodied and informal practices that have been overlooked by traditional geopolitics. Their 
orientation around issues of nationalism, immigration, and security exposed how political struggle 
is not only shaped by large structural agents in the international agenda but also by smaller scales 
as well. Feminist geopolitical scholars have particularly advocated for a shift in scale from the 
state to the local and the individual level to analyze relations of power, everyday struggles and 
production of marginality (Marston, 2000; Dowler et. al., 2010). Their role in political geography 
includes taking the conventional repertoire of geopolitics (e.g., nationhood, borders, security, 
warfare) and questioning its role in producing everyday struggles and issues of marginality (Dixon 
and Marston, 2013). In regard to migration studies, feminist geopolitics scholars’ contributions 
include the understanding of how multiple relations of power are reflected in migrants’ bodies as 
they cross geographical and discursive borders (Silvey and Lawson, 1999; Silvey, 2005; 
Hiemstra,2012; Smith et.al., 2015). 
Feminist scholars agree that movements of migrants are inherently political in nature. 
Silvey (2005), for example, argues that migration is a socially embedded process that is organized 
through existing hierarchies of gender, race, class, nationality, among other differences. Massey’s 
“power geometry” theory explains how individuals have different relations and positions on the 
mobility scale. For her “some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and 
movements, others don’t; some are more in the receiving end of it than others, some are effectively 
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imprisoned by it” (1991:26). Massey’s theorization enables us to think of space as a construction 
which is influenced by politics, but also a space in which migrants have almost no agency to shape 
their mobilities. While some scholars consider migration as a practice in which migrants’ agency 
is restricted (e.g. practices of displacement and criminalization of bodies); others argue that the 
meaning of migrants’ mobilities are reworked by the migrants themselves (Silvey, 2005; Smith et. 
al., 2015). In my study, I show that refugee claimants’ bodies, practices and identities are 
intertwined with struggles of power through different mechanisms, from controlling their 
movements through restrictive immigration policies to categorization practices that only reinforce 
the idea of “real refugees” versus “underserving refugee”. 
By focusing on the scale of the body, feminist scholars aim to understand how individuals’ 
bodies are in constant interaction with political struggle. For feminist geographers, the scale of the 
local is relevant; however, they go further by showing the role of the private or intimate spaces of 
the household and body in the structuration of the political. Bodies are sites of political struggle as 
they can be sites of conflict and elements of control but that also have power of negotiation. All 
political processes have an impact on the individuals’ bodies, regardless if they are resisting or 
oppressed agents. As feminist geographers attempt to situate knowledge in the people’s 
experiences rather than on a “view from nowhere” (Haraway, 1991), they include the subjects’ 
embodied experiences and perspectives in their own research. The body and the 
multidimensionality of embodied experiences are the touchstone of feminist theorists (Nelson and 
Seager, 2005). 
In my study, I draw on intimate geopolitics to demonstrate that the most personal spaces 
of refugee claimants (their identities) are invaded by geopolitical meanings. Mapping relations 
between intimacy and geopolitics is an important contribution of feminist geopolitics (Pain and 
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Staeheli, 2014).  By challenging the boundaries of the geopolitical, they illustrate that bodies are 
intertwined with macro and micro political discourse and national strategies, international events, 
as well as territorial claims and policies (Smith, 2012, Barabansteva, et. al., 2019, Pain and 
Staeheli, 2014). Instead of considering the intimate as a scale in geopolitics (Dowler et. al., 2014), 
feminist scholars argue that the intimate is more than a geographical locality as it is infiltrated, 
connected and complexly related to state governing practices. Thus, the intimate is “a set of spatial 
practices…. connecting the body and that which is distant” (Pain and Staeheli, 2014: 345). 
In this chapter I aim to demonstrate that researching migration within the context of the 
global/national scale is different than researching migration within the context of the body and the 
intimate. The bodies of migrants and refugees are constantly stigmatized and targeted by 
exclusionary policies as they are criminalized agents. On the other hand, their categorization 
situates them as inferior to other people or subjectivities (e.g., asylum seeker vs. high-skilled 
worker or refugee claimant vs. resettled refugee), which has in important impact on the intimate 
process of identity formation.   
I aim to show that the categorization among refugees in Canada causes a difference of the 
perception of refugeeness between sponsored/resettled refugees and inland refugee claimants. 
Thus, their bodies and experiences are juxtaposed in terms of who is a “deserving refugee”. The 
border is made present differently to refugee claimants and it is often embodied through ways of 
understanding their own refugeeness. Although, their journeys are similar, refugee claimants’ 
bodies go through different experiences and emotions from the moment they intend to cross the 
border up until their settlement process.  
Feminist geopolitics theory explores how mechanisms of control, including immigration 
and other policies, are extended throughout the entire migrants’ journeys and after they have 
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arrived in their destination country. In my research, the provincial cuts, which particularly affected 
refugee claimants, not only heightened their lack of official status, but became a way to manage 
their chances to get a positive refugee decision. I engage in further discussion about this in the last 
sections of this chapter. All these policies are embodied and have a relevant impact on people’s 
identities and practices. As Hiemstra notes (2011: 11), “embodied political analysis endeavor to 
identify and understand how laws and discourses associated with a particular policy (and the state) 
are given form, become lived experiences, and shape people’s everyday realities”. 
 
Understanding the conceptualization of refugeeness and refugee identity 
The definition of refugee has caused some of the most vivid and controversial discussions 
in political geography. Most of the 21st century challenges of refugee protection come from the 
simple act of defining who is a refugee and the rights that they are entitled to. The concept of 
refugee was not considered in the political and social imaginary of the western world until the 20th 
century (Krenz, 1966). The devastations of WWII caused the greatest displacements in Europe, 
which changed dynamics of the governmentality of migration and the refugee protection 
framework. This displacement constituted an experimentation for postwar human rights principles 
(Cohen, 2012).  
Ideas of resettlement around the world began to take legal form. For example, the 
establishment of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees in 1950 and of the concept of 
refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention sought to provide relief for people fleeing the aftermath 
of the conflict (Behrman, 2019). According to Hathaway (1984), by carefully establishing such 
mechanisms and the hallmarks of refugeehood, states hoped that assistance could be afforded 
without the risk of domestic problems likely to result from open immigration policies. Nonetheless, 
 193 
the nature of peoples’ movements started to become a problem in the second half of the 20th 
century. Refugee flows were larger and more complex and began to come from the developing 
world (Barnett, 2002). As individuals ran away en masse, the scale and nature of problems posed 
was getting increasingly difficult for those taking large numbers of them. Additionally, they were 
now being persecuted for inherent and unchangeable elements of their identity, including race and 
sexual orientation. 
Intergovernmental consultations over the years lead to an international harmonization of 
practices related to asylum and refugees. This led to the creation and institutionalization of the 
definition of refugee in 1951 through the Geneva Convention. This definition was accepted by 
many and currently it is the cornerstone of immigration and refugee policies around the world. 
Although disguised under a humanitarian approach, these developments were and still are political. 
This definition serves the purpose of determining who can be accepted under this category and, 
consequently, which rights they are entitled to. As Lochak (2013:2) mentions “the instruments 
developed within the confines of international diplomacy remained closely depended on state 
interests, and the definition of “refugee”, throughout its successive changes, reflected underlying 
political issues, even if, paradoxically, the actors in this diplomacy tried for a long time to highlight 
the humanitarian nature of international action, and to reduce the political aspects of the questions 
of refugees.” 
Apart from the legal definition of refugee, scholars have studied the conceptualization of 
refugee as part of a subjective process (Lacroix, 2004). Refugeeness encompasses not only a set 
of characteristics that have to match a legal definition, but also the individual’s subjective 
experience of having to flee their home country and arrive as a guest to a different one. Becoming 
a refugee, due to displacement or persecution, reconstitutes people’s identities which not always 
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fit the states policies’ description. Nonetheless, their refugeeness  –or lack thereof– is often 
determined by a political system that must recognize their status. This process changes consciously 
and unconsciously claimants’ sense of themselves and their relation to the world. Although there 
is a personal adaptation and reconfiguration, their “official” refugeeness is not attributed when 
they flee their country of origin but when –and if– their case is proven before a Court.  
Immigrants and refugees’ identities have been explored in diverse fields such as 
anthropology, sociology, and education. Scholars’ work has focused on construction of identity 
(Chao, 2019); the impact of labelling and categorization in refugee identities (Zetter, 2007; 
Conway, 2011; Suerbaum, 2018) and the role of refugee policy discourse in forming refugee 
claimant subjectivity (Lacroix, 2004). This work is relevant as immigrants and refugees often face 
identity crises as early as crossing the border, which continues when they try to adapt to the new 
society. Changes and restructuring of identities occur in the process of becoming refugees as every 
aspect of life has to be reorganized according to a new set of rules and policies. As Hadjiyanni 
(2002:1) notes: 
 Once at their place of refuge, refugees struggle between losing the past, adjusting to the 
present, and preparing for the future, while at the same time often learning a new language, 
culture, and way of life. The plethora of losses refugees endure as a result of their 
displacement along with the difficulties they face while trying to rebuild their lives, such 
as finding employment and housing, have been viewed as responsible for the “identity 
crisis” noted among displaced people. 
International organizations and nation-states often impose their own definitions of 
refugeeness onto them, limiting the number of people who can fall under official categorizations 
(Conway, 2011). In this respect, Zetter mentions that labelling is not only used to “describe the 
 195 
world but also to construct it in convenient images” (2007: 173). Labeling is not only an 
instrumental process but has become a powerful tool that allows an intrusive intervention in the 
lives and identities of refugees. Moreover, Zetter argues that the practice of labelling can be more 
a problem than a solution as nowadays is more complicated to determine who is a refugee due to 
the complex conditions of international mass movements. For him, “how the different labels are 
formed to describe these different migratory processes and the frequent conflation of, and 
confusion between, these labels lie at the core of the problematique of defining who is a refugee 
at the current time” (2007: 5).  
 In my work, I will use Hadjiyanni’s (2002) “paradigm on refugee identity” to show that 
the refugee label serves the purpose of categorization to determine who is a more deserving 
refugee. Although her work explores identities and consciousness of refugees’ descendants, her 
epistemological work is applicable to demonstrate that the current approach on categorizations in 
asylum, limits the retention, creation, production, and reproduction of refugee identity. She 
demonstrates that the refugee consciousness is not exclusive to those who have been initially 
displaced and who fall under the states’ category of refugee, but it expands to different types of 
exiled individuals, as well as their descendants.  
Hadjiyanni argues that the official 1951 Convention definition of refugee is a colonial term 
that legitimizes the dominance of the receiving country. The host country often instills in a refugee 
a “preferred” identity to protect the host society. The imposition of this identity makes them feel 
that they are still in control and power of the refugee. Moreover, the refugee label is not a flexible 
categorization that includes the complexity of peoples’ movements and decisions. This is 
problematic as the process of becoming a refugee can get ambiguous as a person might adopt 
different titles through the different stages of the refugee experience. Hadjiyanni’s work is relevant 
 196 
as it reminds us that most of the times, some groups of people, whose refugeeness is not officially 
recognized, are obliged to retain a refugee mentality without having the rights obtained from a 
refugee title.  
In her work, Hadjiyanni proposed a new identity paradigm in which the title of refugee is 
not earned by displacement; instead, she claims considering the act of being a refugee as an identity 
in and of itself. This paradigm changes what being a refugee entails and is not based on colonial 
practices of labeling. For her, “being a refugee is now perceived as a part of who displaced people 
are and what they are made of, instead of as a label imposed on them by others” (2002:9). The 
identity of refugee becomes integral of the persons’ experience instead of an imposed category. 
This new paradigm also entails that the title of refugee is not earned but becomes through a lifetime 
of struggle. Hadjiyanni’s paradigm recovers the refugees’ humanity and provides them with 
agency to decide if they want to practice their refugeeness or focus on other facets of their identity, 
so they can build their self-image and denote their own meaning of life. Thus, they are not at the 
expense of the states’ resolution on determining if they are deserving of the refugee title.   
This paradigm demonstrates that being a refugee is now “a matter of becoming, forming, 
expressing, producing, reproducing and eventually transferring identity” (Hadjiyanni, 2002:10). 
In my work, this is relevant as it helps to understand that in Canada, the categorization of refugees 
limits the forming and expressing of identity for one particular group of people upon arrival. The 
differences that entail being a resettled refugee versus a refugee claimant are still part of the 
colonial view of what a refugee should be and when should they be considered as refugees for the 
host nation. A refugee claimant is a person who is in a pre-stage of when refugeeness will occur 
for them, according to Canadian immigration agencies. Thus, the level of refugeeness is only 
determined by the states’ labels. Although claimants consider themselves refugees who are fleeing 
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from persecution, they are not seen as deserving of Canadian full protection and assistance. As I 
demonstrate below, during the long stage of being a refugee claimant in Canada, people are forced 
to experience their refugeeness in a very limited way impacting their live experiences and 
identities.  
 
The Canadian context: refugee claimants’ identities  
In Chapter 3, I explained how the Canadian immigration and refugee system usually works. 
The pivotal statement, that will be useful for this section, is that historically Canada has understood 
itself more as a country of resettlement and not of first arrival. In Canada, there is a long tradition 
of refugee resettlement which is determined by several geopolitical factors and which includes its 
own challenges in the reception and settlement processes (see Hamilton et. al. edited collection, 
2020). In this thesis, I have shown that their policies in the asylum system and in settlement 
practices still demonstrate a strong preference to those refugees who they can select abroad. In 
Canada, immigration has often been seen as a source of national building; therefore, they consider 
that being able to select who arrive at their borders is cornerstone to develop their national identity. 
However, this turns controversial when selecting is a practice directed towards those seeking 
asylum.  
As explained in previous chapters, resettled refugees (government and privately sponsored 
refugees) are given status upon arrival and therefore have immediate access to essential services, 
financial aid and settlement support. The case is different for refugee claimants who made in-
Canada asylum claims. The difference between these groups is that the former became a refugee 
while waiting abroad and the latter is waiting for their decision inside Canada. Resettled refugees 
land to Canada with refugee status after having went through a medical exam, pass a criminal and 
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security check and give biometric information abroad. Refugee claimants land in Canada with a 
temporary status and with the hopes of getting their claim accepted. The reception between these 
two groups of refugees has not been equally framed by the government and media. One group is 
considered as “less deserving” than the other. Refugees who arrive to Canada through a 
resettlement program are seen as “good” refugees who wait patiently to be resettled, while in-land 
refugee claimants are usually considered as queue jumpers who might not deserve to settle in 
Canadian territory (Reynolds, et. al., 2014). 
Lacroix (2004:147) notes that regardless of their status and individual circumstances “the 
experience of refugees transcends national origins and boundaries … the experience of being a 
refugee is defined as universal to those who experience it. It is universal in that the crossing of 
borders and uprootedness is shared by all who are forced out their countries as such constitutes an 
irreversible element in the construction of their present subjectivity”. Thus, although they are 
categorized within different labels; borders, immigration systems and measures of control are 
embodied by all who are forced to flee their countries and who face in any way measures to control 
of migration.  
Lacroix’s argument on the experience of refugee as being universal, does not intend to 
obscure the differences between personal stories of refugees.  She, in fact, explains that rape, 
torture and culturally-specific practices are components specifically related to gender and that 
these differences should not be neglected. Nevertheless, she explains that common unifiers and 
similarities emerge forceful among refugees after experiencing forced displacement, uprootedness 
and encounters with a range of political institutions. She argues that the conceptualization of 
refugeeness is useful in understanding this particular subjective [refugee] experience shared by 
many. I draw on Lacroix’s argument to argue that there should not be a discourse and policies that 
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allow delineations between a “real refugee” and an “undeserving refugee”, as there is one refugee-
specific experience through which their refugeeness will be lived, created and experienced in 
different ways.  
An individual fleeing persecution and making a claim inside Canada only becomes a 
refugee claimant when confronted with a refugee determination system that was established by the 
state. Their refugeeness is in question during the entire process while they consistently try to collect 
every evidence to prove their cases. Although many fleeing their countries of origin are considered 
as persons in refugee-like situations, the attribution of refugee status depends on the issuance of a 
document that proves that identity: a Refugee Protection Claimant Document (RPCD) given after 
their claim is referred to the IRB.  
While the refugee determination process takes place, the procedure seems to be reversed. 
Instead of having access to the rights they are entitled by virtue of being refugees, these become 
limited and their bodies become less deserving entities as they are treated as a lesser category in 
the legal status spectrum: refugee claimants. In this sense, as Vigil and Baillie (2018) mentions 
“identity formation is as much as a process as it is something that it is given”. Thus, their identities 
are being impacted by who they are but also by the categorizations imposed to them by others. 
Through this chapter, I argue that by giving refugees a label, which suggests a lesser category in 
the legal scale of immigration, their struggles increase and, therefore, their options to create and 
live their refugeeness in a constructive way is occluded.  
The Refugee Claimant Protection Document shows that asylum seekers are eligible for a 
protection hearing. Although their refugeeness will still be questioned for months before their 
hearing, this document allows refugee claimants to legally exist and become recognized 
individuals among the Canadian society. Immigration documents only exist in a specific social 
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relation to the person to whom they belong, as they are linked to their identities. The RCPD can 
give people access to certain limited benefits; nonetheless it is also a reminder that the individual 
is only a client of Canada’s Refugee Protection system and that they are still not considered a 
permanent resident. In this regard, Suerbaum (2018) argues that trying to get these documents can 
cause fear, uncertainty and nervousness among refugee claimants, particularly when these are 
absent or useless. For example, the absence of a RCPD is common among those refugees who 
crossed irregularly and decided to wait to make an asylum claim. Although only one of my 
participants, who crossed irregularly, decided to wait to make their refugee claim, I heard of many 
cases similar to this during my volunteer hours. Some people fear that by admitting their intentions 
to ask for refuge at the border, they will be at greater risk of being deported. Moreover, many 
refugee claimants tend to wait to make claims because they want to understand the process first or 
access an organization who can help them. Nonetheless, this will only hinder their rapid access to 
services. Carlos, who arrived in Ontario through secondary migration, explains why he and his 
wife decided to wait to make their claim: 
We went to an immigration office only after a month of our arrival, although we arrived in 
a shelter after fifteen days of crossings. We took advantage of the time, we researched on 
the internet which provinces were a good option…that’s when I realized that in Alberta, 
we would not have the option to study. We researched and made the decision of coming 
here (Ontario). When we arrived, a case worker helped us with the process, she took us to 
Niagara to make our claim (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019).  
In previous chapters, I have discussed how having refugee claimant status in Canada limits 
claimants to access full asylum rights. In this section, I show how their subjectivity as refugees is 
being formed since they made the decision to leave their countries of origin. However, although 
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they have the attributes of a refugee, they have yet to prove it to an administrative tribunal. All the 
struggles and experiences they have to endure by making a claim have an impact on their identities. 
In this section, following Hadjiyanni’s identity paradigm, I aim to demonstrate how throughout 
their experiences, their own subjectivity is changing and, therefore, their refugeeness is becoming 
more evident as they face several challenges. Through the following sections I aim to demonstrate 
that there is an important relationship between identity, states’ labels and access to services. 
Although refugees’ identities differ from the labels they are subjected to, these categorizations 
define the extent to which they access certain rights and services, impacting their entire settlement 
experience. As the state is who provides and/or facilitate these services (e.g., through programs 
and funding to civil organizations), their own labels are also the ticket that will determine who can 
have full access to health, housing, and legal services.  
The construction of their refugee identity is active and dynamic and is often related to the 
process of adjustment at the different stages of the refugee experience. I will take three particular 
settings of the refugee claimant experience to demonstrate this: the moment of leaving countries 
of origin, the moment of crossing the border and the moment of waiting for the decision. These 
experiences are relevant as they differ from the other Canadian categorization of refugees –
resettled refugees– which is often considered as the more valid way to make a claim. Thus, 
refugeeness is created, lived, and experienced differently between these two groups of refugees. 
This is relevant as it exposes a conflicting discourse about Canada as a welcoming nation: 





The moment of leaving their countries of origin 
 
My participants often tried to make sense of why they came to Canada during the 
interviews. Although I tried to avoid direct questioning on the reasons they fled their home 
countries, they often started their stories by explaining the political situation in their countries and 
the precarity of security for their families and themselves. The reasoning they made seemed to act 
as justifications of why they were in Ontario asking for asylum. Although they knew I was a 
doctoral researcher and that the information that they shared would not affect their refugee 
determination process, they felt the need to explain their situations.  
The process of becoming a refugee starts with being forced out of their country for 
unforeseen conditions. Based on my participants’ stories, their decisions to leave their places of 
origin did not came easily as all of them described a strong attachment to their countries and 
families who stayed there. Although some of them had been already domestically fleeing for some 
time, the realization of having to leave their home country came as a difficult choice to make.  
Most of these people came to Canada with a sense of uncertainty and fear of how the process 
would work for them. Contrary to what resettled refugees experience as they have an official status 
upon arrival, claimants do not know what to expect when crossing the border.  
For refugee claimants, the decision to take a plane and leave their countries, often arrives 
at times when they are under a lot of stress since they are facing dangerous circumstances. This 
promptness of departure can lead to a more profound sense of rupture between their old and new 
lives. In contrast, resettled refugees carry out a sponsorship process months or years in advance 
before they could depart to Canada. They are also already living outside their places of origin; 
thus, they already have a sense of assimilation of being away from their home countries. Although 
resettled refugees also experience traumatic events, they have a more secure perspective of the 
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future and travel in much better conditions after they are approved to arrive to Canada; whereas 
for refugee claimants the uncertainty remains for longer periods of time. Moreover, migrating 
under unregulated conditions can cause an additional distress as claimants can face traumatic 
experiences in their journeys and during initial settlement. In a study conducted in Germany, 
Kleiner et. Al. (2019) concluded that refugee claimants presented mental and behavioural disorders 
nine times more often than resettled refugees. 
For refugees, leaving their countries of origin also means leaving their old life. This means 
big sacrifices, not only material but also personal and emotional as well. As Vigil and Baillie 
(2018) explain, becoming a refugee feels as a forced settlement as there is no way of going back. 
The sense of leaving what they have built in their countries was explained by Patricia:  
The language, arriving to a place where you do not know anyone, start from nothing when 
you already have a life in your country, leaving what you have built and worked in all these 
years. It is not easy to start from nothing (Interview with refugee, Toronto, June 26, 2019). 
Through her statement, Patricia is showing that leaving implicates a moment of rupture of who she 
was in her country of origin and that she must leave everything behind to start the process of 
becoming a refugee.   
On the other hand, one of the biggest concerns of Nadia was to find a job similar to what 
she was doing in her country of origin. She mentions: 
I am a high skilled worker.  There should be in Canada a “bridge” to make you fit into your 
skill immediately, but what will happen is that because I need to survive, I will look for 
any job. There should be kind of a bridge, to say ‘this is what you were doing before, now 
how can we help you to support your skills?’ (Interview with refugee claimant, June 25, 
2019)  
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The job she practiced in Africa is an element at the core of her identity. When mentioning that she 
is a high-skilled worker, she says it with pride; therefore, the fact that this part of her life is not 
being recognized in Canada impacts her sense of self-identity and has potential repercussions on 
her integration process. Being a refugee claimant often means that people would be on welfare for 
a certain period of time before they get a job permit; and even when they get it, it is difficult for 
them to get a job that matches their field and/or professional skills while they do not have status. 
Thus, while she is waiting for the refugee decision, her skills are not valued. She is considered as 
a “person on welfare” instead of a “contributing members of the society”. All people that I 
interviewed expressed the need to become contributing members of the society and knew that, 
realistically, they would not find jobs in their field, which is very common among asylum-seekers 
in various contexts.  
Becoming a refugee implies rupture and separation; however, it also means an 
intensification of emotional ties to what they left behind. Although their identities are evolving as 
they are becoming refugees, a sense of yearning and nostalgia will always accompany them. 
Moreover, thinking of home often becomes a source of worrisome and anguish as they are 
uncertain of the wellbeing of their loved ones. Some of my participants expressed that they were 
worried for their family, as Martha mentioned:  
We are fine here but we do not know how my family are back in my country…as a way to 
threaten us, some people are still watching my mom’s house, my mom had to took action 
and installed cameras and an electric fence, she paid for a security service, and avoids going 
to public spaces. She does this so people cannot ask her where I went (Interview with 
refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019). 
Nadia also mentioned the emotional challenge of leaving your family behind:  
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I cannot visit. It is a huge limitation, I cannot visit my family and I do not know if my 
family can come here, because you cannot depend on the government and then have 
someone visit. It is an emotional thing (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, June 25, 
2019). 
Although these emotional ties become stronger with distance, their former roles within their 
families also become altered. For claimants that left their families behind this means that they had 
to stop being the main provider or protector of their children or parents. Making a claim in Canada 
forces them to adapt their role and membership to their own family. Thus, their identity in regard 
to family relations also changes after crossing the border.   
 
The moment of crossing the border  
 
The first contacts with the state authorities for refugee claimants often happen at the border 
or at an inland immigration office. This is a crucial moment for refugee claimants as they often 
experience these encounters with anxiety, apprehension and uneasiness. At that moment, they 
already had left their countries, abandoned their home and job, and spent a considerable amount 
of money on plane tickets for them and their families. Thus, there is not an easy way of going back. 
This is also a crucial moment as “it is at this moment that the refugee determination process begins 
and forces the realization of the contradiction between considering themselves to be refugees and 
having to prove it.” (Lacroix, 2004). Thus, this initial contact will be a decisive moment as they 
will now have to live officially as refugee claimants or, in other words, as clients of the Canadian 
refugee system.  
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During my interviews, all of my participants agreed that even though it was “easy” for 
them to cross the border and make a claim, they experienced certain negative emotions during the 
process due to uncertainty. When I asked about their experience at the border, Patricia mentioned: 
It is terrible, you feel so much fear. I did not know what making a refugee claim implied, I 
was just fleeing my country to ensure the security of my family. I just arrived here but I was 
not sure to what I would face. If I were alone, it would be easier, but when you have children 
you do not want them to experience something difficult. I arrived at the border looking for 
peace and tranquility, but you arrive and start facing more barriers and challenges. The 
officials were questioning us, and when one left another entered the room to keep asking us 
things. I was not relaxed, I was afraid they would reject us. I was asking myself ‘what would 
I do? Where would I go?’ (Interview with refugee, Toronto, June 26, 2019). 
At the border, refugee claimants also face a more blatant criminalization as they are often 
arrested or threatened with detention, as Camila explains: 
At the beginning they told us ‘do not cross, we are going to arrest you’ but we had already 
decided to cross. Five officials were standing with their firearms, so we felt very anxious, then 
I told an official that we needed to cross because we wanted to make a refugee claim. After 
that, they indicated us where we could do that, they took our luggage and put it through the 
scanner machine. Meanwhile, other officials were already questioning us about everything, 
including the reasons why we left our country (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, May 
25, 2019). 
The encounter with Canadian officials, the questioning and other struggles that they 
experience at the border are part of the process of becoming a refugee. That moment is when the 
reality of leaving their old subjectivity behind becomes more evident. Moreover, when they are 
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allowed to make their claim, they get a tangible document, the RCPD, that proves that their new 
lives are starting and that they have to learn how to behave in this new environment. However, this 
not only happens in an official way, through the filing of their application; but also, in a personal 
manner as they have to embody the implications of this new identity.  
Their categorization in the Canadian system as a refugee claimant is limiting as this process 
includes proving that they deserve to be treated as and considered a refugee. The refugee identity 
is something that they are forming and producing throughout their struggles; however, their 
identity as refugee claimant is something imposed by the Canadian system.  This label will equally 
have a repercussion in their lives as much as their refugee identity. For example, due to their status, 
they will have access to limited rights and services while they wait for their refugee decision.  
 
The moment of waiting for their refugee decision: pausing and negotiating  
 
One of the factors that makes claimants’ experiences more difficult is uncertainty. Several 
scholars have studied how waiting for the refugee decision is one of the most painful periods that 
claimants have to endure, which also causes important delays in economic and social integration 
(Conlon, 2011; Bissell, 2007; Hainmueller, et. al., 2016, Hvidtfeldt, et. al., 2018). This aspect 
becomes a pervasive factor in their lives that dictates to what extent they can start or continue with 
the settlement process. As some participants mentioned, starting over is challenging but not 
knowing if you are allowed do it is more difficult.  
As mentioned in previous chapters the waiting times to get an audience were extended 
considerably after 2017 due to the increase in arrivals. A few of my participants expressed that 
their refugee hearings were cancelled and re-scheduled. For example, when I met David, he had 
already waited a year for his hearing. When he wrote a letter to the IRB to ask about the status of 
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their claim, they mentioned that the hearing had been rescheduled due to “logistics and a limited 
number of judges”.  
 Waiting for something to happen can be disempowering as lives are put on hold. Claimants 
are not certain of their refugee resolution and there is a possibility of getting a denial of their claim, 
which means that they can face imminent deportation. As Haas (2017) mentions, the status of 
refugee claimants simultaneously represents the potential for security and the potential for 
expulsion. Moreover, being a refugee claimant means a constant scrutiny from the state to 
corroborate the information they gave, which is based on their life story. Thus, their lives are not 
only suspended in limbo, but invaded as well.  
Although refugee claimants are offered some services and can access legal protection as 
their refugee claims are processed, claimants expressed the need to start their lives and become 
contributing members of the community. However, they have little to no control over this situation. 
They are often embedded in an “institutionalized process of subjectification” (Haas, 2017), where 
their identities would be accepted as a true refugee or a bogus refugee, yet they have little to none 
ability to define their positionality in the meantime. For example, most of my participants 
mentioned that they did not know or understand why there were delays in their cases, and 
particularly in their job permit applications.  
Nonetheless, even though waiting sometimes is seen as passive, refugee claimants often 
find ways to be productive either by preparing their cases or starting their settlement process. As 
unpredictability plays a role in their hearings’ schedules, claimants must have their cases and 
prepare beforehand. This implies several appointments with lawyers, filling out forms, asking for 
documents to their home country agencies, looking for translation services, and meetings with case 
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workers. Even when they are uncertain on when their hearing will be scheduled, they have to be 
prepared, as one of the service providers in Toronto, mentions: 
People ask, ‘when will my hearing be scheduled?’ and we cannot give them an answer. 
Just because we don’t know, it’s unpredictable. But it’s good for them to be ready well 
before that, because theirs could be scheduled right away, right? So that’s kind of how you 
do it. But overall, the delays are very difficult to manage because until they have that 
hearing and they get that decision they are not sure if they are going to be able to stay, so 
it causes a lot of stress, it impacts other areas of their settlement as well. It delays family 
reunification if they have spouses or children that they want to bring over (Interview with 
refugee center director, Toronto, July 5, 2019). 
This participant describes how difficult it is for service providers to give a definite timeline to 
refugee claimants. He talks about the uncertainty of the process and how unsettling this can be for 
them. They start preparing for an audience that might take months or years, as they are subjects to 
changes and delays. Not having a clear date for this important step of their process can become a 
problem as they do not know how long they have to gather evidence and recover documents, some 
of these mailed from their home countries. Waiting for so long can also have important effects on 
their personal and familiar relations. For example, family reunification can be on hold for months 
or years as they are still waiting for their decision.  
Beyond being forced to leave their home country, becoming a refugee implies a series of 
struggles and waiting moments that people must experience. It means being vulnerable and 
performing that vulnerability in order to receive protection; however, it also means being resilient 
to face the adversities on the process. In particular, for refugee claimants, their new identity as 
refugees is developing while they wait under uncertainty, while simultaneously gathering 
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documents to prove they fall under the “refugee” categorization of the state. These struggles make 
them more resilient while their own identity as refugees starts to solidify. This process of identity 
formation cannot wait until the state provides them recognition as refugees; it is inherent of the 
space they are living in and the events they are experiencing at that space and time.  
  
Power relations in the settlement process: unwelcoming refugee claimants   
The previous section explained how an individual, whose refugee identity is becoming 
more evident through their experiences, is exclusively recognized as refugee claimant when 
confronted with labels imposed by the Canadian government. This section aims to show how the 
state implements bordering policies intended to destabilize their lives even more, by making them 
feel unwelcomed rather than ‘deserving’ refugees. I will particularly focus on the impact of 
Canadian policy in claimants’ lives. By doing this, I aim to demonstrate that the local scale is 
relevant to understand relations of power in migration studies. 
In this section I argue that there are concealed power structures that impact the settlement 
experiences of refugee claimants. These bordering policies are concealed by the Canadian 
government to still show a humanitarian image while limiting in relevant ways refugee claimants’ 
settlement experiences as well as their refugee determination process. More importantly, the 
concealment of these practices was effective under refugees’ perspectives as they did not 
completely understand the implications of these policies in their lives. For example, they were not 
aware how provincial cuts increased their vulnerability and precarity while waiting for their 
decision. Contrary, most of my participants felt that they were treated fairly and righteously in 
Canada. As Patricia mentions: 
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Canada is a great country that welcomed us when we needed it the most. This change has 
favoured our children. In our country, they were not experiencing this, we moved a lot and 
we did not have the chance to send them to school, we could not offer them stability. 
Arriving here was great for us! (Interview with refugee claimant, Toronto, June 26, 2019) 
Refugee claimants felt relieved to be in Canada. They considered it a place where they could access 
services and support for their basic needs. Nonetheless, they were immersed in a system which 
was not built to support a large number of people awaiting refugee claim decisions at the same 
time. As mentioned previously, this is demonstrated through the lack of government programs 
specific to refugee claimants, limitation on funding for this group of people, provincial cuts, and 
lack of real solutions in settlement areas, like housing and the shelter system. Thus, this system 
was not built to provide refugee claimants arriving spontaneously at the border, full access to 
Canada’s humanitarian protection.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, access to initial shelter and affordable housing were issues for 
vulnerable populations and different types of immigrants. However, refugee claimants have a 
much more difficult pathway to housing due to financial constraints, landlords’ discrimination and 
limitations due to legal status. Not being able to access shelter and housing is an important 
constraint in claimants’ settlement; this section will focus on other restrictive policies and practices 
carried out by the government of Ontario.  
In 2019, the government of Ontario announced a series of budget cuts that would affect 
low-income families, including refugee claimants. First, during the Spring of 2019, the Ontario 
government cut funding to Legal Aid Ontario by 30%, removing $133 million from the Agency’s 
budget (Tumilty, 2019). The province also mentioned that the organizations could no longer use 
provincial funds for refugee and immigration cases. This was done in a year when the number of 
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RCMP interceptions were still high and there were still more than 87, 270 claims pending decision 
(IRB, 2020b). The threat to budget cuts by the Ontario government also represented a way to force 
Ottawa to cover the full costs for refugee and immigration legal aid services for cases proceeding 
to federal tribunals (Tumilty, 2019). For example, before the cuts, the annual cost of helping 
refugees was about $45 million per year, of which the Federal government only contributed $16 
million (Corrigan, et. al., 2019). Before the implementation of these cuts the provincial 
government had called repeatedly on the federal government to cover full costs of some refugee 
claimants’ services. 
Legal aid in Canada has not always been considered a priority for refugee claims processes. 
Also, although the refugee determination system is under federal jurisdiction, Provinces were left 
with the responsibility of providing legal aid without always ensuring adequate funding. For 
example, in some provinces like Manitoba, the provincial government did not have a budget for 
claimants’ cases in 2006 (Crepeau and Nakache, 2006). 
Reductions in legal aid were implemented previously in other countries as a way to control 
migrants and as deterrent measures. For example, in Australia, legal aid had been cut substantially 
after 2000 as the federal government reduced instances in which legal aid could be granted: 1) 
when there are differences of judicial opinion that have not been settled in court and 2) the 
proceedings seek to challenge lawfulness of detention (Parliament of Australia, 2004). On the other 
hand, in 2004 the UK implemented new arrangements for legal work and asylum matters with the 
objective of reducing spending. The rationale was that lawyers were carrying out unnecessary 
work on the cases of people who were not going to win the right to remain in the UK (Crépeau 
and Nakache, 2006). 
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On the other hand, in Canada, in 2019 the provincial government also announced a funding 
cut to the Transitional Child Benefit (TCB) program that particularly helps low-income families. 
This benefit provides up to $230 a month for low-income families that are not receiving other child 
benefits. Although this cut affected several families, refugee claimants were particularly affected 
by this since they are not eligible to receive any other benefits for their children due to immigration 
status. The TCB budget was planned to be cut on November 1st of 2019; however, the government 
backed out of this decision. The Minister of Children and Women’s issues, Jill Dunlop, announced 
in the fall that funding levels would be maintained to ensure funding for child protecting agencies 
(Jeffords, 2019). Although this budget was not cut, the fact that this discussion arose in the 
province shows the low priority of low-income families, and particularly refugee claimants, in 
Ontario.  
This is not the first time that the government implemented policies that affect refugee 
claimants directly. For example, in 2012 the Interim Federal Health Program was revised to, 
according to the government, preserve the integrity of the Canada’s refugee determination system 
as well as ensure fairness and contain financial costs. The changes in the program included 
restricting access to essential healthcare coverage to refugee claimants. This would deter potential 
asylum seekers from making claims within the country and force those already in Canada to leave 
more quickly (Connoy, 2018).  
The 2019 proposition to eliminate the TCB and the reduction in budget in legal aid would 
cause a domino effect in the settlement of refugee claimants and the offering of services by service 
providers. Families would be put in a difficult position of choosing whether to pay the rent or 
purchase food for their families. They would have a more difficult time finding affordable housing 
with a low assistance rate; they would be forced to depend more on shelters, food banks and other 
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social supports. Moreover, many families would be at increased risk of exploitation by employers 
and landlords as they would be forced to stay in houses and jobs that are unsafe for them (The 
Ontario Coalition of Service Providers for Refugee Claimants, 2019). Thus, through these policies 
refugee claimants are being put at severe risk of poverty and homelessness.  
The establishment of these policies, which directly affect refugee claimants, serves to 
regulate movements and access to services and rights. The capacity of the state to control them is 
deemed necessary, as claimants demonstrated to have a “dangerous” type of agency when they did 
not follow the “regulated refugee pathway”. After arrival, their presence became a problem as they 
did not take an official channel to reach the country. In her work, Connoy (2018) argues that the 
problematization of refugee claimants’ presence can be explored through the lens of 
irregularization. Due to their status, their presence in Canada is often questioned, deemed as 
abnormal, out of place or irregular.  
 
Cutting legal aid in Ontario 
 Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) is responsible for providing legal services to low-income 
Ontarians in different branches of law (e.g., family law, criminal law, mental health law, clinic law 
and refugee and immigration law). According to their mandate, LAO promotes access to justice 
for low-income Ontarians by providing high quality legal aid services, encouraging the innovation 
in the provision of legal services, and identifying and assessing the diverse legal needs of low-
income Ontarians. They provide services through a corporation that operates independently from 
the Government of Ontario, but that is accountable to the Ontario Government for the expenditure 
of public funds (Legal Aid Ontario, n.d.).  
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In particular, refugee claimants are able to get legal aid through community legal clinics or 
Legal Aid certificates issued to individuals who have private-sector refugee lawyers and who, in 
turn, bill LAO for legal services provided.  The number of certificates issued for immigration and 
refugee law had been increased steadily since 2014, from 6,444 in the 2014-2015 fiscal year to 
16,181 in 2018-2019 (Legal Aid Ontario, 2019). Before the cuts, LAO budget included the 
payment of several services that refugees and refugee claimants may need, such as filling in forms 
sent to IRCC (including the Basis of Claim)15, representation of refugees at their hearing, 
preparation of written appeals to the Refugee Appeal Division, preparation of motions to delay an 
order of removal, and representation of refugee claimants at the RPD if their status as Convention 
refugee or protected is threatened to be removed.  
Although, at the moment of research, the LAO website still mentioned that they may pay 
for the services mentioned above, in a written communication with an immigration lawyer, he 
explained that “Legal Aid Ontario is currently only issuing 7-hour certificates to cover BOC 
preparation. There is no certificate funding for evidence disclosure, hearing preparation, and 
hearing time. There is also no certificate funding for any other immigration or refugee processes” 
(Immigration lawyer in Toronto, personal communication, July 22, 2019). 
For a refugee claimant preparing their claim, the 7-hour certificate that LAO pays mainly 
covers the preparation of initial documents. As mentioned previously, in my volunteer hours as a 
translator, we worked with a family to prepare their BOC and other initial documents, which took 
four meetings of at least two hours to merely complete their narrative16. The fact that I, a volunteer, 
 
15 The Basis of Claim (BoC) is a key form that must be filled in by refugee claimants and submitted to the IRB. 
In the form, the claimant will give details about themselves and their lives and the reasons why they need 
protection in Canada. It is used to determine if claimants have a valid claim. 
16 During these sessions, the lawyer listened for the first time the entire claimants’ case and documented it. The 
narrative included their story of persecution until they arrived in Canada.  
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and not a certified translator was doing this job increased the time of the meetings. However, it 
was not possible to get a certified translator anymore due to the budgetary cuts.  
 Legal Aid is a vital service not only for giving the opportunity to low-income Ontarians to 
access these services, but to have a functioning justice system and promote equality in the society. 
According to Brewin and Govender (2010), ensuring that low-income people have adequate legal 
representation have positive effects in the civil society. Unresolved cases can result in future issues 
like social problems, poor health, increased reliance on social assistance, unemployment and 
domestic violence. Therefore, the consequences are costly for the entire society. In their work, 
these authors argue that cuts in legal aid may save money in the very short term; however, the 
costs will be higher in the long term. For example, cases in which the parties lack legal 
representation are more likely to go to trial, which, in turn, is more costly for taxpayers. 
Another consequence of decreasing the budget is that many experienced lawyers will no 
longer be willing to act for legal aid clients and less experienced lawyers in the area would fill in 
these spaces.  A study published by the Canadian Department of Justice in 2016 showed that in 
Quebec less experienced lawyers were more willing to represent claimants on legal aid. They also 
demonstrated that often they took on an excessive number of legal aid mandates, which, in turn 
affected the quality of representation.   
While the cuts affect all Ontarians, they have a significant impact on refugee claimants. 
For newcomers, access to legal aid is particularly crucial as they are facing a new system within 
an unknown legal framework for them. People arriving in Canada have rights to make an asylum 
claim; however, as Brewin and Govender (2010: 6) mention, “without access to the means of 
enforcing one’s legal rights, those rights are meaningless”. Refugee claimants are amongst the 
most vulnerable as they do not have the ability to represent themselves, they often do not speak 
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English and, most of the time, are traumatized. Forcing them to face a complex system without 
proper legal guidance goes against the Canadian humanitarian discourse. As a service provider in 
Toronto explains:  
Legal cuts are very worrisome just because it is access to justice. And our concern 
ultimately with that is that refugee claimants who are in need of protection are going to be 
denied that protection because they did not have access to proper representation. It is not a 
realistic expectation for vulnerable refugees to be able to represent themselves in a 
complicated process like this. And if you’re going to force them to do that, then their access 
to justice is going to be compromised, so that is a huge concern for us (Interview with 
refugee center director, Toronto, July 9, 2019) . 
 The budget cuts to LAO meant that refugees would be no longer covered by legal aid for 
appeals and federal cuts reviews of negative decisions, as well as allegedly wrongful asylum and 
deportation decisions. This is problematic as the chances of negative decisions increase when 
claimants do not have access to appropriate legal representation in the first place. Authors like 
Barutciski (2012) and Rehaag (2011), have demonstrated that counsel is a key factor driving 
successful outcomes. When refugees do not have appropriate legal representation and get a 
negative outcome, they may face life-threatening conditions after deportation. Other consequences 
of LAO budget cuts include claimants choosing to stay in Ontario without legal status due to 
serious fear of returning to home countries, exploitation of claimants as they look for other ways 
to pay for counsel, and increase in administrative delays and backlogs (Keung, 2019). 
 Contrary to other type of newcomers, refugee claimants often arrive with limited financial 
resources. Most of my participants relied at some point on social assistance, and those who already 
had their hearings used legal aid. Those who were newly arrived were mainly worried about 
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lawyers’ fees after they heard about the changes in the Ontario budget. When I asked Martha which 
services could be improved for claimants, she mentioned:  
Legal aid. We have to pay for legal counselling so that is why we really need a job. We 
need to save money to pay him, but we do not know how much we are supposed to pay 
him because we have not talked to him yet (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, 
July 11, 2019).  
They were already in debt, and her husband was paying child support for other of his kid that 
stayed with in their home country. She continues: 
What worries me the most, is that he (Pablo) does not only have this kid and this new baby, 
but he has more children. He cannot work, he cannot send back child support money. I am 
worried that his ex-wife will get mad and decide to take legal action which can affect our 
chances of getting refuge here (Interview with refugee claimant, Fort Erie, July 11, 2019).  
Ontario is one of the provinces with the highest number of asylum claims, which in turn, 
may create budgetary and financial challenges. Even if these cuts were a form to pressure Ottawa 
to increase their budget for immigration and refugee legal cases, this decision was made at the 
expense of the lives of thousands of refugee claimants. Making things harder for refugee claimants 
became a practical option within a system that is already “kind of falling apart around claimants 
in many different ways”, as a service provider describes. Even though maintaining fair procedures 
for refugee claimants and purposely redirect government resources (Legal Aid) is a balancing act 
that not many western democracies achieve; by imposing these restrictions the lives of refugee 
claimants become collaterals to these decisions. In August of 2019, the federal government 
announced a one-time emergency funding to mitigate the crisis; however, this is still a temporal 
solution with no real long-term commitment for the program.  
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The Canadian refugee system is complex and nearly impossible to navigate without legal 
representation. Previous studies have demonstrated that the overall acceptance rate for 
underrepresented claimants is significantly lower than for represented claimants (Rehaag, 2011). 
Due to the complexity of the system, a report written for the UNHCR (2012) suggested procedural 
changes in the IRB for underrepresented claimants, such as simplifying and making all the 
procedures less onerous in the spirit of fairness. The objective is for refugee claimants to 
understand completely the matters that will affect their claims. This report even suggests that 
complex cases should not go without any legal counselling and asks the IRB to introduce a form 
of duty counsel. Thus, limiting the accessibility to legal representation in Ontario potentially will 
decrease the number of people getting refugee or permanent status and will affect the possibilities 
of bringing their families.  
The strategy of Ontario to block legal aid funding from being used for refugee and 
immigration cases sends a message to Canadian society and politics, that the province would not 
be entirely responsible for refugee claimants processes regardless of the consequences of this 
decision. Through this, Ontario intended to pressure Ottawa to resolve this situation, but without 
a real commitment to find a mutually agreeable solution (Schertzer and Paquet, 2019). Moreover, 
the strategy of arguing that refugee claimants fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
and not under theirs, problematizes refugee claimants’ existence in the province. Their presence is 
targeted and questioned, affecting their ability to make a claim; this, in turn, produces insecurity, 
vulnerability and anxiety in claimants’ lives (Connoy, 2018). This action contributes to the idea 
that claimants are “different”, and not always recognized, subjects within the context of 
humanitarian assistance and refugee protection. As they are considered refugees who did not 
waited outside Canada for resettlement, protection and services towards them can be easily 
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stripped away. This not only makes them feel unwelcomed but dehumanizes the entire refugee 
determination process.  
Carlos explained that they arrive to Ontario as they thought they would have more support 
than in other Provinces:  
We did research and concluded that it was more expensive for us to stay there (Alberta) 
and they (the government) do not help that much. The only strange issue that happened 
now is about legal services, the legal aid support that the government changed now. What 
they give you now are the first few hours so you could submit your claim. We were told 
that the next time we see the lawyer we will have to make a payment plan (Interview with 
refugee claimant, For Erie, July 11, 2019). 
Carlos and his family do not have employment income and are looking for an apartment after three 
months in a shelter. Having to consider the expense of paying a lawyer potentially forced them to 
stay longer periods of time in temporary accommodation in order to save for their legal 
representation. They also have other expenses to cover first as they went into debt in order to be 
able to travel by plane from their country of origin to the US, pay the cab to reach the Canadian 
border and then, other plane tickets from Alberta to Ontario.  
 Budgetary cuts became an unscrupulous strategy from the Conservative government of 
Ontario, to pressure Ottawa to cover refugee related expenses. This structural change in the system 
covertly pushed refugee claimants to a more vulnerable situation, increasing their chances to fall 
in a more financial precarious situation. The decision to make budget cuts causes a domino effect 
in all areas of settlement, as a service provider explains: 
Certainly, the legal aid cuts are very concerning, and they are creating a lot of chaos within 
the system, with families not being able to get legal representation and forward properly 
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making the refugee claims and getting representation or appeals. So, that is creating a big 
pressure and, I think, what people sometimes overlook is that that pressure translates to 
other areas of settlement, too. Because now what you have is a situation where if families 
do not have legal aid for a lawyer, they are forced to make a decision: Am I going to pay 
for a lawyer or am I going to pay my rent? It is going to impact poverty, homelessness, all 
of these different areas that are already a concern for the population (Interview with refugee 
center director, Toronto, July 5, 2019). 
Refugee claimants have to consider high rents costs in Ontario, in addition to wait longer to get a 
job permit which forces them to rely longer in social welfare. Cutting legal aid funding now poses 
another pressure to their situation as they will have to cover all their basic needs and the costly 
refugee claim process. Thus, they may have to make difficult decisions which involve prioritizing 
paying rent or other essential needs versus paying more hours to their lawyers to complete their 
claims. Thus, budgetary cuts not only impact all areas of settlement, but also opportunities to 
access a decent livelihood.   
 
Conclusion  
Refugee claimants represent one of the many categories of persons who seek refuge in 
Canada. The difference between them and resettled refugees is that they have yet to prove their 
refugeeness, and therefore, their fear, suffering and helplessness as these are characteristics 
expected from any refugee (Connoy, 2018). Due to how the Canadian refugee system works, 
anybody that arrives at Canada’s doors to make a claim is considered to be someone that is 
somehow doing something wrong and that may not deserve access to services provided in the 
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country. Thus, having limited programs and funding in services for refugee claimants is justified 
under this deceiving premise.  
This chapter aimed to demonstrate that even when refugee claimants’ refugeeness is 
constantly under scrutiny, their identity is changing by adapting their lives to all the challenges 
and struggles they face in looking for recognition. Thus, while the label of “refugee claimant” is 
given to them, and only classifies them as clients of the Canadian refugee system, their identity as 
refugees is constantly forming. All of these struggles particular to the refugee experience, such as 
facing persecution, proving it to an overseas or inland tribunal, leaving family and friends behind, 
having limited financial resource,  have an impact on their identities and their bodies. I explained 
this through the discussion of three of the most life-changing moments related to the refugee 
experience: leaving countries of origin, crossing the administrative border, and waiting for refugee 
claims decision.  
Although refugee claimants’ identities are shifting and adapting while they are in Canada, 
the government responses in 2019 implied practices that framed claimants as “not deserving” 
refugees. In this case, the Conservative government of Ontario made budgetary cuts in one of the 
most important areas of refugee services –legal aid– and made threats to implement further 
reductions. By taking this action, the Province demonstrated that the lives of refugee claimants 
were used as a “bargaining chip” to pressure Ottawa to fund more refugee and immigration legal 
matters. While this happens at the local scale, refugees were also used as bargaining chips in other 
bordering process at other scales. For example, at the national scale, Canada justified harsher 
policies towards irregular arrivals as a way to provide a sense of security for the Parliament and 
the electorate. However, they dismissed the sense of emergency in issues like settlement by not 
providing real and effective solutions in shelter and housing needs for this group of people. 
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Equally, Canada showed a welcoming and humanitarian position in the international arena, while 
putting refugee claimants in a vulnerable position through selectivity, neglect, financial cuts, and 
(un)provision once they arrive at their borders. Thus, they used refugees as a way to maintain their 
humanitarian position during a time when the US was evidently steering away from the refugee 
cause.  
 In this chapter I have argued that Canada uses refugee determination processes, based on 
colonial categorizations, as a barrier for refugees’ identities which consequently alters their 
realities and experiences.  Thus, Canada is actively imposing the invisible border in a more local 
and intimate space. Moreover, I argue that they are using concealed bordering tactics which puts 
at risk the well-being and lives of this group of people; for example, by cutting legal aid. Access 
to an adequate legal representation is imperative to increase the chances to get a positive decision; 
therefore, if they do not have access to financial aid their chances of protection diminish 
considerably. Additionally, the provincial government is putting the burden of paying high costs 
of legal representation to individuals who are already in social assistance (Ontario Works) and 
who often have to wait months before they could a job permit. My analysis aims to demonstrate 
empirically how the geopolitical decisions and bordering practices implemented at the national 







CHAPTER 7  
 Conclusions 
Canada’s attitude towards newcomers is often considered welcoming by the international 
community and, also domestically, by their own society. Canada has been a safe haven for many, 
including Chileans, Tibetans, and most recently Syrians; however, the current configuration of the 
asylum system is not conducive to include diverse types of refugees from different regions of the 
world. This concluding chapter aims to provide insights into the objectives of this dissertation. 
Specifically, its purpose is to shed light on the dynamics of Canadian bordering practices when 
they often act and perform as a humanitarian nation. This chapter also highlights the importance 
of the theoretical framework used throughout this thesis –humanitarianism, externalization, 
reverberations– and how this contributes to understandings of bordering work at different scales. 
The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the future of refugees in the region as a few geopolitical 
elements had changed since the end of field research; for example, the recent change of 
administration in the United States.  
My work examined the dynamics of Canadian bordering policies using a dichotomy of 
visible/invisible border.  I argue that Canada makes their border visible in times of crises to provide 
a sense of security for certain audiences; however, they often attempt to invisibilize their border 
to maintain a humanitarian image while still limiting refugee claimants’ mobility. These invisible 
bordering practices are carried out through neglect and (un)provision. The manner in which I 
approach these invisible bordering dynamics follows feminist geopolitics endeavours that 
scrutinize relations of power at different scales. At the regional level, I examined Canada’s lack of 
commitment to provide humanitarian relief in Central America and the (in)action to modify the 
STCA. At the national, I discussed the lack of resources and bureaucratic negligence of the 
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Canadian agency that facilitates protection and settlement to refugees (IRB). At the local, I 
analyzed  governmental neglect and lack of real solution for refugees’ settlement; and at the scale 
of the body, I studied the impacts of Canadian exclusionary practices in refugee claimants’ 
identities and experiences. While the dichotomy of the invisble/visible border aims to demonstrate 
how Canada’s government conceal the border for their own purposes; other dichotomies are also 
relevant to expand future endeavours of this study, for example, law/practice, action/neglect, or 
hidden/known. 
The application of Hiemstra’s concept of reverberations was also prominent throughout 
this thesis as it proved fitting to reveal bordering practices and power relations at different levels. 
In this light, reverberations is a useful and insightful concept as it captures and distills the effects 
and results of policy across geopolitical levels. Therefore, policy impacts in every stage of the 
refugee experience can be exposed. I took the concept of reverberations as a malleable element 
which allowed me not only to understand a result or a consequence of bordering policing (seeing 
forward), but also to trace back the causes of Canadian harsher policies. Understanding the catalyst 
and causes of bordering practices in Canada is useful to situate national and regional geopolitical 
policy that limits human mobility in North America. In this case, I explored the ways in which US 
policies reverberated in the Canadian refugee system.  
In the first chapters of this thesis, I used the reverberations concept to show that Canada is 
adapting policies as a result of more asylum seekers crossing their border, after changes in US 
policy. However, while I argue that Canada is often the subject of shifts in policy in the US and 
the conditions of mobility in North America, Canada’s policy also reverberates in US in matters 
of immigration, trade, and security (e.g. STCA). Considering that the US-Canada bilateralism links 
two industrialized countries, with a shared British colonial history and twentieth-century history 
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of economic interdependence and shared democratic norms (Golob, 2012), Canada also has power 
to shape relationships in matters of security and immigration. Thus, the idea of reverberations at a 
regional level can be further developed and expanded by understanding that Canada is not a simple 
receptor but a key player in delineating mobility and border enforcement in the region. Assessing 
how policy reverberations develop between countries will shed light into North American 
multilateral securitization against unwanted arrivals.  
Although the first chapters focused on the national scale and how policies reverberated 
from one country to another, this dynamic can also be observed at finer scales and other 
jurisdictions. Chapter 4 demonstrated that Canadian national responses reverberated at provincial 
and municipal scales, making it an issue of intergovernmental relations and cooperation. Provinces 
and municipalities faced the reverberations of the federal lack of rapid response and lack of 
previous preparedness for the arrival of unexpected asylum seekers at their borders. For example, 
provinces like Ontario and Quebec and municipalities like the City of Toronto, invested a large 
amount of funds to accommodate refugee claimants. In addition to the lack of clarity of roles, the 
complexity of the current intergovernmental relations in matters of immigration caused significant 
tensions between the different jurisdictions. As shown in Chapter 6, these tensions reverberated at 
even more local scales, as refugee claimants’ experiences and bodies were shaped by the limited 
ability of the three levels of government to cooperate to enhance this populations’ protection and 
well-being.  
The epistemological and empirical endeavours of this thesis draw on feminist and critical 
geopolitics to inquire about states’ responses and discourses to control mobility, localized impacts 
of immigration policy and shifts in identity paradigms that allow for new considerations of 
refugeeness. More broadly, this work opens up a discussion of how countries with unmilitarized 
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borders and with an outstanding reputation in matters of humanitarianism, utilize their bordering 
resources to stop unwanted arrivals. Throughout this thesis, I argue that Canadian strategies are 
part of what I call, the “invisible border”, which aims to conceal their restrictive practices that limit 
and deter asylum seekers. These practices obscure the unbalanced nature of the Canadian refugee 
system as their restrictiveness is not as evident as other theatrical bordering mechanisms. By 
looking at how unmilitarized borders work to stop mobility and by tracing the invisible, I aim to 
elucidate invisible processes that happen at visible militarized borders as well. Thus, I demonstrate 
that not only border walls or increase border patrolling are major impediments for human mobility, 
but that other invisible bordering elements have the same effects, such as failure to adapt to a 
humanitarian need or neglect towards domestic institutions that facilitate protection. In other 
countries, these invisible bordering practices can be encountered working jointly with other very 
visible and evident immigration policies.  
One of the salient issues in regard to Canada’s commitment to refugee protection is the 
nature of their humanitarian system; particularly, as one that excludes certain types of refugees. 
By using colonial categorizations, Canada is including anti-immigrant responses embedded in their 
humanitarian discourse and projected in asylum seekers. Thus, Canada, through these 
categorizations, reinforces the idea of a deserving type of refugee, whose mobility is only 
determined by the states’ decisions. This re-inscribes power geometries in which some people are 
more in charge of movement, while others are more in the receiving end and imprisoned by their 
own mobility (Massey, 1991). I showed that humanitarianism then takes another meaning as 
exclusion becomes part of the concept and interacts with refugee identities.  
Canada’s humanitarianism is selective and often legitimizes its own narratives of 
protection while dismissing the refugee experience. In Chapter 6, I showed how Canada maintains 
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colonial categorizations of refugees which limits access to services and also their formation and 
expression of their own identities. These categorizations between resettled refugees and refugee 
claimants builds on ideas embedded in securitized narratives of migration. Therefore, Canadian 
selectiveness towards refugees is closer to security practices instead of protection. Revealing the 
nuances of humanitarian discourses is key to understand how these projects also impact negatively 
refugee claimants, even when they had apparently accessed a fair refugee determination system. 
In this case, Canada’s support is contingent upon obedience and behaviour (e.g., helpless, victims) 
of refugees.  
Identity was also a prominent analytical element in this thesis. My work discusses how the 
“colonial” thinking on who refugees are supposed to become after displacement affects profoundly 
the identities of this group of people. Interviews with refugee claimants showed that they were 
trying to prove that they had the “correct” characteristics to be recognized as valid refugees; 
however, they felt conflicted in accepting and embodying this imposed construct. I was told several 
times that they did not want to be seen as victims and as a burden for Canadian society, while also 
trying to prove themselves as people in urgent need. Their own refugeeness, the one that they were 
building, shifting and transforming, was limited to this essentializing? framework. The empirical 
and epistemological findings of this work reveal that the concept of refugee can only be explored 
by changing our own perception of what the name refugee entails.  
States’ policies are embodied and often work to control the development of refugees’ 
identities in favour of states’ interests. In Canada, this is intertwined with a form of governance in 
which the state chooses and looks after those who fit their idea of refugee and leaves aside others 
that do not, such as inland claimants and irregular arrivals.  Through this selective exclusion on 
the basis of legal status, the colonial idea of the refugee is fostered and encouraged. It also 
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represents a re-assertion of Canada’s sovereignty. By imposing hierarchies of deservingness 
among refugees, they are rearticulating how humanitarian provisions should be offered and to 
whom. They are dictating how refugees should seek asylum if they want to access immediate 
and/or basic protection once they reach sovereign territory. This not only have important domestic 
implications, but it also reaffirms a strong international narrative that irregularizes people actively 
crossing borders and seeking asylum (see Connoy, 2018). 
My approach to reject colonial categorization of refugeeness draws on Hadjiyanni’s 
refugee identity paradigm –explained in Chapter 6– as it offers epistemological tools to understand 
broader implications of refugee identity. This new paradigm transcends any state-like 
characteristics that are given to this group of people and offers them the possibility of determining 
and controlling their own refugeeness. As shown in Chapter 6, refugee claimants face the border 
constantly and it is embodied through ways of understanding their own refugeeness. The situations 
and events they experience determine claimants’ sense of themselves as they go through 
individualized processes of adaptation and reconfiguration. This new paradigm proves useful in 
understanding the experience and identity formation process of refugees whose cases do not 
comply or are questioned to fit into the “official” label of refugee. Using this framework, I called 
attention to the restrictions of the current concept of refugee and how it limits the idea of offering 
human security for all.  
This project is also useful to understand how geopolitical lines at different scales are re-
asserted and re-drawn at the same time. The US-Canada border is broadly seen as less chaotic than 
other borders. However, it is still a place of contention for those seeking asylum through the inland 
program. Recent events at the border have shown that mobility and options for asylum seekers’ 
protection are often hindered. Canada’s interdiction system has been useful in limiting the access 
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of spontaneous arrivals for years. The geopolitical lines, thus, have been re-asserted through 
strategies of (in)actions, (un)provision and neglect, not only at the regional scale, without offering 
protection to Central Americans but also at the scale of the body, as Canada’s categorizations 
dismiss refugee claimants’ experiences and the identity formation processes. Traditionally, the 
Canadian government has succeeded in offshoring some of its responsibilities to asylum seekers 
to the US, particularly with the STCA. Nonetheless, more recent events at the border have also 
followed the same dynamics. The 2019 COVID pandemic had several implications in world 
politics, including restriction of human mobility and increased immigrant and refugee economic 
precarity and vulnerability. In North America, it caused negotiations between US and Canada to 
close their border to land crossings. More importantly, both countries agreed on asylum seekers to 
be sent back to US when caught crossing irregularly into Canada, with this practice functioning as 
a de facto expansion of the STCA (Rehaag, et. al., 2020). The implications of this agreement are 
still seen months after the border closure. For example, there were only 24 RMCP interceptions at 
the border in November of 2020 in Quebec- one of the most important border crossings for asylum 
seekers- compared to 1,086 in January of the same year (Government of Canada, 2020e). 
On the other hand, the spatialities and mobilities of refugee claimants’ crossing at the US-
Canada border, continue to shape and resist these same traditional geopolitical dynamics in the 
continent. Thus, they are also re-drawing the geopolitical lines established in North America. The 
flows of immigrants of 2017 demonstrated that asylum seekers are using more often non-
traditional routes and mechanism to arrive to Canadian territory. More importantly, they are 
looking at Canada as a first country of asylum; particularly, when the US makes their own policies 
more restrictive. Most of the times, for asylum seekers in the continent, Canada becomes the only 
option when looking for protection.  
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Using invisible bordering practices as a way to deter and prevent asylum seekers to reach 
Canadian territory, becomes more problematic as Canada’s humanitarianism is often rooted in a 
welcoming attitude towards people in need. I argue that Canada should change this geopolitical 
dynamic of border policing for two reasons: to be more inclusive in their refugee system and to 
avoid strains and backlogs in the resolution of asylum petitions and in their settlement system. 
Moreover, having the US –a country with a complex relation with refugee resettlement and 
irregular migrants– as their neighbour, Canada should expect the reverberations of their shifts in 
migration policy. Events like the one explored in this thesis demonstrates how policing can 
intensify without major policy change, simply by failing to adapt to a humanitarian need. Despite 
the need for more inclusivity, maintaining the current geopolitical situation in North America 
proves instrumental in reaffirming Canadian state power. The next section will highlight the 
contributions and lines of inquiry that this work opens.  
 
Research contributions  
The proposed contributions of this study changed along the way, as my analysis was further 
developed. In initial stages, I identified the absence of multi-scalar approaches to asylum policy 
and refugees’ experiences in Canada, with few exceptions (see Walton-Roberts, et. al., 2019). 
While my research aims to fill this gap, it also pays additional attention to issues related to the 
refugee identity and experience. The aim of this research was to produce empirical and 
comprehensive examination on how different scales intertwine in asylum policy. It sheds light on 
important theoretical underpinnings related to borders and immigration policies; however, its most 
constructive contribution comes with exploration of the “invisible” border policing dynamics and 
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its consequences in the intimate spaces of refugee claimants, including their own perception of 
refugeeness.  
This project is designed to bring attention to a nation-state often categorized as welcoming 
for immigrants: Canada. By exploring the dynamics of border policing in Canada, after a flow of 
asylum seekers arrive at their borders, this work extends empirically and conceptually literature in 
border studies, securitization and externalization. It sheds light on mechanisms and bordering 
strategies that countries with non-militarized borders use as a way to keep people out of their 
territories. It also offers important discussions on how we can conceive and perceive the politics 
of the invisible border. Invisible bordering practices are often perceived as mechanisms that are 
spread through a specific territory or that are externalized to offshore lands; for example, e-borders, 
third country agreements, etc. Therefore, this is border work which is not palpable for many but 
that actively impose limitations for some. Nonetheless, in this thesis, I demonstrate that the 
invisible border can be performed through inaction and unprovision. Thus, the invisible border is 
not only concealed but it is performed by not acting on a humanitarian need. This also contributes 
to the discussion of how territoriality and spatiality is conceived. Borders should not have to be 
rendered visible, knowledgeable and drawn upon a particular land, to be powerful.  
This study extends the concept of reverberations as it is used to trace back harsher Canadian 
immigration policies, but also to understand how these same practices reverberate forward in every 
stage of refugee claimants’ processes and experiences. Thus, Hiemstra’s (2012) concept of 
reverberation can be extended not only to study the impacts of immigration policy at immigrant 
countries of origin, but in other places at any other stage of the migrant experience. Looking at the 
reverberations it is necessary to make the invisible border visible again and understand where and 
how it precisely acts upon refugee claimants. This thesis shows the manifestations and implications 
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of Canadian “invisible” practices at places as intimate as refugees’ identities. More importantly, it 
expands how we critically engage with policy impacts in refugees’ lives. In this case, Canada not 
only used selective categorizations to provide access to services to one type of refugee; but their 
categorizations became restrictive in refugee claimants’ expression and formation of their own 
identity as refugees. 
Looking at these implications, this project questions one of the governing systems that 
define and shape migratory patterns and dynamics: humanitarianism.  While several scholars have 
demonstrated that exclusion is also part of humanitarian practices, this thesis extends empirically 
how humanitarian narratives impact refugees subjectivity highlighting exclusionary narratives. 
Moreover, by using categorizations based on colonial perspectives of refugees, Canada re-
articulates their humanitarian practices. Using these categorizations allows them to offer protection 
only to those who fit their description. Therefore, in their narrative, their humanitarian 
responsibility is fulfilled. This case study highlights how humanitarian practices follow a pattern 
which re-asserts the Canadian border, instead of withdrawing it for all refugees to access 
protection. In Canada, refugee claimants end up confronted with a system which limits their 
refugeeness and impede their internal self-actualization; however, they are still immersed in an 
official discourse in which Canada’s is open to refugees. This work is also relevant in 
understanding how the state relates to and interacts with the uprooted and into what extend they 
are willing to incorporate them in the society.  
This project points to the need for increasing knowledge regarding shared responsibility of 
refugee arrivals in North America, in lieu of exclusive unilateral duty from either the US or 
Canada.  Shared responsibility and cooperation at a regional level has been decreasing with post- 
9/11 securitization measures. Previous work by Garcia (2006) shows that one of the legacies of 
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the Central American refugee crisis in in the 80s was greater cooperation between Mexico, Canada 
and the US as important pieces of policy and international diplomacy came into effect. However, 
the challenges experienced by irregular and regular crossers at the US-Canada border in recent 
years demonstrated that the idea of a shared responsibility has been halted by interdiction and 
securitization practices, particularly the Safe Third Country Agreement. In this respect, Gilbert 
(2012) have discussed how the cooperation between Mexico, US and Canada has focused on 
bilateralism instead of trilateral cooperation and regional partnership, particularly after 2005. 
Following feminist geopolitics scholarship, this study expands empirically on the locality 
of politics and conflict and draws attention to discrepancies at different levels and instances aimed 
to help refugee claimants. My data demonstrated that having the Safe Third Country in place is an 
element of tension between the government and local practices of refugee support. As mentioned 
previously, the cooperation between the civil organizations, including the Canadian Council for 
Refugees, Amnesty International and the Canadian Council for Churches, made it possible to have 
the STCA ruled as unconstitutional by the Federal Court of Canada in July of 2020 (CCR, n.d.). 
Unfortunately, the Canadian government appealed that notion a few months later, resulting in the 
Federal Court of Appeal to temporarily suspend the Federal’s Court ruling. The results of this 
study, along with the refugee centers directors’ proposals highlighted in Chapter 5, show that more 
effective and systematic legislative and policy change is needed to reflect Canada’s true share of 
responsibility towards this population. 
 
Lines of inquiry  
Discussion of my research findings prompts several new lines of inquiry in the discipline, 
and in particular in refugee and migration studies. One of the aims of this thesis was to explore in 
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depth Canada’s responses and bordering practices towards an unexpected inflow of asylum 
seekers, and how their humanitarianism shifted according to the evolution of the events. The 
results of this study, focused on Canada’s practices that invisibilize the border and its implications 
at different scales. Considering humanitarianism as a framework for analysis was key in achieving 
the results obtained through field research and to understand Canada’s dynamics of border work. 
Nonetheless, my study aims to open up the discussion to further inquire Canadian humanitarianism 
and responsibility towards refugees.  
In her work Connoy (2018) argues that humanitarianism is often portrayed as the practice 
to alleviate suffering to some; however, it is also founded on difference and inequality. This project 
demonstrated that there are powerful concealed structures that Canada is maintaining to restrict 
the movement and access of some types of refugees. More knowledge and discussion in this area 
is necessary as a way to truly understand the underpinnings of how humanitarianism work in places 
internationally recognized as welcoming and open communities. Humanitarian responses and 
practices can create powerful structures that end up being counterproductive for refugees causing 
more vulnerability and insecurity.  
Following this epistemological line, it is important to explore how refugee claimants 
perceive these humanitarian practices themselves. My data showed that most refugee claimants 
were grateful for having access to certain services in Canada; however, their concern on 
accessibility was evident when more stricter policies were put in place, like Provincial cuts to legal 
aid. Work on humanitarianism has shown that this practice has evolved (Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015); 
however, it is equally important to determine how the perception of humanitarians from refugee 
claimants also shifts and the consequences of these evolutions. By doing this, researchers can 
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address how humanitarian practices, including social welfare, are embodied when they become 
counterproductive for some. 
On the other hand, this study inspires questions of refugee identity and refugeeness. 
Considering new ways of broadly conceptualizing what a refugee is, researchers empower those 
living the refugee experience instead of reproducing the authority of the categorizer. Work on 
labels and categorization of migrants has been vast (Zetter, 1991; Nyers, 2006; Scheel and Squire; 
2014); some have discussed how the creation of new categories, such as “humanitarian 
immigrants”, are used to contain mobility while asserting individuals’ victimhood (see Thomaz, 
2018). These new categories also have important consequences as they promote a benevolent 
international image of states while imposing limits in their settlement and development. This study 
shows how refugee subjectivity is impacted by these practices and discourses of categorization.  
My work also pushes scholars to consider new ways of understanding the dynamics of 
refugee identity and how it relates to processes of arrival and adaptation at different stages. It also 
shows how refugee identity is related to larger geopolitical contexts in which it becomes part of 
states’ practices of deterrence and securitization. Considering refugeeness as fluid and 
transformative, further work can explore the distinction and similarities in identity 
(trans)formation between refugee claimants and resettled refugees. Most current scholarship 
studies focus on the differentiations between these two groups in relation to access and limitations 
due to legal status. However, I consider it relevant to explore in depth questions such as: Do 
claimants and resettled refugees adopt differently the label of refugee? Is the uprooting process 
different to both groups, and what are the implications for their identities? What are the constitutive 
elements of the refugee identity? Moreover, I consider it important to ask what similarities unify 
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all refugees into a collective with a shared identity based on the struggle for protection, recognition 
and access to basic human rights. 
Finally, my approach to investigate these matters focused on the stories and experiences of 
refugee claimants. My work centered the voices of those experiencing uncertainty and 
vulnerability. Centering their voices becomes a promise that their stories will not get lost in the 
refugee determination process, which often generalizes and over-simplifies them. Using more 
grounded and feminist methodologies is a powerful tool to investigate issues of refugeeness and 




After my field research ended, two major events took place that changed the geopolitics of 
asylum seeking in North America. First, after a contentious election period, President Biden was 
elected in 2020 and assumed office in 2021. This provided a sense of relief and suggested a return 
to normalcy in US relations with Canada, particularly in issues pertaining to security, migration 
and economics. The second event was the 2019 COVID pandemic which dramatically reduced the 
number of border crossings at the US-Canada border and represented a period of immobility for 
many asylum seekers.  
On May, 4th of 2021, Biden announced that he would allow as many as 62,500 refugees to 
enter the US, changing the limits that Trump imposed years before at only 15,000 refugees (Shear 
and Kanno-Youngs, 2021). This decision came five months after he took office and following 
strong pressure from Democrats and refugee advocates. Increasing the resettlement cap was one 
of the first steps to expand refugee protection capacity in the US. Throughout this thesis, I 
demonstrate that refugee protection plans are complex and involve a series of resources and efforts 
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to reach an adequate infrastructure that supports every step of the refugee resettlement process. 
While Biden has demonstrated willingness to increase refugee admissions, his administration will 
have to deal with poor infrastructure that needs immediate attention and investment to ensure more 
refugee admissions. In this respect, in his statement, Biden (2021) mentioned “the sad truth is that 
we will not achieve 62,500 admissions this year. We are working quickly to undo the damage of 
the last four years. It will take some time, but that work is already underway.” 
While “undoing the damage” of the previous administration can be a challenge, Biden’s 
next steps will show how the US will manage its own invisible border. Will this be an opportunity 
to reassert American humanitarianism or to neglect the institutions that need support to ensure 
refugee arrival and settlement in the US? Biden’s administration would have to train more 
personnel, revive links and connections with international refugee organizations, and increase 
capacity and coordination with domestic resettlement agencies (Nezer and Rodriguez, 2021). More 
importantly, the Biden administration will have to manage the backlog of claims which was 
exacerbated during Trump’s administration due to an administrative slowdown.  
Currently, more than 386,000 asylum seekers are caught in asylum backlog (Ades, 2021), 
most of these people are enduring family separation, economic deprivation, and fear of 
deportation. As in Canada, this is a part of the invisible border in the US which has become a major 
impediment to human mobility. Of the many, anti-refugee policies instituted by the Trump’s 
administration, the backlog is not as visible as border family separations or as the Remain in 
Mexico policy; however, it represents an enormous obstacle for refugee protection inside and 
outside US territory. Biden is committed to “undo” the harsher and more evident policies of the 
previous administration; however, invisible bordering practices will still exist until deeper and 
more concrete steps are taken to improve the asylum system.  
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 On the other hand, COVID-19 halted the mobility of people due to a health risk which 
implicated spreading the virus. In particular, Canada and the US closed off their borders since 
March 2020 and later on, Canada suspended flights to and from particular countries (e.g. India, 
Pakistan, Mexico and the Caribbean). As any other event with geopolitical implications, this 
affected unequally vulnerable populations like asylum seekers. For example, refugees face 
exclusion and multiple barriers to health care and, in general, they are at greater risk of poor health 
outcomes. This vulnerability is exacerbated by poor living conditions and great economic 
precarity. In addition, many people within this population live, travel, and work in conditions 
where physical distancing and recommended hygiene measures are impossible to attain (Orcutt, 
et. al., 2020). The pandemic is having an unprecedented impact on mobility, including issues of 
border and migration management. Despite the public health rationale to extend protection 
measures and strategies to everyone to prevent ongoing transmission, many countries established 
emergency policies related with the securitization and protection of their nationals, leaving 
migrants to contend with devastating consequences.  
 The pandemic appears to reinforce the securitization trend, as it provides more means to 
justify the narrative of asylum seekers as threats to national well-being. While the virus has proven 
to be transnational, rapidly moving and spreading without discriminating against any group of 
people, borders have become more visible and less permeable. Moreover, it has changed how 
nation-states perceive issues of humanitarianism and membership while facing a major and 
unprecedented public health situation. In addition, border closures, such as those undertaken by 
Canada and the United States, reinforced a sense of solidarity among nationals but left unprotected 
the most basic rights of asylum claimants and irregular migrants (see Triandafyllidou, 2020). 
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 Issues like the global pandemic call into question larger, global issues of solidarity, 
responsibility and humanitarianism. The pandemic has proven necessary for humanity to work 
together to reduce the risks and impacts of world health related events. It also demonstrated that 
human health needs to be understood holistically. Nonetheless, states’ controls of mobility often 
disrupt this approach as they are explicitly hostile towards refugees and their healthcare needs, 
even before the pandemic started (see Connoy, 2018). Future research is needed to interrogate the 
complexities of inclusion and health care policies, as well as the reverberations of world health-
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In appreciation for your time, you will receive 
a free lunch or free coffee and pastries depending on the time of the day.  
For more information about this study, or to volunteer for this study,  
please contact: 
PhD candidate Mónica Romero 
Email: rome5530@mylaurier.ca 
Advisor: Dr. Alison Mountz 
  
This study has received Wilfrid Laurier University ethics clearance. 








Participants’ profile (refugee claimants) 
 
 Pseudonym Length of time in 
Canada at the 
time of the 
interview 
Mode of entry Place of 
residence 
1 Carlos 3 months Irregular arrival Fort Erie 
2 Pablo  2 months PoE Fort Erie 
3 Martha 2 months PoE Fort Erie 
4 Camila 7 months Irregular arrival Toronto 
5 Eduardo 7 months Irregular arrival Toronto 
6 Nadia 1 month and a half Irregular arrival Toronto 
7 Patricia 10 months PoE Toronto 
8 David ------ Irregular arrival Toronto 
9 Maria 2 years PoE Toronto 
10 Juan 3 years PoE Toronto 
11 Mario 1 month PoE Fort Erie 
 
 
Participants’ profile (refugee center workers and members of the government) 
 
 Pseudonym Position Type of 
organization 
Location 
1 Marcos Case worker Refugee center Toronto 
2 Aryanne Case worker Refugee centre Toronto 
3 Victoria Case worker Refugee center Toronto 
4 Melissa Volunteer Refugee center Toronto 
5 Jessica Director Refugee center Toronto 
6 Caroline Director Refugee center Toronto 
7 Victor Director Refugee center London 
8 Alicia Director Refugee Center Fort Erie 
9 Luisa Director Refugee Center Fort Erie 
10 Denisse Case worker Refugee Center Kitchener 
11 Hector Director Refugee Center Toronto 
12 Mariana Settlement 
worker 
Refugee Center Kitchener 
13 Silvya Director Refugee Center Kitchener 
14 Anahi Unit director Refugee Center Kitchener 
































































List of interview questions for members of the government 
1. What is your agency’s role in helping refugees and refugee claimants once they arrive to 
the province/city? 
2. What are the services/resources that your agency offers directly and indirectly for 
newcomers and refugees? Has your agency developed new resources and/or tools for 
supporting refugee claimants? 
3. How does your agency manage the spikes of refugee claimants in the province/city? 
4. What are the strategies that your agency has adopted to cope with the arrival of asylum 
seekers in the province/city? 
5. How would you characterize the relationship between the Federal government and the 
provincial/cities government agencies? What roles do they play, and how do their decisions 
on matters relating immigration impact your agency’s practices and capacities? 
6. Do you consider there to be gaps in the services provided to refugee claimants between the 
three levels of government?  
7. Do you believe changes to US immigration policies and practices impact Canadian official 
responses towards refugee claimants? How so?  
8. Could you describe some of the emergency strategies that this agency had to put in place 
during the last summer? In relation to accommodation, health services, and work permits 
(expedited processes)?  
9. Do you consider that the emergency strategies implemented are enough to support refugee 
claimants coming from the United States? 








List of interview questions for refugee centers’ directors and case workers 
1. What type of services does your center offer to refugees and refugee claimants? 
2. Could you describe how the process works when a refugee claimant seeks assistance from 
your organization? 
3. How is the refugee center experiencing the arrival of refugee claimants to the city? Tell me 
about the general situation during the last two years.  
4. Do you consider this situation unprecedented in Ontario? 
5. Could you tell me about the demographics of this group of refugees (age, gender, country 
of origin)? How have these changed over the last two years? 
6. How are these people arriving? What means are these people using to reach Canada? 
7. Do you consider that the political situation that is lived in the US has impacted the arrival 
of refugee claimants to Canada? 
8. Which type of help have you received from the federal and provincial government? And 
in which ways this impacts your capacity to offer adequate settlements services to 
immigrants? 
9. How do you think this affects the lives of refugees and refugee claimants? 
10. Do you know which are the Canadian responses towards the influx of immigrants during 
the last two years? Do you think they are appropriate? 
11. How do you think the future looks for your organization with the increase of asylum claims 
in the province? 
12. How do you think this situation consolidated Canada’s position in the region? Will it 








List of interview questions for refugees and refugee claimants 
1. How long have you been in Canada? 
2. What motivated to leave your country of origin? 
3. What were the main reasons that motivated you to ask for asylum in Canada and not other 
countries? 
4. How were you received? Are there any experiences (positives and negatives) that you 
would like to talk about in this interview? 
5. If you lived in the US previously to your arrival to Canada, how was your experience in 
the country? For how many years did you live in the US? 
6. If you stopped in the US before your arrival to Canada, how was your experience in the 
country? 
7. When did you decide to extend your migratory journey to Canada? 
8. Did the US current immigration policy have a role in your decision to leave the country? 
9. If it weren’t for the changes in immigration policy in the US after 2016, would you still be 
living there? 
10. By what means did you come to Canada and Ontario? 
11. What do you think of the settlement services offered to you during your time in Canada? 
12. Do you feel supported by the Canadian government and settlement agencies? 
13. Have you found any limitations in the country due to your immigration status? 
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